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Abstract
Reinforcement learning problems are often phrased in terms of Markov decision pro-
cesses (MDPs). In this thesis we go beyond MDPs and consider reinforcement learning
in environments that are non-Markovian, non-ergodic and only partially observable.
Our focus is not on practical algorithms, but rather on the fundamental underlying
problems: How do we balance exploration and exploitation? How do we explore opti-
mally? When is an agent optimal? We follow the nonparametric realizable paradigm:
we assume the data is drawn from an unknown source that belongs to a known countable
class of candidates.
First, we consider the passive (sequence prediction) setting, learning from data that
is not independent and identically distributed. We collect results from artificial intelli-
gence, algorithmic information theory, and game theory and put them in a reinforcement
learning context: they demonstrate how an agent can learn the value of its own policy.
Next, we establish negative results on Bayesian reinforcement learning agents, in
particular AIXI. We show that unlucky or adversarial choices of the prior cause the
agent to misbehave drastically. Therefore Legg-Hutter intelligence and balanced Pareto
optimality, which depend crucially on the choice of the prior, are entirely subjective.
Moreover, in the class of all computable environments every policy is Pareto optimal.
This undermines all existing optimality properties for AIXI.
However, there are Bayesian approaches to general reinforcement learning that sat-
isfy objective optimality guarantees: We prove that Thompson sampling is asymptot-
ically optimal in stochastic environments in the sense that its value converges to the
value of the optimal policy. We connect asymptotic optimality to regret given a recov-
erability assumption on the environment that allows the agent to recover from mistakes.
Hence Thompson sampling achieves sublinear regret in these environments.
AIXI is known to be incomputable. We quantify this using the arithmetical hierar-
chy, and establish upper and corresponding lower bounds for incomputability. Further,
we show that AIXI is not limit computable, thus cannot be approximated using finite
computation. However there are limit computable ε-optimal approximations to AIXI.
We also derive computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit
computable weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.
Finally, our results culminate in a formal solution to the grain of truth problem: A
Bayesian agent acting in a multi-agent environment learns to predict the other agents’
policies if its prior assigns positive probability to them (the prior contains a grain of
truth). We construct a large but limit computable class containing a grain of truth and
show that agents based on Thompson sampling over this class converge to play ε-Nash
equilibria in arbitrary unknown computable multi-agent environments.
ix
xKeywords. Bayesian methods, sequence prediction, merging, general reinforcement
learning, universal artificial intelligence, AIXI, Thompson sampling, knowledge-seeking
agents, Pareto optimality, intelligence, asymptotic optimality, computability, reflective
oracle, grain of truth problem, Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Everything I did was for the glamor, the money, and the sex. — Albert Einstein
After the early enthusiastic decades, research in artificial intelligence (AI) now mainly
aims at specific domains: playing games, mining data, processing natural language,
recognizing objects in images, piloting robots, filtering email, and many others (Russell
and Norvig, 2010). Progress on particular domains has been remarkable, with several
high-profile breakthroughs: The chess world champion Garry Kasparov was defeated
by the computer program Deep Blue in 1997 (IBM, 2012a). In 2011 the world’s best
Jeopardy! players were defeated by the computer program Watson (IBM, 2012b). As
of 2014 Google’s self-driving cars completed over a million kilometers autonomously on
public roads (Google, 2014). Finally, in 2016 Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo beat Lee
Sedol, one of the world’s best players, at the board game Go (Google, 2016).
While these advancements are very impressive, they are highly-specialized algo-
rithms tailored to their domain of expertise. Outside that domain these algorithms
perform very poorly: AlphaGo cannot play chess, Watson cannot drive a car, and
DeepBlue cannot answer natural language queries. Solutions in one domain typically
do not generalize to other domains and no single algorithm performs well in more than
one of them. We classify these kinds of algorithms as narrow AI .
This thesis is not about narrow AI. We expect progress on narrow AI to continue
and even accelerate, taking the crown of human superiority in domain after domain.
But this is not the ultimate goal of artificial intelligence research. The ultimate goal is
to engineer a mind—to build a machine that can learn to do all tasks that humans can
do, at least as well as humans do them. We call such a machine human-level AI (HLAI)
if it performs at human level and strong AI if it surpasses human level. This thesis is
about strong AI.
The goal of developing HLAI has a long tradition in AI research and was explicitly
part of the 1956 Dartmouth conference that gave birth to the field of AI (McCarthy
et al., 1955):
We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried
out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New
Hampshire. The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that
every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle
be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it. An
1
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attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language, form
abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans,
and improve themselves. We think that a significant advance can be made
in one or more of these problems if a carefully selected group of scientists
work on it together for a summer.
In hindsight this proposal reads vastly overconfident, and disappointment was inevitable.
Making progress on these problems turned out to be a lot harder than promised, and
over the last decades any discussion of research targeting HLAI has been avoided by
serious researchers in the field. This void was filled mostly by crackpots, which tainted
the reputation of HLAI research even further. However, this trend has recently been re-
verted: Chalmers (2010), Hutter (2012a), Schmidhuber (2012), Bostrom (2014), Hawk-
ing, Tegmark, Russell, and Wilczek (2014), Shanahan (2015), and Walsh (2016) are
well-known scientists discussing the prospect of HLAI seriously. Even more: the ex-
plicit motto of Google DeepMind, one of today’s leading AI research centers, is to “solve
intelligence.”
1.1 Reinforcement Learning
The best formal model for strong AI we currently have is reinforcement learning (RL).
Reinforcement learning studies algorithms that learn to act in an unknown environment
through trial and error (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Szepesvári, 2010; Wiering and van
Otterlo, 2012). Without knowing the structure of the environments or the goal, an
agent has to learn what to do through the carrot-and-stick approach: it receives a
reward in form of a numeric feedback signifying how well it is currently doing; from
this signal the agent has to figure out autonomously what to do. More specifically,
in a general reinforcement learning problem an agent interacts sequentially with an
unknown environment : in every time step the agent chooses an action and receives a
percept consisting of an observation and a real-valued reward . The sequence of past
actions and percepts is the history . The goal in reinforcement learning is to maximize
cumulative (discounted) rewards (this setup is described formally in Section 4.1).
A central problem in reinforcement learning is the balance between exploration and
exploitation: should the agent harvest rewards in the regions of the environment that it
currently knows (exploitation) or try discovering more profitable regions (exploration)?
Exploration is costly and dangerous: it forfeits rewards that could be had right now,
and it might lead into traps from which the agent cannot recover. However, exploration
may pay off in the long run. Generally, it is not clear how to make this tradeoff (see
Section 5.6).
Reinforcement learning algorithms can be categorized by whether they learn on-
policy or off-policy . Learning on-policy means learning the value of the policy that
the agent currently follows. Typically, the policy is slowly improved while learning,
like SARSA (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In contrast, learning off-policy means following
one policy but learning the value of another policy (typically the optimal policy), like
Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992). Off-policy methods are more difficult to handle
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in practice (see the discussion on function approximation below) but tend to be more
data-efficient since samples from an old policy do not have to be discarded.
Reinforcement learning has to be distinguished from planning . In a planning prob-
lem we are provided with the true environment and are tasked with finding an optimal
policy. Mathematically it is clear what the optimal policy is, the difficulty stems from
finding a reasonable solution with limited computation. Reinforcement learning is fun-
damentally more difficult because the true environment is unknown and has to be
learned from observation. This enables two approaches: we could learn a model of the
true environment and then use planning techniques within that model; this is the model-
based approach. Alternatively, we could learn an optimal policy directly or through an
intermediate quantity (typically the value function); this is the model-free approach.
Model-based methods tend to be more data-efficient but also computationally more
expensive. Therefore most algorithms used in practice (Q-learning and SARSA) are
model-free.
1.1.1 Narrow Reinforcement Learning
In the reinforcement learning literature it is typically assumed that the environment is a
Markov decision process (MDP), i.e., the next percept only depends on the last percept
and action and is independent of the rest of the history (see Section 4.1.3). In an MDP,
percepts are usually called states. This setting is well-analyzed (Puterman, 2014; Bert-
sekas and Tsitsiklis, 1995; Sutton and Barto, 1998), and there is a variety of algorithms
that are known to learn the MDP asymptotically, such as TD learning (Sutton, 1988)
and Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992).
Moreover, for MDPs various learning guarantees have been proved in the literature.
First, there are bounds on the agent’s regret , the difference between the obtained re-
wards and the rewards of the optimal policy. Auer et al. (2009) derive the regret bound
O˜(dS
√
At) for ergodic MDPs where d is the diameter of the MDP (how many steps
a policy needs on average to get from one state of the MDP to any other), S is the
number of states, A is the number of actions, and t is the number of time steps the
algorithm runs. Second, given ε and δ, a reinforcement learning algorithm is said to
have sample complexity C(ε, δ) iff it is ε-suboptimal for at most C(ε, δ) time steps with
probability at least 1 − δ (probably approximately correct, PAC). For MDPs the first
sample complexity bounds were due to Kakade (2003). Lattimore and Hutter (2012)
use the algorithm UCRLγ (Auer et al., 2009) with geometric discounting with discount
rate γ and derive the currently best-known PAC bound of O˜(−T/(ε2(1 − γ)3) log δ)
where T is the number of non-zero transitions in the MDP.
Typically, algorithms for MDPs rely on visiting every state multiple times (or even
infinitely often), which becomes infeasible for large state spaces (e.g. a video game screen
consisting of millions of pixels). In these cases, function approximation can be used to
learn an approximation to the value function (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Linear function
approximation is known to converge for several on-policy algorithms (Tsitsiklis and Roy,
1997; Sutton, 1988; Gordon, 2001), but proved tricky for off-policy algorithms (Baird,
1995). A recent breakthrough was made by Mahmood et al. (2015) and Yu (2015)
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with their emphatic TD algorithm that converges off-policy. For nonlinear function
approximation no convergence guarantee is known.
Among the historical successes of reinforcement learning is autonomous helicopter
piloting (Kim et al., 2003) and TD-Gammon, a backgammon algorithm that learned
through self-play (Tesauro, 1995), similar to AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016).
1.1.2 Deep Q-Networks
The current state of the art in reinforcement learning challenges itself to playing simple
video games. Video games are an excellent benchmark because they come readily with
the reward structure provided: the agent’s rewards are the change in the game score.
Without prior knowledge of any aspect of the game, the agent needs to learn to score
as many points in the game as possible from looking only at raw pixel data (sometimes
after some preprocessing).
This approach to general AI is in accordance with the definition of intelligence given
by Legg and Hutter (2007b):
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments.
In reinforcement learning the definition of the goal is very flexible, and provided by
the rewards. Moreover, a diverse selection of video games arguably constitutes a ‘wide
range of environments.’
A popular such selection is the Atari 2600 video game console (Bellemare et al.,
2013). There are hundreds of games released for this platform, with very diverse chal-
lenges: top-down shooting games such as Space Invaders, ball games such as Pong,
agility-based games such as Boxing or Gopher, tactical games such as Ms. Pac-Man,
and maze games such as Montezuma’s Revenge. An overview over some of the games
is given in Figure 1.1 on page 13.
Mnih et al. (2013, 2015) introduce the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm, com-
bining Q-learning with nonlinear function approximation through convolutional neural
networks. DQN achieves 75% of the performance of a human game tester on 29 of 49
Atari games. The two innovations that made this breakthrough possible are (1) using
a not so recent target Q-function in the TD update and (2) experience replay. For ex-
perience replay, a set of recent state transitions is retained and the network is regularly
retrained on random samples from these old transitions.1
DQN rides the wave of success of deep learning (LeCun et al., 2015; Schmidhuber,
2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016). Deep learning refers to the training of artificial neural
networks with several layers. This allows them to automatically learn higher-level
abstractions from data. Deep neural networks are conceptionally simple and have been
studied since the inception of AI; only recently has computation power become cheap
enough to train them effectively. Recently deep neural networks have taken the top of
the machine learning benchmarks by storm (LeCun et al., 2015, and references therein):
1The slogan for experience replay should be ‘regularly retrained randomly on retained rewards’.
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These methods have dramatically improved the state-of-the-art in speech
recognition, visual object recognition, object detection and many other do-
mains such as drug discovery and genomics.
Since the introduction of DQN there have been numerous improvements on this
algorithm: increasing the gap on the Q-values of different actions (Bellemare et al.,
2016), training in parallel (Nair et al., 2015; Mnih et al., 2016), improvements to the
experience replay mechanism (Schaul et al., 2016), generalization to continuous action
spaces (Lillicrap et al., 2016), solve the overestimation problem (van Hasselt et al.,
2016), and improvements to the neural network architecture (Wang et al., 2016). TheQ-
values learned by DQN’s neural networks are intransparent to inspection; Zahavy et al.
(2016) use visualization techniques on the Q-value networks. Finally, Liang et al. (2016)
managed to reproduce DQN’s success using only linear function approximation (no
neural networks). The key is a selection of features similar to the ones produced by
DQN’s convolutional neural networks.
Regardless of its success, the DQN algorithm fundamentally falls short of the re-
quirements for strong AI: Q-learning with function approximation is targeted at solving
large-state (fully observable) Markov decision processes. In particular, it does not ad-
dress the following challenges.
• Partial observability. All games in the ATARI framework are fully observable (ex-
cept for Montezuma’s revenge): all information relevant to the state of the game
is visible on the screen at all times (when using the four most recent frames).
However, the real world is only partially observable. For example, when going
to the supermarket you have to remember what you wanted to buy because you
currently cannot observe which items you are missing at home. A strong AI needs
to have memory and be able to remember things that happened in the past (rather
than only learning from it).
An obvious approach to equip DQN with memory is to use recurrent neural
networks instead of simple feedforward neural networks (Heess et al., 2015).
Hausknecht and Stone (2015) show that this enables the agent to play the games
when using only a single frame as input. However, it is currently unclear whether
recurrent neural networks are powerful enough to learn long-term dependencies
in the data (Bengio et al., 1994).
• Directed exploration. DQN fails in games with delayed rewards. For example, in
Montezuma’s Revenge the agent needs to avoid several obstacles to get to a key
before receiving the first reward. DQN fails to score any rewards in this environ-
ment. This is not surprising: the typical approach for reinforcement learning, to
use ε-exploration for which the agent chooses actions at random with a certain
probability, is insufficient for exploring complex environments; the probability of
random walking into the first reward is just too low.
Instead we need a more targeted exploration approach that aims at understanding
the environment in a structured manner. Theoretical foundations are provided
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by knowledge-seeking agents (Orseau, 2011, 2014a; Orseau et al., 2013). Kulkarni
et al. (2016) introduce a hierarchical approach based on intrinsic motivation to
improve DQN’s exploration and manage to score points in Montezuma’s Revenge.
However, their approach relies on quite a bit of visual preprocessing and domain
knowledge.
• Non-ergodicity. When losing in an Atari game, the agent always gets to play the
same game again. From the agent’s perspective, it has not actually failed, it just
gets transported back to the starting state. Because of this, there are no strong
incentives to be careful when exploring the environment: there can be no bad
mistakes that make recovery impossible.
However, in the real world some actions are irreversibly bad. If the robot drives
off a cliff it can be fatally damaged and cannot learn from the mistake. The real
world is full of potentially fatal mistakes (e.g. crossing the street at the wrong
time) and for humans, natural reflexes and training by society make sure that we
are very confident of what situations to avert. This is crucial, as some mistakes
must be avoided without any training examples. Current reinforcement learning
algorithms only learn about bad states by visiting them.
• Wireheading. The goal of reinforcement learning is to maximize rewards. When
playing a video game the most efficient way to get rewards is to increase the
game score. However, when a reinforcement learning algorithm is acting in the
real world, theoretically it can change its own hard- and software. In this set-
ting, the most efficient way to get rewards is to modify the reward mechanism to
always provide the maximal reward (Omohundro, 2008; Ring and Orseau, 2011;
Bostrom, 2014). Consequently the agent no longer pursues the designers’ origi-
nally intended goals and instead only attempts to protect its own existence. The
name wireheading was established by analogy to a biology experiment by Olds
and Milner (1954) in which rats had a wire embedded into the reward center of
their brain that they could then stimulate by the push of a button.
Today’s reinforcement learning algorithms usually do not have access to their own
internal workings, but more importantly they are not smart enough to understand
their own architecture. They simply lack the capability to wirehead. But as we
increase their capability, wireheading will increasingly become a challenge for
reinforcement learning.
1.1.3 General Reinforcement Learning
A theory of strong AI cannot make some of the typical assumptions. Environments
are partially observable, so we are dealing with partially observable Markov decision
processes (POMDPs). The POMDP’s state space does not need to be finite. Moreover,
the environment may not allow recovery from mistakes: we do not assume ergodic-
ity or weak communication (not every POMDP state has to be reachable from every
other state). So in general, our environments are infinite-state non-ergodic POMDPs.
Table 1.1 lists the assumptions that are typical but we do not make.
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Assumption Description
Full observability the agent needs no memory to act optimally
Finite state the environment has only finitely many states
Ergodicity the agent can recover from any mistakes
Computability the environment is computable
Table 1.1: List of assumptions from the reinforcement learning literature. In this
thesis, we only make the computability assumption which is important for Chapter 6
and Chapter 7.
Learning POMDPs is a lot harder, and only partially successful attempts have
been made: through predictive state representations (Singh et al., 2003, 2004), and
Bayesian methods (Doshi-Velez, 2012). A general approach is feature reinforcement
learning (Hutter, 2009c,d), which aims to reduce the general reinforcement learning
problem to an MDP by aggregating histories into states. The quest for a good cost
function for feature maps remains unsuccessful thus far (Sunehag and Hutter, 2010;
Daswani, 2015). However, Hutter (2014) managed to derive strong bounds relating the
optimal value function of the aggregated MDP to the value function of the original
process even if the latter violates the Markov condition.
A full theoretical approach to the general reinforcement learning problem is given by
Hutter (2000, 2001a, 2002a, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2012b). He introduces the Bayesian RL
agent AIXI building on the theory of sequence prediction by Solomonoff (1964, 1978).
Based in algorithmic information theory, Solomonoff’s prior draws from famous insights
by William of Ockham, Sextus Epicurus, Alan Turing, and Andrey Kolmogorov (Rath-
manner and Hutter, 2011). AIXI uses Solomonoff’s prior over the class of all computable
environments and acts to maximize Bayes-expected rewards. We formally introduce
Solomonoff’s theory of induction in Chapter 3 and AIXI in Section 4.3.1. See also Legg
(2008) for an accessible introduction to AIXI.
A typical optimality property in general reinforcement learning is asymptotic opti-
mality (Lattimore and Hutter, 2011): as time progresses the agent converges to achieve
the same rewards as the optimal policy. Asymptotic optimality is usually what is
meant by “Q-learning converges” (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) or “TD learning con-
verges” (Sutton, 1988). Orseau (2010, 2013) showed that AIXI is not asymptotically
optimal. Yet asymptotic optimality in the general setting can be achieved through op-
timism (Sunehag and Hutter, 2012a,b, 2015), Thompson sampling (Section 5.4.3), or
an extra exploration component on top of AIXI (Lattimore, 2013, Ch. 5).
In our setting, learning the environment does not just involve learning a fixed finite
set of parameters; the real world is too complicated to fit into a template. Therefore we
fall back on the nonparametric approach where we start with an infinite but countable
class of candidate environments. Our only assumption is that the true environment is
contained in this class (the realizable case). As long as this class of environments is
large enough (such as for the class of all computable environments), this assumption is
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rather weak.
1.2 Contribution
The goal of this thesis is not to increase AI capability. As such, we are not trying to
improve on the state of the art, and we are not trying to derive practical algorithms.
Instead, the emphasis of this thesis is to further our understanding of general rein-
forcement learning and thus strong AI. How a future implementation of strong AI will
actually work is in the realm of speculation at this time. Therefore we should make as
few and as weak assumptions as possible.
We disregard computational constraints in order to focus on the fundamental un-
derlying problems. This is unrealistic, of course. With unlimited computation power
many traditional AI problems become trivial: playing chess, Go, or backgammon can
be solved by exhaustive expansion of the game tree. But the general RL problem does
not become trivial: the agent has to learn the environment and balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation. That being said, the algorithms that we study do have
a relationship with algorithms being used in practice and our results can and should
educate implementation.
On a high level, our insights can be viewed from three different perspectives.
• Philosophically. Concisely, our understanding of strong AI can be summarized as
follows.
intelligence = learning + acting (1.1)
Here, intelligence refers to an agent that optimizes towards some goal in accor-
dance with the definition by Legg and Hutter (2007b). For learning we distinguish
two (very related) aspects: (1) arriving at accurate beliefs about the future and
(2) making accurate predictions about the future. Of course, the former implies
the latter: if you have accurate beliefs, then you can also make good predictions.
For RL accurate beliefs is what we care about because they enable us to plan
for the future. Learning is a passive process that only observes the data and
does not interfere with its generation. In particular, learning does not require
a goal. With acting we mean the selection of actions in pursuit of some goal.
This goal can be reward maximization as in reinforcement learning, understand-
ing the environment as for knowledge-seeking agents, or something else entirely.
Together they enable an agent to learn the environment’s behavior in response to
itself (on-policy learning) and to choose a policy that furthers its goal. We dis-
cuss the formal aspects of learning in Chapter 3 and some approaches to acting
in Chapter 4.
Given infinite computational resources, learning is easy and Solomonoff induc-
tion provides a complete theoretical solution. However, acting is not straightfor-
ward. We show that in contrast to popular belief, AIXI, the natural extension of
Solomonoff induction to reinforcement learning, does not provide the objectively
best answer to this question. We discuss some alternatives and their problems in
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Chapter 5. Unfortunately, the general question of how to act optimally remains
open.
AIXItl (Hutter, 2005, Ch. 7.2) is often mentioned as a computable approximation
to AIXI. But AIXItl does not converge to AIXI in the limit. Inspired by Hutter
search (Hutter, 2002b), it relies on an automated theorem prover to find the
provably best policy computable in time t with a program of length ≤ l. In
contrast to AIXI, which only requires the choice of universal Turing machine,
proof search requires an axiom system that must not be too weak or too strong.
In Section 5.2.3 we discuss some of the problems with AIXItl. Moreover, in
Corollary 6.13 we show that ε-optimal AIXI is limit computable, which shows
that AIXI can be computably approximated by running this algorithm for a fixed
number of time steps or until a timeout is reached. While neither AIXItl nor
this AIXI approximation algorithm are practically feasible, the latter is a better
example for a computable strong AI.
In our view, AIXI should be taken as a descriptive rather than prescriptive model.
It is descriptive as an abstraction from an actual implementation of strong AI
where we ignore all the details of the learning algorithm and the computational
approximations of choosing how to act. It should not be viewed as a prescription
of how strong AI should be built and AIXI approximations (Veness et al., 2011,
2015) are easily outperformed by neural-network-based approaches (Mnih et al.,
2015).
• Mathematically. Some of the proof techniques we employ are novel and could
be used to analyze other algorithms. Examples include the proofs for the lower
bounds on the computability results (Section 6.3.2) and to a lesser extent the
upper bounds (Section 6.3.1), which should work analogously for a wide range of
algorithms. Furthermore, the proof of the asymptotic optimality of Thompson
sampling (Theorem 5.25) brings together a variety of mathematical tools from
measure theory, probability theory, and stochastic processes.
Next, the recoverability assumption (Definition 5.31) is a novel technical assump-
tion on the environment akin to ergodicity and weak communication in finite-state
environments. It is more general, yet mathematically simple and works for arbi-
trary environments. This assumption turns out to be what we need to prove the
connection from asymptotic optimality to sublinear regret in Section 5.5.
Moreover, we introduce the use of the recursive instead of the iterative value
function (Section 6.4). The iterative value function is the natural extension of
expectimax search to the sequential setting and was originally used by Hutter
(2005, Sec. 5.5). Yet it turned out to be an incorrect and inconvenient definition:
it does not correctly maximize expected rewards (Proposition 6.19) and it is not
limit computable (Theorem 6.22 and Theorem 6.23). However, this is only a
minor technical correction.
Finally, this work raises new mathematically intriguing questions about the prop-
erties of reflective oracles (Section 7.1).
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• Practically. One insight from this thesis is regarding the effective horizon. In
practice geometric discounting is ubiquitous which has a constant effective hori-
zon. However, when facing a finite horizon problem or an episodic task, some-
times the effective horizon changes. One lesson from our result on Thompson
sampling (Section 5.4.3 and Section 5.5) is that you should explore for an ef-
fective horizon instead of using ε-greedy. While the latter exploration method
is often used in practice, it has proved ineffective in environments with delayed
rewards (see Section 1.1.2).
Furthermore, our application of reinforcement learning results to game theory in
Chapter 7 reinforces this trend to solve game theory problems (Tesauro, 1995;
Bowling and Veloso, 2001; Busoniu et al., 2008; Silver et al., 2016; Heinrich and
Silver, 2016; Foerster et al., 2016, and many more). In particular, the approxima-
tion algorithm for reflective oracles (Section 7.1.3) could guide future applications
for computing Nash equilibria (see also Fallenstein et al., 2015b).
On a technical level, we advance the theory of general reinforcement learning. In its
center is the Bayesian reinforcement learning agent AIXI. AIXI is meant as an answer
to the question of how to do general RL disregarding computational constraints. We
analyze the computational complexity of AIXI and related agents in Chapter 6 and
show that even with an infinite horizon AIXI can be computationally approximated
with a regular Turing machine (Section 6.3.1). We also derive corresponding lower
bounds for most of our upper bounds (Section 6.3.2).
Chapter 5 is about notions of optimality in general reinforcement learning. We
dispel AIXI’s status as the gold standard for reinforcement learning. Hutter (2002a)
showed that AIXI is Pareto optimal, balanced Pareto optimal, and self-optimizing.
Orseau (2013) established that AIXI does not achieve asymptotic optimality in all
computable environments (making the self-optimizing result inapplicable to this gen-
eral environment class). In Section 5.1 we show that every policy is Pareto optimal and
in Section 5.3 we show that balanced Pareto optimality is highly subjective, depending
on the choice of the prior; bad choices for priors are discussed in Section 5.2. Notable
is the dogmatic prior that locks a Bayesian reinforcement learning agent into a particu-
lar (bad) policy as long as this policy yields some rewards. Our results imply that there
are no known nontrivial and non-subjective optimality results for AIXI. We have to
regard AIXI as a relative theory of intelligence. More generally, our results imply that
general reinforcement learning is difficult even when disregarding computational costs.
But this is not the end to Bayesian methods in general RL. We show in Section 5.4
that a Bayes-inspired algorithm called Thompson sampling achieves asymptotic opti-
mality. Thompson sampling, also known as posterior sampling or the Bayesian control
rule repeatedly draws one environment from the posterior distribution and then acts as
if this was the true environment for a certain period of time (depending on the discount
function). Moreover, given a recoverability assumption on the environment and some
mild assumptions on the discount function, we show in Section 5.5 that Thompson
sampling achieves sublinear regret.
Finally, we tie these results together to solve an open problem in game theory:
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Chapter Publication(s)
Chapter 1 -
Chapter 2 -
Chapter 3 with links to Leike and Hutter (2014a, 2015d); Filan et al. (2016)
Chapter 4 -
Chapter 5 Leike and Hutter (2015c); Leike et al. (2016a)
Chapter 6 Leike and Hutter (2015b,a, 2016)
Chapter 7 Leike et al. (2016b)
Chapter 8 -
Appendix A Leike and Hutter (2014b)
Table 1.2: List of publications by chapter.
When acting in a multi-agent environment with other Bayesian agents, each agent
needs to assign positive prior probability to the other agents’ actual policies (they need
to have a grain of truth). Finding a reasonably large class of policies that contains the
Bayes optimal policies with respect to this class is known as the grain of truth prob-
lem (Hutter, 2009b, Q. 5j). Only small classes are known to have a grain of truth and
the literature contains several related impossibility results (Nachbar, 1997, 2005; Foster
and Young, 2001). Moreover, while AIXI assumes the environment to be computable,
our computability results on AIXI confirm that it is incomputable (Theorem 6.15 and
Theorem 6.17). This asymmetry elevates AIXI above its environment computationally,
and prevents the environment from containing other AIXIs.
In Chapter 7 we give a formal and general solution to the grain of truth prob-
lem: we construct a class of policies that avoid this asymmetry. This class contains all
computable policies as well as Bayes optimal policies for every lower semicomputable
prior over the class. When the environment is unknown, our dogmatic prior from Sec-
tion 5.2 makes Bayes optimal agents fail to act optimally even asymptotically. However,
our convergence results on Thompson sampling (Section 5.4.3) imply that Thompson
samplers converge to play ε-Nash equilibria in arbitrary unknown computable multi-
agent environments. While these results are purely theoretical, we use techniques from
Chapter 6 to show that they can be computationally approximated arbitrarily closely.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is based on the papers Leike and Hutter (2014a,b, 2015a,b,c, 2016); Leike
et al. (2016a,b). During my PhD, I was also involved in the publications Leike and Heiz-
mann (2014a,b, 2015); Heizmann et al. (2015, 2016) based on my research in termination
analysis (in collaboration with Matthias Heizmann), Daswani and Leike (2015) (co-
authored with Mayank Daswani in equal parts), Everitt et al. (2015) (co-authored with
Tom Everitt in equal parts), Filan et al. (2016) (written by Daniel Filan as part of
his honour’s thesis supervised by Marcus Hutter and me). Leike and Hutter (2016) is
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still under review. Leike and Hutter (2014a, 2015d) are tangential to this thesis’ main
thrust, so the results are mentioned only in passing. A list of papers written during my
PhD is given in Table 1.3 on page 14, with a corresponding chapter outline in Table 1.2.
The core of our contribution is found in chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Every thesis chapter starts with a quote. In case this is not blatantly obvious: these
are false quotes, a desperate attempt to make the thesis less dry and humorless. None
of the quotes were actually stated by the person they are attributed to (according to
our knowledge).
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(a) Space Invaders: the player controls the
green cannon on the bottom of the screen
and fires projectiles at the yellow ships at
the top. The red blobs can be used as
cover, but also fired through.
(b) Pong: the player controls the green
paddle on the right of the screen and needs
to hit the white ball such that the com-
puter opponent controlling the red paddle
on the left fails to hit the ball back.
(c) Ms. Pac-Man: the player controls the
yellow mouth and needs to eat all the red
pallets in the maze. The maze is roamed
by ghosts that occasionally hunt the player
and kill her on contact unless a ‘power pill’
was consumed recently.
(d) Boxing: the player controls the white
figure on the screen and extends their arms
to throw a punch. The aim is to hit the
black figure that is controlled by the com-
puter and dodge their punches. (I’m sure
the choice of color was by accident.)
(e) Gopher: a hungry rodent attempts to
dig to the surface and steal the vegetables.
The player controls the farmer who pro-
tects them by filling the rodent’s holes.
(f) Montezuma’s Revenge: the player con-
trols the red adventurer. The aim is to
navigate a maze of deadly traps, use keys
to open doors, and collect artifacts.
Figure 1.1: A selection of Atari 2600 video games.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Mathematics is a waste of time. — Leonhard Euler
This chapter establishes the notation and background material that is used through-
out this thesis. Section 2.1 is about probability and measure theory, Section 2.2 is
about stochastic processes, Section 2.3 is about information theory, and Section 2.4 is
about algorithmic information theory. We defer the formal introduction to reinforce-
ment learning to Chapter 4. Additional preliminary notation and terminology is also
established in individual chapters wherever necessary. A list of notation is provided in
the appendix on page 171.
Most of the content from this chapter can be found in standard textbooks and
reference works. We recommend to consult Wasserman (2004) on statistics, Durrett
(2010) on probability theory and stochastic processes, Cover and Thomas (2006) on
information theory, Li and Vitányi (2008) on algorithmic information theory, Russell
and Norvig (2010) on artificial intelligence, Bishop (2006) and Hastie et al. (2009)
on machine learning, Sutton and Barto (1998) on reinforcement learning, and Hutter
(2005) and Lattimore (2013) on general reinforcement learning.
We understand definitions to follow natural language; e.g., when defining the ad-
jective ‘continuous’, we define at the same time the noun ‘continuity’ and the adverb
‘continuously’ wherever appropriate.
Numbers. N := {1, 2, 3, . . .} denotes the set of natural numbers (starting from 1),
Q := {±p/q | p ∈ N∪{0}, q ∈ N} denotes the set of rational numbers, and R denotes the
set of real numbers. For two real numbers r1, r2, the set [r1, r2] := {r ∈ R | r1 ≤ r ≤ r2}
denotes the closed interval with end points r1 and r2; the sets (r1, r2] := [r1, r2] \ {r1}
and [r1, r2) := [r1, r2]\{r2} denote half-open intervals; the set (r1, r2) := [r1, r2]\{r1, r2}
denotes an open interval.
Strings. Fix X to be a finite nonempty set, called alphabet . We assume that X
contains at least two distinct elements. The set X ∗ := ⋃∞n=0X n is the set of all finite
strings over the alphabet X , the set X∞ is the set of all infinite strings over the alphabet
X , and the set X ] := X ∗ ∪X∞ is their union. The empty string is denoted by , not to
be confused with the small positive real number ε. Given a string x ∈ X ], we denote
its length by |x|. For a (finite or infinite) string x of length ≥ k, we denote with xk the
k-th character of x, with x1:k the first k characters of x, and with x<k the first k − 1
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characters of x. The notation x1:∞ stresses that x is an infinite string. We use x v y
to denote that x is a prefix of y, i.e., x = y1:|x|. Our examples often (implicitly) involve
the binary alphabet {0, 1}. In this case we define the functions ones, zeros : X ∗ → N
that count the number of ones and zeros in a string respectively.
Computability. A function f : X ∗ → R is lower semicomputable iff the set {(x, q) ∈
X ∗ ×Q | f(x) > q} is recursively enumerable. If f and −f are lower semicomputable,
then f is called computable. See Section 6.1.2 for more computability definitions.
Asymptotic Notation. Let f, g : N → R≥0. We use f ∈ O(g) to denote that there
is a constant c such that f(t) ≤ cg(t) for all t ∈ N. We use f ∈ o(g) to denote that
lim supt→∞ f(t)/g(t) = 0. For functions on strings P,Q : X ∗ → R we use Q
×≥ P to
denote that there is a constant c > 0 such that Q(x) ≥ cP (x) for all x ∈ X ∗. We also
use Q
×≤ P for P ×≥ Q and Q ×= P for Q ×≤ P and P ×≤ Q. Note that Q ×= P does not
imply that there is a constant c such that Q(x) = cP (x) for all x ∈ X ∗. For a sequence
(at)t∈N with limit limt→∞ at = a we also write at → a as t→∞. If no limiting variable
is provided, we mean t→∞ by convention.
Other Conventions. Let A be some set. We use #A to denote the cardinality of
the set A, i.e., the number of elements in A, and 2A to denote the power set of A, i.e.,
the set of all subsets of A. We use log to denote the binary logarithm and ln to denote
the natural logarithm.
2.1 Measure Theory
For a countable set Ω, we use ∆Ω to denote the set of probability distributions over
Ω. If Ω is uncountable (such as the set of all infinite strings X∞), we need to use the
machinery of measure theory. This section provides a concise introduction to measure
theory; see Durrett (2010) for an extensive treatment.
Definition 2.1 (σ-algebra). Let Ω be a set. The set F ⊆ 2Ω is a σ-algebra over Ω iff
(a) Ω ∈ F ,
(b) A ∈ F implies Ω \A ∈ F , and
(c) for any countable number of sets A0, A1, . . . ,∈ F , the union
⋃
i∈NAi ∈ F .
For a set A ⊆ 2Ω, we define σ(A) to be the smallest (with respect to set inclusion)
σ-algebra containing A.
For the real numbers, the default σ-algebra (used implicitly) is the Borel σ-algebra B
generated by the open sets of the usual topology. Formally, B := σ({(a, b) | a, b ∈ R}).
A set Ω together with a σ-algebra F forms a measurable space. The sets from the σ-
algebra F are called measurable sets. A function f : Ω1 → Ω2 between two measurable
spaces is called measurable iff any preimage of an (in Ω2) measurable set is measurable
(in Ω1).
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Definition 2.2 (Probability Measure). Let Ω be a measurable space with σ-algebra
F . A probability measure on the space Ω is a function µ : F → [0, 1] such that
(a) µ(Ω) = 1 (normalization), and
(b) µ(
⋃
i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈N µ(Ai) for any collection {Ai | i ∈ N} ⊆ F that is pairwise
disjoint (σ-additivity).
A probability measure µ is deterministic iff it assigns all probability mass to a single
element of Ω, i.e., iff there is an x ∈ Ω with µ({x}) = 1.
We define the conditional probability µ(A | B) for two measurable sets A,B ∈ F
with µ(B) > 0 as µ(A | B) := µ(A ∩B)/µ(B).
Definition 2.3 (Random Variable). Let Ω be a measurable space with probability
measure µ. A (real-valued) random variable is a measurable function X : Ω→ R.
We often (but not always) denote random variables with uppercase Latin letters.
Given a σ-algebra F , a probability measure P on F , and an F-measurable random
variable X, the conditional expectation E[X | F ] of X given F is a random variable
Y such that (1) Y is F-measurable and (2) ∫AXdP = ∫A Y dP for all A ∈ F . The
conditional expectation exists and is unique up to a set of P -measure 0 (Durrett, 2010,
Sec. 5.1). Intuitively, if F describes the information we have at our disposal, then
E[X | F ] denotes the expectation of X given this information.
We proceed to define the σ-algebra on X∞ (the σ-algebra on X ] is defined analo-
gously). For a finite string x ∈ X ∗, the cylinder set
Γx := {xy | y ∈ X∞}
is the set of all infinite strings of which x is a prefix. Furthermore, we fix the σ-algebras
Ft := σ
({Γx | x ∈ X t}) and F∞ := σ( ∞⋃
t=1
Ft
)
.
The sequence (Ft)t∈N is a filtration: from Γx =
⋃
a∈X Γxa follows that Ft ⊆ Ft+1 for
every t ∈ N, and all Ft ⊆ F∞ by the definition of F∞.
For our purposes, the σ-algebra Ft means ‘all symbols up to and including time
step t.’ So instead of conditioning an expectation on Ft, we can just as well condition
it on the sequence x1:t drawn at time t. Hence we write E[X | x1:t] instead of E[X | Ft].
Moreover, for conditional probabilities we also write Q(xt | x<t) instead of Q(x1:t | x<t).
In the context of probability measures, a measurable set E ∈ F∞ is also called an
event . The event Ec := X∞ \ E denotes the complement of E. In case the event E is
defined by a predicate Q dependent on the random variable X, E = {x ∈ Ω | Q(X(x))},
we also use the shorthand notation
P [Q(X)] := P ({x ∈ Ω | Q(X(x))}) = P (E).
We assume all sets to be measurable; when we write P (A) for some set A ⊆ X∞,
we understand implicitly that A be measurable. This is not true: not all subsets of
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X∞ are measurable (assuming the axiom of choice). While we choose to do this for
readability purposes, note that under some axioms compatible with Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, notably the axiom of determinacy, all subsets of X∞ are measurable.
2.2 Stochastic Processes
This section introduces some notions about sequences of random variables.
Definition 2.4 (Stochastic Process). (Xt)t∈N is a stochastic process iff Xt is a random
variable for every t ∈ N.
A stochastic process (Xt)t∈N is nonnegative iff Xt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N. The process is
bounded iff there is a constant c ∈ R such that |Xt| ≤ c for all t ∈ N.
In the real numbers, a sequence (zt)t∈N converges if and only if it is a Cauchy se-
quence, i.e., iff |zt+1−zt| → 0 as t→∞. For sequences of random variables convergence
is a lot more subtle and there are several different notions of convergence.
Definition 2.5 (Stochastic Convergence). Let P be a probability measure. A stochastic
process (Xt)t∈N converges to the random variable X
• in P -probability iff for every ε > 0,
P
[|Xt −X| > ε]→ 0 as t→∞;
• in P -mean iff
EP
[|Xt −X|]→ 0 as t→∞;
• P -almost surely iff
P
[
lim
t→∞Xt = X
]
= 1.
Almost sure convergence and convergence in mean both imply convergence in prob-
ability (Wasserman, 2004, Thm. 5.17). If the stochastic process is bounded, then con-
vergence in probability implies convergence in mean (Wasserman, 2004, Thm. 5.19).
A sequence of real numbers (at)t∈N converges in Cesàro average to a ∈ R iff
1/t
∑t
k=1 ak → a as t → ∞. The definition for sequences of random variables is
analogous.
Definition 2.6 (Martingale). Let P be a probability measure over (X∞,F∞). A
stochastic process (Xt)t∈N is a P -supermartingale (P -submartingale) iff
(a) each Xt is Ft-measurable, and
(b) E[Xt | Fs] ≤ Xs (E[Xt | Fs] ≥ Xs) P -almost surely for all s, t ∈ N with s < t.
A P -martingale is a process that is both a P -supermartingale and a P -submartingale.
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Example 2.7 (Fair Gambling). Suppose Mary bets on the outcome of a fair coin flip.
If she predicts correctly, her wager is doubled and otherwise it is lost. Let Xt denote
Mary’s wealth at time step t. Since the game is fair, E[Xt+1 | Ft] = Xt where Ft
represents the information available at time step t. Hence E[Xt] = X1, so in expectation
she never loses money regardless of her betting strategy. 3
For martingales the following famous convergence result was proved by Doob (1953).
Theorem 2.8 (Martingale Convergence; Durrett, 2010, Thm. 5.2.9). If (Xt)t∈N is a
nonnegative supermartingale, then it converges almost surely to a limit X with E[X] ≤
E[X1].
By Theorem 2.8 the martingale from Example 2.7 representing Mary’s wealth con-
verges almost surely, regardless of her betting strategy. Either she refrains from betting
at some point (assuming she cannot place smaller and smaller bets) or she cannot play
anymore because her wealth is 0. Is there a lesson to learn here about gambling?
2.3 Information Theory
This section introduces the notions of entropy and two notions of distance between
probability measures: KL-divergence and total variation distance.
Definition 2.9 (Entropy). Let Ω be a countable set. For a probability distribution
p ∈ ∆Ω, the entropy of p is defined as
Ent(p) := −
∑
x∈Ω: p(x)>0
p(x) log p(x).
Definition 2.10 (KL-Divergence). Let P,Q be two measures and let m ∈ N be a
lookahead time step. The Kullback-Leibler-divergence (KL-divergence) of P and Q
between time steps t and m is defined as
KLm(P,Q | x<t) :=
∑
xt:m∈Xm−t+1
P (x1:m | x<t) log P (x1:m | x<t)
Q(x1:m | x<t) .
Moreover, we define KL∞(P,Q | x<t) := limm→∞KLm(P,Q | x<t).
KL-divergence is also known as relative entropy . KL-divergence is always nonneg-
ative by Gibbs’ inequality, but it is not a distance since it is not symmetric. If the
alphabet X is finite, then KLm(P,Q | x) is always finite. However, KL∞(P,Q | x) may
be infinite.
Definition 2.11 (Total Variation Distance). Let P,Q be two measures and let 1 ≤
m ≤ ∞ be a lookahead time step. The total variation distance between P and Q
between time steps t and m is defined as
Dm(P,Q | x) := sup
A⊆Xm
∣∣∣P (A | x<t)−Q(A | x<t)∣∣∣.
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Total variation distance is always bounded between 0 and 1 since P and Q are prob-
ability measures. Moreover, in contrast to KL-divergence total variation distance satis-
fies the axioms of distance: symmetry (D(P,Q) = D(Q,P )), identity of indiscernibles
(D(P,Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q), and the triangle inequality (D(P,Q) +D(Q,R) ≥
D(P,R)).
The following lemma shows that total variation distance can be used to bound
differences in expectation.
Lemma 2.12 (Total Variation Bound on the Expectation). For a random variable X
with 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 and two probability measures P and Q∣∣EP [X]− EQ[X]∣∣ ≤ D(P,Q).
KL-divergence and total variation distance are linked by the following inequality.
Lemma 2.13 (Pinsker’s inequality; Tsybakov, 2008, Lem. 2.5i). For all probability
measures P and Q on X∞, for every x ∈ X ∗, and for every m ∈ N
Dm(P,Q | x) ≤
√
1
2
KLm(P,Q | x)
2.4 Algorithmic Information Theory
A universal Turing machine (UTM) is a Turing machine that can simulate all other
Turing machines. Formally, a Turing machine U is a UTM iff for every Turing machine
T there is a binary string p (called program) such that U(p, x) = T (x) for all x ∈ X ∗,
i.e., the output of U when run on (p, x) is the same as the output of T when run on x.
We assume the set of programs on U is prefix-free. The Kolmogorov complexity K(x)
of a string x is the length of the shortest program on U that prints x and then halts:
K(x) := min{|p| | U(p) = x}.
A monotone Turing machine is a Turing machine with a one-way read-only input
tape, a one-way write-only output tape, and a read/write work tape. Monotone Turing
machines sequentially read symbols from their input tape and write to their output
tape. Interpreted as a function, a monotone Turing machine T maps a string x to the
longest string that T writes to the output tape while reading x and no more from the
input tape (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Ch. 4.5.2).
We also use U to denote a universal monotone Turing machine (programs on the
universal monotone Turing machine do not have to be prefix-free). The monotone Kol-
mogorov complexity Km(x) denotes the length of the shortest program on the monotone
machine U that prints a string starting with x (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Def. 4.5.9):
Km(x) := min{|p| | x v U(p)}. (2.1)
Since monotone complexity does not require the machine to halt, there is a constant c
such that Km(x) ≤ K(x) + c for all x ∈ X∗.
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The following notion of a (semi)measure is particular to algorithmic information
theory.
Definition 2.14 (Semimeasure; Li and Vitányi, 2008, Def. 4.2.1). A semimeasure over
the alphabet X is a function ν : X ∗ → [0, 1] such that
(a) ν() ≤ 1, and
(b) ν(x) ≥∑a∈X ν(xa) for all x ∈ X ∗.
A semimeasure is a (probability) measure iff equalities hold in (a) and (b) for all x ∈ X ∗.
Semimeasures are not probability measures in the classical measure theoretic sense.
However, semimeasures correspond canonically to classical probability measures on the
probability space X ] = X ∗ ∪X∞ whose σ-algebra is generated by the cylinder sets (Li
and Vitányi, 2008, Ch. 4.2 and Hay, 2007).
Lower semicomputable semimeasures correspond naturally to monotone Turing ma-
chines (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Thm. 4.5.2): for a monotone Turing machine T , the
semimeasure λT maps a string x to the probability that T outputs something starting
with x when fed with fair coin flips as input (and vice versa). Hence we can enumerate
all lower semicomputable semimeasures ν1, ν2, . . . by enumerating all monotone Tur-
ing machines. We define the Kolmogorov complexity K(ν) of a lower semicomputable
semimeasure ν as the Kolmogorov complexity of the index of ν in this enumeration.
We often mix the (semi)measures of algorithmic information theory with concepts
from probability theory. For convenience, we identify a finite string x ∈ X ∗ with its
cylinder set Γx. Then ν(x) in the algorithmic information theory sense coincides with
ν(Γx) in the measure theory sense if we use the identification of semimeasures with
probability measures above.
Example 2.15 (Lebesgue Measure). The Lebesgue measure or uniform measure is
defined as
λ(x) := (#X )−|x|. 3
The following definition turns a semimeasure into a measure, preserving the predic-
tive ratio ν(xa)/ν(xb) for a, b ∈ X .
Definition 2.16 (Solomonoff Normalization). The Solomonoff normalization νnorm of
a semimeasure ν is defined as νnorm() := 1 and for all x ∈ X ∗ and a ∈ X ,
νnorm(xa) := νnorm(x)
ν(xa)∑
b∈X ν(xb)
. (2.2)
By definition, νnorm is a measure. Moreover, νnorm dominates ν according to the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.17 (νnorm ≥ ν). νnorm(x) ≥ ν(x) for all x ∈ X ∗ and all semimeasures ν.
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Proof. We use induction on the length of x: if x =  then νnorm() = 1 = ν(), and
otherwise
νnorm(xa) =
νnorm(x)ν(xa)∑
b∈X ν(xb)
≥ ν(x)ν(xa)∑
b∈X ν(xb)
≥ ν(x)ν(xa)
ν(x)
= ν(xa).
The first inequality holds by induction hypothesis and the second inequality uses the
fact that ν is a semimeasure.
Chapter 3
Learning
The problem of induction is essentially solved. — David Hume
Machine learning refers to the process of learning models of and/or making predictions
about (large) sets of data points that are typically independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.); see Bishop (2006) and Hastie et al. (2009). In this chapter we do not
make the i.i.d. assumption. Instead, we aim more generally at the theoretical fundamen-
tals of the sequence prediction problem: how will a sequence of symbols generated by
an unknown stochastic process be continued? Given a finite string x<t = x1x2 . . . xt−1
of symbols, what is the next symbol xt? How likely does a given property hold for the
entire sequence x1:∞? Arguably, any learning or prediction problem can be phrased in
this fashion: anything that can be stored on a computer can be turned into a sequence
of bits.
We distinguish two major elements of learning. First, the process of converging
to accurate beliefs, called merging . Second, the process of making accurate forecasts
about the next symbol, called predicting . These two notions are not distinct: if you
have accurate beliefs about the unseen data, then you can make good predictions, but
not necessarily vice versa (see Example 3.41). We discuss different notions of merging
in Section 3.4 and state bounds on the prediction regret in Section 3.5.
In the general reinforcement learning problem we target in this thesis, the environ-
ment is unknown and the agent needs to learn it. The literature on non-i.i.d. learning
has focused on predicting individual symbols and bounds on the number of prediction
errors (Hutter, 2001b, 2005; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006), and the results on merg-
ing are from the game theory literature (Blackwell and Dubins, 1962; Kalai and Lehrer,
1994; Lehrer and Smorodinsky, 1996). However, we argue that merging is the essential
property for general AI. In order to make good decisions, the agent needs to have ac-
curate beliefs about what its actions will entail. On a technical level, merging leads to
on-policy value convergence (Section 4.2.3), the fact that the agents learns to estimate
the values for its own policy correctly.
The setup we consider is the realizable case: we assume that the data is generated
by an unknown probability distribution that belongs to a known (countable) class of
distributions. In contrast, the nonrealizable case allows no assumptions on the under-
lying process that generates the data. A well-known approach to the nonrealizable case
is prediction with expert advice (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006), which we do not con-
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sider here. Generally, the nonrealizable case is harder, but Ryabko (2011) argues that
for some problems, both cases coincide.
After introducing the formal setup in Section 3.1, we discuss several examples for
learning distributions and notions that relate the learning distribution with the process
generating the data in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we connect these notions to the theory
of martingale processes.
Section 3.6 connects the results from the first sections to the learning framework
developed by Solomonoff (1964, 1978), Hutter (2001b, 2005, 2007b), and Schmidhuber
(2002) (among others). This framework relies on results from algorithmic information
theory and computability theory to learn any computable distribution quickly and
effectively. It is incomputable (see Section 6.2), but can serve as a gold standard for
learning.
Most of this chapter echoes the literature. We collect results from economics and
computer science that previously had not been assembled in one place. We provide
proofs that connect the various properties (Proposition 3.23, Proposition 3.16, and
Proposition 3.37), and we fill in a few gaps in the picture: the prediction bounds for
absolute continuity (Section 3.5.2) and the improved regret bounds for nonuniform
measures (Theorem 3.48 and Theorem 3.51). Section 3.7 summarizes the results in
Table 3.2 on page 45 as well as Figure 3.1 on page 46.
3.1 Setup
For the rest of this chapter, fix P and Q to be two probability measures over the
measurable space of infinite sequences (X∞,F∞). We think of P as the true distribution
from which the data sequence x1:∞ is drawn, and of Q as our belief distribution or
learning algorithm. In other words, we use the distribution Q to learn a string drawn
from the distribution P .
Let H denote a hypothesis, i.e., any measurable set from F∞. Our prior belief in
the hypothesis H is Q(H). In each time step t, we make one observation xt ∈ X . Our
history x<t = x1x2 . . . xt−1 is the sequence of all previous observations. We update our
belief in accordance with Bayesian learning; our posterior belief in the hypothesis H is
Q(H | x1:t) = Q(H ∩ x1:t)
Q(x1:t)
.
The observation xt confirms the hypothesis H iff Q(H | x1:t) > Q(H | x<t) (the belief
in H increases), and the observation xt disconfirms the hypothesis H iff Q(H | x1:t) <
Q(H | x<t) (the belief in H decreases). If Q(H | x1:t) = 0, then H is refuted or falsified .
When we assign a prior belief of 0 to a hypothesis H, this means that we think
that H is impossible; it is refuted from the beginning. If Q(H) = 0, then the posterior
Q(H | x<t) = 0, so no evidence whatsoever can change our mind that H is impossible.
This is bad if the hypothesis H is actually true.
To be able to learn we need to make some assumptions on the learning distribution
Q: we need to have an open mind about anything that might actually happen, i.e.,
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Q(H) > 0 on any hypothesis H with P (H) > 0. This property is called absolute
continuity . We discuss this and other notions of compatibility of P and Q in Section 3.2.
We motivate this chapter with the following example.
Example 3.1 (The Black Ravens; Rathmanner and Hutter, 2011, Sec. 7.4). If we live
in a world in which all ravens are black, how can we learn this fact? Since at every time
step we have observed only a finite subset of the (possibly infinite) set of all ravens,
how can we confidently state anything about all ravens?
We formalize this problem in line with Rathmanner and Hutter (2011, Sec. 7.4) and
Leike and Hutter (2015d). We define two predicates, blackness B and ravenness R.
There are four possible observations: a black raven BR, a non-black raven BR, a black
non-raven BR, and a non-black non-raven BR. Therefore our alphabet consists of four
symbols corresponding to each of the possible observations, X := {BR,BR,BR,BR}.
We are interested in the hypothesis ‘all ravens are black’. Formally, it corresponds
to the measurable set
H := {x ∈ X∞ | xt 6= BR ∀t} = {BR,BR,BR}∞, (3.1)
the set of all infinite strings in which the symbol BR does not occur.
If we observe a non-black raven, xt = BR, the hypothesisH is refuted sinceH∩x1:t =
∅ and this implies Q(H | x1:t) = 0. In this case, our inquiry regarding H is settled.
The interesting case is when the hypothesis H is in fact true (P (H) = 1), i.e., P does
not generate any non-black ravens. The property we desire is that in a world in which
all ravens are black, we arrive at this belief: P (H) = 1 implies Q(H | x<t) → 1 as
t→∞. 3
3.2 Compatibility
In this section we define dominance, absolute continuity , dominance with coefficients,
weak dominance, and local absolute continuity , in decreasing order of their strength.
These notions make the relationship of the two probability measures P and Q precise.
We also give examples for various choices for the learning algorithm Q.
In our examples, we frequently rely on the following process.
Example 3.2 (Bernoulli Process). Assume X = {0, 1}. For a real number r ∈ [0, 1]
we define the Bernoulli process with parameter r as the measure
Bernoulli(r)(x) := rones(x)(1− r)zeros(x).
Note that Bernoulli(1/2) = λ, the Lebesgue measure from Example 2.15. 3
Definition 3.3 (Dominance). The measure Q dominates P (Q
×≥ P ) iff there is a
constant c > 0 such that Q(x) ≥ cP (x) for all finite strings x ∈ X ∗.
Dominance is also called having a grain of truth (Lehrer and Smorodinsky, 1996,
Def. 2a and Kalai and Lehrer, 1993); we discuss this property in the context of game
theory in Chapter 7.
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Example 3.4 (Bayesian mixture). LetM be a countable set of probability measures
on (X∞,F∞) and let w ∈ ∆M be a prior over M. If w(P ) > 0 for all P ∈ M, the
prior w is called positive or universal . Then the Bayesian mixture ξ :=
∑
P∈Mw(P )P
dominates each P ∈M. 3
The Bayesian mixture is a mathematically simple yet very powerful concept. It is
very easy to derive from a countable set of distributions, and it has been considered
extensively in the literature (Solomonoff, 1964; Jaynes, 2003; Hutter, 2005, . . . ). Ryabko
(2009) shows that even for uncountably infinite classes, if there are good predictors, then
a Bayesian mixture over a countable subclass asymptotically also does well.
Example 3.5 (Solomonoff Prior). Solomonoff (1964) defines a distribution M over X ]
that assigns to a string x the probability that the universal monotone Turing machine
U outputs x when fed with fair coin flips on the input tape. Formally,
M(x) :=
∑
p:xvU(p)
2−|p| (3.2)
where p is a binary string.1 The functionM is a lower semicomputable semimeasure, but
not computable and not a measure (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Lem. 4.5.3); see Section 6.2
for the computability properties of M . More importantly, M dominates every lower
semicomputable semimeasure (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Thm. 4.5.1).
Solomonoff’s prior M has a number of appealing philosophical properties. In line
with Ockham’s razor it favors simple environments over complex ones: Turing machines
that have a short program on the UTM U have a higher contribution in the sum (3.2).
In line with Epicurus’ principle it never discards possible explanations: every program
that produces the string x contributes to the sum. See Rathmanner and Hutter (2011)
for a discussion on the philosophical underpinnings of Solomonoff’s prior. 3
Wood et al. (2011) show that the Solomonoff priorM can equivalently be defined as
a Bayesian mixture over all lower semicomputable semimeasures with a prior w(P ) ∝
2−K(P ). (If we use w(P ) = 2−K(P ) we get a semiprior because
∑
P∈M 2
−K(P ) can be
less than 1. This prior also carries the name Solomonoff prior .)
Definition 3.6 (Absolute Continuity). The measure P is absolutely continuous with
respect to Q (Q P ) iff Q(A) = 0 implies P (A) = 0 for all measurable sets A.
Remark 3.7 (Absolute Continuity ; Dominance). Absolute continuity is strictly
weaker than dominance: let X := {0, 1} and define a probability measure P that
assigns probability 2/3 to 1 and probability 1/3 to 0 until seeing the first 0, then P
behaves like the Lebesgue measure λ. Formally,
P (x1:t) :=
{(
2
3
)t if x1:t = 1t, and(
2
3
)n 1
3λ(xn+2:t) if ∃n ≥ 0. 1n0 v x1:t.
1We use the name Solomonoff prior for both a distribution over X∞ and a distribution over a com-
putably enumerable setM. Maybe M should better be called Solomonoff mixture to avoid confusion.
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Since λ(1t)/P (1t) = (3/4)t → 0 as t→∞, there is no constant c such that λ(x)/P (x) >
c > 0 for all finite strings x ∈ X ∗, hence λ does not dominate P . But P is absolutely
continuous with respect to λ because P -almost surely we draw a 0 eventually, and
then P behaves like λ. Hence P -almost surely λ/P 6→ 0. The claim now follows from
Proposition 3.23b. 3
The idea of Remark 3.7 is to ‘punch a hole into λ’ at the infinite string 1∞. This
infinite string has probability 0, hence this hole does not break absolute continuity.
But it breaks dominance on this infinite string. Analogously we could punch countably
many holes into a probability measure without breaking absolute continuity.
Definition 3.8 (Weak Dominance). The measure Q weakly dominates P (Q
×≥W P )
iff
lim
t→∞
1
t
log
Q(x1:t)
P (x1:t)
= 0 with P -probability 1.
Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996, Rem. 8) point out that for any P and Q,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log
Q(x1:t)
P (x1:t)
≤ 0 P -almost surely,
so crucial is whether the lim inf is also 0.
Remark 3.9 (Weak Dominance). The measure Q weakly dominates P if and only if
P -almost surely log(P (x)/Q(x)) ∈ o(t). 3
Ryabko and Hutter (2007, 2008) consider the following definition. It is analogous
to Definition 3.3, except that the constant c is allowed to depend on time.
Definition 3.10 (Dominance with Coefficients; Ryabko and Hutter, 2008, Def. 2). The
measure Q dominates P with coefficients f (Q ≥ P/f) iff Q(x) ≥ P (x)/f(|x|) for all
x ∈ X ∗.
If Q dominates P with coefficients f and f grows subexponentially (f ∈ o(exp)),
then Q weakly dominates P by Remark 3.9.
Example 3.11 (Speed Prior). Schmidhuber (2002) defines a variant of Solomonoff’s
priorM that penalizes programs by their running time, called the speed prior. Consider
the speed prior
SKt(x) :=
∑
p:xvU(p)
2−|p|
t(U, p, x)
where t(U, p, x) is the number of time steps the Turing machine U takes to produce x
from the program p. For any deterministic measure P computable in time q we have
SKt(x)
×≥ P (x)/q(|x|). Therefore SKt dominates P with coefficients O(q). If q is a
polynomial (P is computable in polynomial time), then it grows subexponentially and
thus SKt weakly dominates P . 3
The semimeasure loss SKt(x)−
∑
a∈X SKt(xa) in the speed prior is quite substantial:
since it takes at least n steps to output a string of length n, M(x) ≥ |x|SKt(x).
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Example 3.12 (Laplace Rule). The Laplace rule ρL is defined by
ρL(xt | x<t) := #{i < t | xi = xt}
t+ #X .
For X = {0, 1} and r ∈ [0, 1] the measure ρL dominates Bernoulli(r) with coefficients
f(t) = t−#X+1 (Ryabko and Hutter, 2008, Prop. 3). 3
Definition 3.13 (Local Absolute Continuity). The measure P is locally absolutely
continuous with respect to Q (Q L P ) iff Q(x) = 0 implies P (x) = 0 for all finite
strings x ∈ X ∗.
The notable difference between local absolute continuity and absolute continuity
is that Definition 3.6 talks about arbitrary measurable sets while Definition 3.13 only
talks about finite strings. The former is a much stronger property.
For example, every measure is locally absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure since λ(x) > 0 for all finite strings x ∈ X ∗.
Local absolute continuity is an extremely weak property. If it is not satisfied, we
have to be very careful when using Q for prediction: then there is a positive probability
that we have to condition on a probability zero event.
Example 3.14 (The Minimum Description Length Principle; Grünwald, 2007). Let
M be a countable set of probability measures on (X∞,F∞) and let K : M → [0, 1]
be a function such that
∑
P∈M 2
−K(P ) ≤ 1 called regularizer. Following notation from
Hutter (2009a), we define for each x ∈ X ∗ the minimal description length model as
MDLx := arg min
P∈M
{− logP (x) +K(P )}.
− logP (x) is the (arithmetic) code length of x given model P , andK(P ) is a complexity
penalty for P . Given data x ∈ X ∗, MDLx is the measure P ∈ M that minimizes the
total code length of data and model.
Note that the Lebesgue measure is not locally absolutely continuous with respect
to the MDL distribution Q(x) := MDLx(x): for some x ∈ X ∗ the minimum description
P ∈M may assign probability zero to a continuation xy ∈ X ∗. 3
Remark 3.15 (MDL is Inductively Inconsistent; Leike and Hutter, 2014a, Cor. 13).
The MDL estimator for countable classes as defined in Example 3.14 is inductively
inconsistent: the selected model P ∈ M can change infinitely often and thus the
limit limt→∞MDLx<t may not exist. This can be a major obstacle for using MDL for
prediction, since the model used for prediction has to be changed over and over again,
incurring the corresponding computational cost. 3
The following proposition establishes the relationship between our notions of com-
patibility; see also Figure 3.1 on page 46.
Proposition 3.16 (Relationships between Compatibilities).
(a) If Q
×≥ P , then Q P .
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(b) If Q P , then Q ×≥W P .
(c) If Q
×≥ P , then Q dominates P with coefficients f for a constant function f .
(d) If Q dominates P with coefficients f and f ∈ o(exp), then Q ×≥W P .
(e) If Q
×≥W P , then QL P .
Proof. (a) From Proposition 3.23 (a) and (b).
(b) From Proposition 3.23b and Kalai and Lehrer (1994, Prop. 3a).
(c) Follows immediately from the definitions.
(d) From Remark 3.9.
(e) Follows immediately from the definitions.
Note that the converse of Proposition 3.16d is false: in Remark 3.7 we defined
a measure P that is absolutely continuous with respect to λ (and hence is weakly
dominated by λ), but the coefficients for P/λ grow exponentially on the string 1t.
This infinite string has P -probability 0, but dominance with coefficients demands the
inequality Q ≥ P/f to hold for all strings.
Remark 3.17 (Local Absolute Continuity ; Absolute Continuity). Define P :=
Bernoulli(2/3) and Q := Bernoulli(1/3). Both measures P and Q are nonzero on
all cylinder sets: Q(x) ≥ 3−|x| > 0 and P (x) ≥ 3−|x| > 0 for every x ∈ X ∗. Therefore
Q is locally absolutely continuous with respect to P . However, Q is not absolutely
continuous with respect to P : define
A :=
{
x ∈ X ω
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
t→∞
1
t ones(x1:t) ≤ 12
}
.
The set A is F∞-measurable since A =
⋂∞
n=1
⋃
x∈Un Γx with Un := {x ∈ X ∗ | |x| ≥
n and ones(x) ≤ |x|/2}, the set of all finite strings of length at least n that have at
least as many zeros as ones. We have that P (A) = 0 and Q(A) = 1, hence Q is not
absolutely continuous with respect to P . 3
3.3 Martingales
The following two theorems state the connection between probability measures on infi-
nite strings and martingales. For two probability measures P and Q the quotient Q/P
is a nonnegative P -martingale if Q is locally absolutely continuous with respect to P .
Conversely, for every nonnegative P -martingale there is a probability measure QL P
such that the martingale is P -almost surely a multiple of Q/P .
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Theorem 3.18 (Measures 7→ Martingales; Doob, 1953, II§7 Ex. 3). Let Q and P be
two probability measures on (X∞,F∞) such that Q is locally absolutely continuous with
respect to P . Then the stochastic process (Xt)t∈N,
Xt(x) :=
Q(x1:t)
P (x1:t)
is a nonnegative P -martingale with E[Xt] = 1.
Theorem 3.19 (Martingales 7→Measures). Let P be a probability measure on (X∞,F∞)
and let (Xt)t∈N be a nonnegative P -martingale with E[Xt] = 1. There is a probability
measure Q on (X∞,F∞) that is locally absolutely continuous with respect to P and for
all x ∈ X∞ and all t ∈ N with P (x1:t) > 0,
Xt(x) =
Q(x1:t)
P (x1:t)
.
The proofs for Theorem 3.18 and Theorem 3.19 are provided in the Appendix.
Example 3.20 (The Posterior Martingale). Suppose we are interested in a hypothesis
H ⊆ X∞ (such as the proposition ‘all ravens are black’ in Example 3.1). If Q(H) =∑
P∈Mw(P )P (H) is a Bayesian mixture over a set of probability distributions M
with prior weights w ∈ ∆M (see Example 3.4), then the posterior belief Q(H | x) =∑
P∈Mw(P | x)P (H | x). The weights w(P | x) are called posterior weights, and
satisfy the identity
w(P | x) = w(P )P (x)
Q(x)
(3.3)
since
Q(H | x) = Q(H ∩ x)
Q(x)
=
1
Q(x)
∑
P∈M
w(P )P (H ∩ x)
=
∑
P∈M
w(P )
P (x)P (H ∩ x)
Q(x)P (x)
=
∑
P∈M
w(P | x)P (H | x).
According to Theorem 3.18 the posterior weight w(P | x) is a Q-martingale with
expectation w(P ). In particular, this means that the posterior weights converge Q-
almost surely by the martingale convergence theorem (Theorem 2.8). SinceQ dominates
P , by Proposition 3.16a P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and hence the
posterior also converges P -almost surely. 3
Remark 3.21 (Martingales and Absolute Continuity). While Theorem 3.18 trivially
also holds if Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P , Theorem 3.19 does not imply
that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P .
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Let P and Q be defined as in Remark 3.17. Consider the process X0(x) := 1,
Xt+1(x) :=
{
2Xt, if xt+1 = 0, and
1
2Xt, if xt+1 = 1.
The process (Xt)t∈N is a nonnegative P -martingale since every Xt is Ft-measurable and
for x = y1:t we have
E[Xt+1 | Ft](y) = P (x0 | x)2Xt(y) + P (x1 | x)12Xt(y)
= 132Xt(y) +
2
3 · 12Xt(y) = Xt(y).
Moreover,
Q(x) =
(
1
3
)ones(x) (2
3
)zeros(x)
=
(
2
3
)ones(x) (1
3
)zeros(x)
2−ones(x)2zeros(x) = P (x)Xt(y).
Hence Xt(y) = Q(y1:t)/P (y1:t) P -almost surely. The measure Q is uniquely defined
by its values on the cylinder sets, and as shown in Remark 3.17, Q is not absolutely
continuous with respect to P . 3
Theorem 3.22 (Radon-Nikodym Derivative). If Q  P , then there is a function
dP/dQ : X∞ → [0,∞) called the Radon-Nikodym derivative such that∫
fdP =
∫
f
dP
dQ
dQ
for all measurable functions f .
This function dP/dQ can be seen as a density function of P with respect to the
background measure Q. Moreover, dP/dQ is the limit of the martingale P/Q (Durrett,
2010, Sec. 5.3.3) which exists Q-almost surely according to Theorem 2.8.
The following proposition characterizes the notions of compatibility from Section 3.2
in terms of the martingale Q/P .
Proposition 3.23 (Martingales and Compatibility). The following relationships hold
between Q, P , and the P -martingale Yt := Q(x1:t)/P (x1:t).
(a) Q
×≥ P if and only if Yt ≥ c > 0 for all t ∈ N.
(b) Q P if and only if P -almost surely Yt 6→ 0 as t→∞.
(c) Q dominates P with coefficients f if and only if Yt ≥ 1/f(t) for all t.
(d) Q
×≥W P if and only if P -almost surely log(Yt+1/Yt)→ 0 in Cesàro average.
(e) QL P if and only if P -almost surely Yt > 0 for all t ∈ N.
Proof. (Yt)t∈N is a P -martingale according to Theorem 3.18.
(a) Q(x) ≥ cP (x) with c > 0 for all x ∈ X ∗ is equivalent to Q(x)/P (x) ≥ c > 0 for all
x ∈ X ∗.
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(b) Proved by Hutter (2009a, Lem. 3i).
(c) Analogously to the proof of (a).
(d) If Q weakly dominates P , we get − log Yt ∈ o(t) according to Remark 3.9. To-
gether with Y0 = 1 we get − log Yt =
∑t−1
k=0− log(Yk+1/Yk) ∈ o(t), therefore
t−1
∑t−1
k=0− log(Yk+1/Yk) → 0 as t → ∞. Conversely, if the Cesàro average con-
verges to 0, then t−1 log Yt → 0, hence − log Yt ∈ o(t).
(e) Let x ∈ X ∗ be any finite string. If Q L P and P (x) > 0, then Q(x) > 0,
and hence Q(x)/P (x) > 0. Conversely, if P (x) > 0 then Yt is well-defined, so if
Y|x|(x) > 0 then Q(x) > 0.
From Proposition 3.23b and Theorem 3.22 we get that Q  P if and only if the
Radon-Nikodym derivative dQ/dP is positive on a set of P -measure 1.
3.4 Merging
If Q is capable of learning, it should use the sequence x drawn from P to change its
opinions more in the direction of P . More precisely, we want Q( · | x<t) ≈ P ( · | x<t)
for large t. In the rest of this chapter, we make this notion of closeness precise and
discuss different conditions on Q that are sufficient for learning.
Strong merging implies that the belief of any hypothesis merges. This is very strong,
as hypotheses can talk about tail events: events that are independent of any finite initial
part of the infinite sequence (such as the event A in Remark 3.17). Weak merging only
considers hypothesis about the next couple of symbols, and almost weak merging allows
Q to deviate from P in a vanishing fraction of the time. Much of this section is based
on Kalai and Lehrer (1994) and Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996).
3.4.1 Strong Merging
Definition 3.24 (Strong Merging). Q merges strongly with P iff D∞(P,Q | x<t)→ 0
as t→∞ P -almost surely.
The following theorem is the famous merging of opinions theorem by Blackwell and
Dubins (1962).
Theorem 3.25 (Absolute Continuity⇒ Strong Merging; Blackwell and Dubins, 1962).
If P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then Q merges strongly with P .
Example 3.26 (The Black Ravens 2; Rathmanner and Hutter, 2011, Sec. 7.4). Recall
the black raven problem from Example 3.1. Let Q be a learning distribution that
dominates the true distribution P , such as a Bayesian mixture (Example 3.4). By
Proposition 3.16a we get Q P , and hence Q merges strongly to P by Theorem 3.25.
Thus we get as t → ∞ that P -almost surely |Q(H | x<t) − P (H | x<t)| → 0 for the
hypothesis H that ‘all ravens are black’ defined in (3.1). Thus if all ravens are black
in the real world (P (H) = 1), Q learns this asymptotically (Q(H | x<t) → 1). This is
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the solution we desired: the learning distribution Q converges to a true belief about an
infinite set by only looking from a finite (but growing) number of data points. 3
The following is the converse of Theorem 3.25.
Theorem 3.27 (Strong Merging ∧ Local Absolute Continuity⇒ Absolute Continuity;
Kalai and Lehrer, 1994, Thm. 2). If Q is locally absolutely continuous with respect to
P and Q merges strongly with P , then P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q.
The following result shows that local absolute continuity is not required for strong
merging: recall that according to Example 3.14 the MDL distribution is not locally
absolutely continuous with respect to every P from the classM.
Theorem 3.28 (Strong Merging for MDL; Hutter, 2009a, Thm. 1). If P ∈M, then
D∞(P,MDLx | x)→ 0 as |x| → ∞ P -almost surely.
Let M be a (possibly uncountable) set of probability measures on (X∞,F∞).
Ryabko (2010, Thm. 4) shows that if there is a Q that merges strongly with every
P ∈ M, then there is a Bayesian mixture over a countable subset of M that also
merges strongly with every P ∈M.
3.4.2 Weak Merging
In Definition 3.24 the supremum ranges over all measurable sets A ∈ F∞ which includes
tail events. Instead, we may restrict the supremum to the next few symbols. This is
known as weak merging.
Definition 3.29 (Weak Merging). Q weakly merges with P iff for every d ∈ N,
Dt+d(Q,P | x<t)→ 0 as t→∞ P -almost surely.
The following lemma gives an equivalent formulation of weak merging.
Lemma 3.30 (Lehrer and Smorodinsky, 1996, Rem. 5). Q weakly merges with P if
and only if Dt(Q,P | x<t)→ 0 as t→∞ P -almost surely.
Unfortunately, weak dominance is not sufficient for weak merging (Lehrer and
Smorodinsky, 1996, Ex. 10). We need the following stronger condition, that turns
out to be (almost) necessary. In the following, let Yt := Q(x1:t)/P (x1:t) denote the
P -martingale from Proposition 3.23.
Theorem 3.31 (Kalai and Lehrer, 1994, Prop. 5a). If P -almost surely Yt+1/Yt → 1,
then Q merges weakly with P .
Example 3.32 (Laplace Rule 2). Suppose we use the Laplace rule from Example 3.12
to predict a Bernoulli(r) process. By the strong law of large numbers, ρL(xt | x<t)→ r
almost surely. Therefore we can use Theorem 3.31 to conclude that ρL merges weakly
with Bernoulli(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. (Note that strongly merging with every Bernoulli
process is impossible; Ryabko, 2010, p. 7) 3
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The following is a converse to Theorem 3.31.
Theorem 3.33 (Kalai and Lehrer, 1994, Prop. 5b). If Q merges weakly with P , then
Yt+1/Yt → 1 in P -probability.
Unfortunately, weak dominance is not enough to guarantee weak merging.
Example 3.34 (Weak Dominance;WeakMerging; Ryabko and Hutter, 2007, Prop. 7).
Let X = {0, 1} and let f be any arbitrarily slowly monotone growing function with
f(t)→∞. Define P (1∞) := 1, the sequence (ti)i∈N such that f(ti+1) ≥ 2f(ti), and
Q(xt | x<t) :=

1
2 if t = ti for some i ∈ N,
1 if t 6= ti and xt = 1, and
0 otherwise.
Now Q dominates P with coefficients f by construction and Q weakly dominates P if
f grows subexponentially. However, |Q(1 | 1t) − P (1 | 1t)| ≥ 1/2 for infinitely many
t ∈ N. 3
3.4.3 Almost Weak Merging
The following definition is due to Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996, Def. 10).
Definition 3.35 (Almost Weak Merging). Q almost weakly merges with P iff for every
d ∈ N
1
t
t∑
k=1
Dt+d(Q,P | x<t)→ 0 as t→∞ P -almost surely.
There is also an analogue of Lemma 3.30 for almost weakly merging in the sense
that we can equivalently set d = 0 (Lehrer and Smorodinsky, 1996, Rem. 6).
Remark 3.36 (Weak Merging and Merging in KL-Divergence). From Lemma 2.13
follows that weak merging is implied by KLd(P,Q | x) → 0 P -almost surely and
almost weak merging is implied by
∑t
k=1 KL1(P,Q | x<k) ∈ o(t) P -almost surely,
i.e., KLt(P,Q) ∈ o(t) (Ryabko and Hutter, 2008, Lem. 1). The converse is generally
false. 3
The following proposition relates the three notions of merging.
Proposition 3.37 (Strong Merging ⇒ Weak Merging ⇒ Almost Weak Merging). If
Q merges strongly with P , then Q merges weakly with P . If Q merges weakly with P ,
then Q merges almost weakly with P .
Proof. Follows immediately from the definitions.
Theorem 3.38 (Weak Dominance⇒ Almost Weak Merging; Lehrer and Smorodinsky,
1996, Thm. 4). If Q weakly dominates P , then Q merges almost weakly with P .
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From Theorem 3.38 we get that the speed prior (Example 3.11) merges almost
weakly with any probability distribution estimable in polynomial time.
We also have the following converse to Theorem 3.38.
Theorem 3.39 (Almost Weak Merging⇒Weak Dominance; Lehrer and Smorodinsky,
1996, Cor. 7). If Q is locally absolutely continuous with respect to P , Q merges almost
weakly with P , and P -almost surely lim inft→∞ Yt+1/Yt > 0, then Q weakly dominates
P .
3.5 Predicting
In Section 3.4 we wanted Q to acquire the correct beliefs about P . In this section, we
exploit the accuracy of our beliefs for predicting individual symbols. We derive bounds
on the number of errors Q makes when trying to predict a string drawn from P .
Since the data drawn from P is stochastic, we cannot expect to make a finite number
of errors. Even the perfect predictor that knows P generally makes an infinite number
of errors. For example, trying to predict the Lebesgue measure λ (Example 2.15), in
expectation we make half an error in every time step. So instead we are asking about
the asymptotic error rate of a predictor based on Q compared to a predictor based on
P , the prediction regret .
Let xRt be the t-th symbol predicted by the probability measure R according to the
maximum likelihood estimator:
xRt :∈ arg max
a∈X
R(x<ta | x<t). (3.4)
The instantaneous error of a R-based predictor is defined as
eRt :=
{
0 if xt = xRt , and
1 otherwise.
and the cumulative error is
ERt :=
t∑
k=1
eRk .
Note that both et and Et are random variables.
Definition 3.40 (Prediction Regret). In time step t the prediction regret is EQt − EPt
and the expected prediction regret is E
[
EQt − EPt
]
.
More generally, we could also follow Hutter (2001b) and phrase predictive perfor-
mance in terms of loss: given a loss function ` : X ×X → R the predictor Q suffers an
(instantaneous) loss of `(xQt , xPt ) in time step t. If the loss function ` is bounded in [0, 1],
many of the results for prediction regret also hold for cumulative loss (for Section 3.5.2
we also need `(a, a) = 0 for all a ∈ X ). In this chapter we chose to phrase the results
in terms of prediction errors instead of loss because prediction errors are conceptionally
simpler.
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Example 3.41 (Good Prediction Regret ; Merging/Compatibility). Good predic-
tion regret does not imply (weak/strong) merging or (weak) dominance: Let P :=
Bernoulli(1/3) and Q := Bernoulli(1/4). Clearly P and Q do not merge (weakly) or
(weakly) dominate each other. However, a P -based predictor always predicts 0, and so
does a Q-based predictor. Therefore the prediction regret EQt − EPt is always 0. 3
Example 3.42 (Adversarial Sequence; Legg, 2006, Lem. 4). No learning distribution
Q will learn to predict everything. We can always define a Q-adversarial sequence z1:∞
recursively according to
zt :=
{
0 if Q(0 | z<t) < 1/2, and
1 if Q(0 | z<t) ≥ 1/2.
In every time step the probability that a Q-based predictor makes an error is at least
1/2, hence eQt ≥ 1/2 and EQt ≥ t/2. But z1:∞ is a deterministic sequence, thus an
informed predictor makes zero errors. Therefore the prediction regret of Q on the
sequence z1:∞ is linear. 3
3.5.1 Dominance
We start with the prediction regret bounds proved by Hutter (2001b) in case the learning
distribution Q dominates the true distribution P . In the following, let cP denote the
constant from Definition 3.3.
Theorem 3.43 (Hutter, 2007b, Eq. 5 & 8). For all P and Q,√
EPEQn −
√
EPEPn ≤
√
2KLn(P,Q).
The following bound on prediction regret then follows easily, but it is a factor of
√
2
worse than the bound stated by Hutter (2005, Thm. 3.36).
Corollary 3.44 (Expected Prediction Regret). For all P and Q,
0 ≤ EP
[
EQn − EPn
]
≤ 2KLn(P,Q) + 2
√
2KLn(P,Q)EPEPn .
Proof. From Theorem 3.43 we get
EP
[
EQn − EPn
]
=
(√
EPEQn +
√
EPEPn
)(√
EPEQn −
√
EPEPn
)
≤
(√
EPEQn +
√
EPEPn
)√
2KLn(P,Q)
≤
(√
2KLn(P,Q) +
√
EPEPn +
√
EPEPt
)√
2KLn(P,Q)
= 2KLn(P,Q) + 2
√
2KLn(P,Q)EPEPn .
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If Q dominates P , then we have KLn(P,Q) ≤ − ln cP :
KLn(P,Q) =
∑
x∈Xn
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
≤
∑
x∈Xn
P (x) log
1
cP
= − log cP (3.5)
This invites the following corollary.
Corollary 3.45 (Prediction Regret for Dominance; Hutter, 2005, Cor. 3.49). If Q
dominates P , then the following statements hold.
(a) EPEQ∞ is finite if and only if EPEP∞ is finite.
(b)
√
EPEQ∞ −
√
EPEP∞ ∈ O(1)
(c) EPEQt /EPEPt → 1 for EPEPt →∞.
(d) EP
[
EQt − EPt
]
∈ O
(√
EPEPt
)
.
If the true distribution P is deterministic, we can improve on these bounds:
Example 3.46 (Predicting a Deterministic Measure). Suppose we are predicting a
deterministic measure P that assigns probability 1 to the infinite string x1:∞. If P is
dominated by Q, the total expected prediction regret EPEQ∞ is bounded by −2 ln cP
by Corollary 3.44. This is easy to see: every time we predict a wrong symbol a 6= xt,
then Q(a | x<t) ≥ Q(xt | x<t), so Q(xt | x<t) ≤ 1/2. Therefore Yt ≤ Yt−1/2 and by
dominance Yt ≥ cP . Hence a prediction error can occur at most − log cP times. 3
Generally, the O(EPEPt ) bounds on expected prediction regret given in Corol-
lary 3.45 are essentially unimprovable:
Example 3.47 (Lower Bounds on Prediction Regret). Set X := {0, 1} and consider
the uniform measure λ from Example 2.15. For each time step t, we have λ(0 | x<t) =
λ(1 | x<t) = 1/2, so the argmax in (3.4) ties and hence it does not matter whether
we predict 0 or 1. We take two predictors P and Q, where P always predicts 0 and Q
always predicts 1. Let Zt := E
Q
t − EPt . Since their predictions never match, Zt is an
ordinary random walk with step size 1. We have (Weisstein, 2002)
lim sup
t→∞
EP [EQt − EPt ]√
t
=
√
2/pi
and for the law of the iterated logarithm (Durrett, 2010, Thm. 8.8.3)
lim sup
t→∞
EQt − EPt√
2t log log t
= 1 P -almost surely.
Both bounds are known to be asymptotically tight. 3
While Example 3.47 shows that the bounds from Corollary 3.45 are asymptotically
tight, they are misleading because in most cases, we can do much better. According
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to the following theorem, the worst case bounds are only attained if P (xt | x<t) is
sufficiently close to 1/2.
Theorem 3.48 (Expected Prediction Regret for Nonuniform Measures). If X = {0, 1}
and there is an ε > 0 such that |P (xt | x<t)− 1/2| ≥ ε for all x1:t ∈ X ∗, then
EP
[
EQt − EPt
]
≤ KLt(P,Q)
ε
.
Proof. Recall the definition of entropy in nats:
Ent(p) := −p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p).
The second order Taylor approximation of Ent at 1/2 is
f(p) = ln 2− 2(p− 12)2.
One can check that f(p) ≥ Ent(p) for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Define p := P (xPt | x<t) ≥ 1/2
and q := Q(xQt | x<t) ≥ 1/2 to ease notation. Consider the function
g(p, q, ε) := p− (1− p)− ε−1(p ln p1−q + (1− p) ln 1−pq )
which is strictly increasing as q decreases, so from q ≥ 1/2 we get
g(p, q, ε) ≤ 2p− 1− ε−1 ln 2 + ε−1Ent(p) ln 2
≤ 2p− 1− ε−1 ln 2 + ε−1f(p) ln 2
= 2p− 1− ε−12(p− 12)2,
which decreases as p increases, hence it is maximized for p = 1/2 + ε,
g(p, q, ε) ≤ 2ε− ε−12ε2 = 0
Therefore g is nonpositive. If xQt = xPt , the one-step error is 0. Otherwise EP [et |
x<t] = p − (1 − p) and g(p, q, ε) = EP [et | x<t] − ε−1KL1(P,Q | x<t), so we get
EP [et | x<t] ≤ ε−1KL1(P,Q | x<t). Summing this from t = 1 to n yields the claim.
E
[
EQn − EPn
]
≤ ε−1KLn(P,Q).
3.5.2 Absolute Continuity
Theorem 3.49 (Prediction with Absolute Continuity). If Q P , then√
EQt −
√
EPt ≤ O
(√
log log t
)
P -almost surely.
The proof idea is inspired by Miller and Sanchirico (1999). We think of P and Q as
two players in a zero-sum betting game. In every time step t, the players will make a
bet on the outcome of xt. If xt = x
Q
t 6= xPt , then Q wins $1 from P , if xt = xPt 6= xQt ,
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then Q loses $1 to P . Otherwise xQt = xPt or x
Q
t 6= xt 6= xPt and neither player gains
or loses money. Since Q predicts according to the maximum likelihood principle (3.4),
it is rational to accept the bet from Q’s perspective. In Q’s eyes, the worst case is a
fair bet, so Q will not lose more money than it would lose on a random walk. The law
of the iterated logarithm gives a Q-probability one statement about this bound, which
transfers to P by absolute continuity.
Proof. Define the stochastic process Zt := E
Q
t − EPt . Since EQ[eRt ] = Q(xRt | x<t), we
get
EQ[Zt+1 | Ft] = Q(xQt | x<t)−Q(xPt | x<t) + Zt
≥ Q(xQt | x<t)−Q(xQt | x<t) + Zt = Zt,
hence (Zt)t∈N is a Q-submartingale. In the worst case (for Q), (Zt)t∈N is just a random
walk with step size 1. But Zt can only move if Q and P predict a different symbol. If
this happens, at least one of them makes an error. Let mt be the number of steps Zt
has moved (Zt+1 6= Zt). Then mt ≤ EQt + EPt and mt ≤ t. By the law of the iterated
logarithm (Durrett, 2010, Thm. 8.8.3),
lim inf
t→∞
Zt√
2mt log logmt
= −1
Q-almost surely. We define the event
A :=
{
∃C ∀t. Zt ≥ −C
√
mt log logmt
}
.
Then Q(A) = 1, hence P (A) = 1 by absolute continuity.
EQt − EPt = Zt ≤ C
√
(EQt + E
P
t ) log log t ≤ C
(√
EQt +
√
EPt
)√
log log t
Dividing both sides by
√
EQt +
√
EPt yields that there is a P -almost surely finite random
variable C such that
√
EQt −
√
EPt ≤ C
√
log log t.
This invites the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 3.50 (Prediction Regret for Absolute Continuity). If Q P , then
EQt − EPt ∈ O
(
log log t+
√
EPt log log t
)
P -almost surely.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Corollary 3.44.
While Corollary 3.50 establishes an almost sure prediction regret bound, it is dif-
ferent from the bound on expected prediction regret from Corollary 3.44; bounds on
E[EQt − EPt ] are incomparable to almost sure bound given in Theorem 3.49: for a se-
quence of nonnegative (unbounded) random variables convergence in mean does not
40 Learning
imply almost sure convergence (Stoyanov, 2013, Sec. 14.7) or vice versa (Stoyanov,
2013, Sec. 14.8ii).
We proceed to establish an improved prediction regret bound in case P is nonuniform
analogously to Theorem 3.48.
Theorem 3.51 (Prediction Regret for Nonuniform Measures). If Q P , X = {0, 1},
and there is an ε > 0 such that with P -probability 1
|P (xt | x<t)− 1/2| ≥ ε
for all t ∈ N, then P -almost surely EQt − EPt ∈ O(1).
Proof. If |P (xt | x<t) − 1/2| ≥ ε, then for large enough t, Q will have merged with P
(Theorem 3.25) and hence |Q(xt | x<t)− 1/2| ≥ ε/2 infinitely often.
Thus Zt has an expected gain of ε/2 if the predictors disagree. Therefore Zt →∞
Q-almost surely. Consequently, the set
A := {∃t0 ∀t ≥ t0. Zt ≥ 0}
has Q-measure 1. By absolute continuity, it also has P -measure 1, hence there is a
P -almost surely finite random variable C such that for all t, Zt ≥ −C.
There is another argument that we could use to show that under the condition of
Theorem 3.51 EQt −EPt is almost surely finite: If P is absolutely continuous with respect
to Q, then Q merges strongly with P and hence Q merges weakly with P . Therefore
almost surely there is a t0 such that for all t ≥ t0 we have |Q(xPt | x<t)−P (xPt | x<t)| <
ε, thus xQt = xPt for t ≥ t0.
3.5.3 Dominance with Coefficients
Lemma 3.52 (KL Divergence and Dominance With Coefficients). If Q dominates P
with coefficients f , then KLt(Q,P ) ≤ ln f(t).
Proof. Analogous to (3.5).
This lets us derive an analogous regret bound to Corollary 3.44.
Corollary 3.53 (Expected Prediction Regret for Dominance With Coefficients). If Q
dominates P with coefficients f , then
EP
[
EQn − EPn
]
≤ 2 ln f(t) + 2
√
2EPEPn ln f(t).
Proof. Apply Lemma 3.52 to Corollary 3.44.
For weak dominance we get sublinear prediction regret.
Corollary 3.54 (Sublinear Prediction Regret for Weak Dominance). If Q weakly dom-
inates P , then EP [EQn − EPn ] ∈ o(t).
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Proof. By Remark 3.9 ln f ∈ o(t). Applying Corollary 3.53 we get
EP
[
EQn − EPn
] ≤ 2o(t) + 2√2EPEPn o(t) ≤ 2o(t) + 2√2O(t)o(t) ∈ o(t).
3.6 Learning with Algorithmic Information Theory
Algorithmic information theory provides a theoretical framework to apply the probabil-
ity theory results from the previous sections. In the following we discuss Solomonoff’s
famous theory of induction (Section 3.6.1), the speed prior (Section 3.6.2), and learning
with a universal compression algorithm (Section 3.6.3).
3.6.1 Solomonoff Induction
Solomonoff (1964, 1978) proposed a theory of learning, also known as universal in-
duction or Solomonoff induction. It encompasses Ockham’s razor by favoring simple
explanations over complex ones, and Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations by
never discarding possible explanations. See Rathmanner and Hutter (2011) for a very
readable introduction to Solomonoff’s theory and its philosophical motivations and
Sterkenburg (2016) for a critique of its optimality.
At the core of this theory is Solomonoff’s distribution M , as defined in Example 3.5.
SinceM dominates all lower semicomputable semimeasures, we get all the merging and
prediction results from Section 3.4 and Section 3.5: when drawing a string from any
computable measure P , M arrives at the correct belief for any hypothesis.
Corollary 3.55 (Strong Merging for Solomonoff Induction). M merges strongly with
every computable measure.
Proof. From Proposition 3.16a and Theorem 3.25.
Corollary 3.56 (Expected Prediction Regret for Solomonoff Induction). For all com-
putable measures P ,
EP
[
EMt − EPt
] ≤ K(P ) ln 4 +√2EPEPt K(P ) ln 16.
Proof. From Corollary 3.44 and cP = 2−K(P ).
Remark 3.57 (Converging Fast and Slow). The convergence of M to a computable P
is fast in the sense of Corollary 3.56: M cannot make many more prediction errors than
P in expectation. When predicting an infinite computable sequence x1:∞, the total
number of prediction errors is bounded by |p|2 ln 2 ≈ 1.4|p| where p is a program that
generates x1:∞ (Example 3.46).
The convergence of M to P is also slow in the sense that M(xt | x<t) → 1 slower
than any computable function since 1−M(xt | x<t) ×≥ 2−minn≥tK(n) for all t. 3
The bound from Corollary 3.56 is not optimal. Even if we knew the program p
generating the sequence x1:∞, there might be a shorter program p′ that computes x1:∞;
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hence the improved bound EM∞ ≤ |p′|2 ln 2 also holds. Since Kolmogorov complexity is
incomputable, we can’t find the ‘best’ bound algorithmically.
Solomonoff induction may even converge on some incomputable measures.
Example 3.58 (M Converges on Some Incomputable Measures). Let r be an incom-
putable real number. Then the measure P := Bernoulli(r) is not computable and M is
not absolutely continuous with respect to P : for
A :=
{
x ∈ X∞
∣∣∣ lim
t→∞ ones(x1:t) = r
}
we have P (A) = 1 but M(A) = 0. Since M L P we get from Theorem 3.27 that M
does not merge with P . Nevertheless, M still succeeds at prediction because it domi-
nates Bernoulli(q) for each rational q and the rationals are dense around r. According
to Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996, Lem. 3), this implies that M weakly dominates P
and by Theorem 3.38 M almost weakly merges to P . 3
The fact that M does not merge strongly with every Bernoulli(r) process is not
a failure of Solomonoff’s prior. Ryabko (2010, p. 7) shows that for the class of all
Bernoulli measures there is no probability measure that merges strongly with each of
them.
The definition of M has only one parameter: the choice of the universal Turing
machine. The effect of this choice on the function K can be uniformly bounded by
a constant by the invariance theorem (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Thm. 3.1.1). Hence the
choice of the UTM changes the prediction regret bound from Corollary 3.56 only by
a constant. This constant can be large, preventing any finite-time guarantees that are
independent of the UTM. However, asymptotically Solomonoff induction succeeds even
for terrible choices of the UTM.
The Solomonoff normalization Mnorm of M is defined according to Definition 2.16.
While Mnorm dominates M according to Lemma 2.17 and thus every lower semicom-
putable semimeasure, in some respects, Mnorm behaves a little differently from M .
Another way to complete the semimeasure M into a measure is given in the following
example.
Example 3.59 (The Measure Mixture; Gács, 1983, p. 74). The measure mixture M is
defined as
M(x) := lim
n→∞
∑
y∈Xn
M(xy). (3.6)
It is the same as M except that the contributions by programs that do not produce
infinite strings are removed: for any such program p, let k denote the length of the
finite string generated by p. Then for |xy| > k, the program p does not contribute to
M(xy), hence it is excluded from M(x).
Similarly toM , the measure mixtureM is not a (probability) measure sinceM() <
1; but in this case normalization (2.2) is just multiplication with the constant 1/M(),
leading to the normalized measure mixture Mnorm. 3
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Even thoughM merges strongly with any computable measure P with P -probability
1, Lattimore and Hutter (2013, 2015) show that generally it does not hold for all Martin-
Löf random sequences (which also form a set of P -probability 1). Hutter and Muchnik
(2007, Thm. 6) construct non-universal lower semicomputable semimeasures that have
this convergence property for all P -Martin-Löf random sequences. For infinite nonran-
dom sequences whose bits are selectively predicted by some total recursive function,
Lattimore et al. (2011, Thm. 10) show that the normalized Solomonoff measure Mnorm
converges to 1 on the selected bits. This does not hold for the unnormalized measure
M (Lattimore et al., 2011, Thm. 12).
3.6.2 The Speed Prior
Solomonoff’s prior M is incomputable (Theorem 6.3); a computable alternative is the
speed prior from Example 3.11. In this section we state merging and prediction results
for SKt, a speed prior introduced by Filan et al. (2016) formally defined in Example 3.11.
It is slightly different from the speed prior defined by Schmidhuber (2002), but for the
latter no compatibility properties are known for nondeterministic measures.
Definition 3.60 (Estimable in Polynomial Time). A function f : X ∗ → R is estimable
in polynomial time iff there is a function g : X ∗ → R computable in polynomial time
such that f ×= g.
For a measure P estimable in polynomial time the speed prior SKt dominates P
with coefficients polynomial in |x| − logP (x) (Filan et al., 2016, Eq. 12). Thus SKt
weakly dominates P and we get the following results.
Corollary 3.61 (Almost Weak Merging for SKt). SKt almost weakly merges with every
measure estimable in polynomial time.
Proof. From Theorem 3.38 and Filan et al. (2016, Eq. 12) since logP does not grow
superexponentially P -almost surely.
Corollary 3.62 (Expected Prediction Regret for SKt; Filan et al., 2016, Thm. 9). For
all measures P estimable in polynomial time,
EP
[
ESKtn − EPn
] ∈ O(log n+√EPEP∞ log n) .
Proof. From Corollary 3.44 and Filan et al. (2016, Eq. 14).
3.6.3 Universal Compression
Solomonoff’s distribution can be approximated using a standard compression algorithm,
motivated by the similarityM(x) ≈ 2−Km(x), where Km denotes monotone Kolmogorov
complexity. The function Km is a universal compressor , compressing at least as well
as any other recursively enumerable program.
Gács (1983) shows that the similarity M ≈ 2−Km is not an equality. However, the
difference between − logM and Km is very small: the best known lower bound is due
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to Day (2011) who shows that Km(x) > − logM(x) +O(log log |x|) for infinitely many
x ∈ X ∗.
Nevertheless, 2−Km dominates every computable measure (Li and Vitányi, 2008,
Thm. 4.5.4 and Lem. 4.5.6ii(d); originally proved by Levin, 1973). Hence all the strong
results that hold for Solomonoff induction (prediction regret and strong merging) also
hold for compression: we apply Theorem 3.25 and Corollary 3.44 to get the following
results. See Hutter (2006a) for further discussion on using the universal compressor
Km for learning.
Corollary 3.63 (Strong Merging for Universal Compression). The distribution 2−Km(x)
merges strongly with every computable measure.
Corollary 3.64 (Expected Prediction Regret for Universal Compression). For Q(x) :=
2−Km(x) and for all computable measures P there is a constant cP such that
EP
[
EQt − EPt
]
≤ cP +
√
cPEPEPt .
This provides a theoretical basis for viewing compression as a general purpose learn-
ing algorithm. In this spirit, the Hutter prize is awarded for the compression of a 100MB
excerpt from the English Wikipedia (Hutter, 2006c).
Practical compression algorithms (such as the algorithm by Ziv and Lempel (1977)
used in gzip) are not universal. Hence they do not dominate every computable distri-
bution. As with the speed prior, what matters is the rate at which Yt = Q(x1:t)/P (x1:t)
goes to 0, i.e., does the compressor weakly dominate the true distribution in the sense
of Definition 3.8?
Veness et al. (2015) successfully apply the Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm as a
learning algorithm for reinforcement learning; however, some preprocessing of the data
is required. More remotely, Vitányi et al. (2009) use standard compression algorithms
to classify mammal genomes, languages, and classical music.
3.7 Summary
Ultimately, whether learning succeeds depends on the rate at which the nonnegative
P -martingale Q/P goes to 0 (when drawing from P ). If Q/P does not converge to zero,
then Q merges strongly with P and thus arrives at correct beliefs about any hypothesis,
including tail events. If Q/P converges to zero subexponentially, then Q merges almost
weakly with P and thus asymptotically has incorrect beliefs about the immediate future
only a vanishing fraction of the time.
Corollary 3.44 bounds the expected prediction regret by the KL-divergence between
P and Q plus a
√
EPEPt term. The KL-divergence is in turn bounded by the rate at
which Q/P goes to zero. It is constant if Q dominates P and bounded by ln f if Q
dominates P with coefficients f . If Q weakly dominates P , then the KL-divergence is
sublinear. We also derived bounds on the prediction regret for absolute continuity (Sec-
tion 3.5.2). Remarkably, the bounds are only log log t worse than the bound we get from
dominance. Moreover, they hold almost surely instead of in expectation.
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name symbol defined in property
Bayesian mixture ξ Example 3.4 dominates every P ∈M
Solomonoff prior M Example 3.5 dominates every lower semi-
computable semimeasure
universal compression 2−Km Equation 2.1 dominates every computable
measure
speed prior SKt Example 3.11 weak dominates every mea-
sure estimable in polytime
Laplace rule ρL Example 3.12 merges weakly with every
Bernoulli process
MDL MDLx Example 3.14 merges strongly with every
P ∈M
Table 3.1: Examples of learning distributions discussed in this chapter and their
properties.
compatibility
of P and Q
martingale merging prediction regret
Q
×≥ P Yt ≥ c > 0 strong merging −2 ln c+ 2
√
−2EPEPt ln c
Q P Yt 6→ 0 strong merging O
(
log log t+√
EPEPt log log t
)
Yt+1/Yt → 1 weak merging o(t)
Q ≥ P/f Yt ≥ 1/f(t) 2 ln f(t) + 2
√
2EPEPt ln f(t)
Q
×≥W P log(Yt+1/Yt) → 1
in Cesàro average
almost weak
merging
o(t)
QL P Yt > 0 O(t)
Table 3.2: Summary on properties of learning. The first column lists different notions
of compatibility introduced in Section 3.2; the second column lists properties of the
P -martingale Yt := Q(x1:t)/P (x1:t) from Section 3.3; the third column lists different
notions of merging discussed in Section 3.4; the fourth column states the bounds on
the prediction regret (in expectation and almost surely respectively) from Section 3.5.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the origin of the results.
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strong merging
weak merging
almost
weak
merging
Q
×≥ P
Q P
Q ≥ P/f
Q
×≥W P
QL P
Yt ≥ c > 0
Yt 6→ 0
Yt+1/Yt → 1
log(Yt+1/Yt)→ 0
in Cesàro average
Yt > 0
f ∈ o(t)
Hutter (2009a, Lem. 3i)
Blackwell and Dubins (1962)
Kalai and Lehrer (1994, Thm. 2), L
Lehrer and Smorodinsky
(1996, Thm. 4)
Lehrer and Smorodinsky
(1996, Cor. 7),
L and
lim inf
t→∞
Yt+1/Yt > 0
Kalai and Lehrer (1994, Prop. 5)
Figure 3.1: Properties of learning and their relationship. We use Yt :=
Q(x1:t)/P (x1:t). An arrow between two statements means that one statement implies
the other. The transitive property of implications is not made explicit. The source of
the result is indicated on the arrow, sometimes together with a side condition. If no
source is given, then the relationship is easy and a proof can be found in this chapter.
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Next, we showed that the
√
EPEPt term is generally unimprovable (Example 3.47).
However, it comes only from predicting measures that assign probabilities close to 1/2.
If we can bound P away from 1/2, then the
√
EPEPt term disappears (Theorem 3.48
and Theorem 3.51).
Table 3.1 lists our learning distributions. The Bayesian mixture is the strongest
since it dominates every measure from the given classM (Example 3.4). The minimum
description length model MDLx does not have this property, yet it still merges strongly
with every measure from the class (Example 3.14 and Theorem 3.28). The Laplace rule
is only useful for learning i.i.d. measures; it merges weakly with every Bernoulli pro-
cess (Example 3.12 and Example 3.32). We also discussed some learning distributions
from algorithmic information theory. Solomonoff’s prior is a Bayesian mixture over
all lower semicomputable semimeasures (Example 3.5 and Wood et al., 2011). Like
the universal compressor it dominates and hence merges strongly with all computable
measures. The speed prior dominates all probability measures estimable in polynomial
time with polynomial coefficients (Example 3.11), and thus merges weakly with each of
them.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results from this chapter and Figure 3.1 illustrates their
logical relationship and their origin.
We conclude this chapter with a paradox from the philosophy of science.
Remark 3.65 (The Paradox of Confirmation). Recall the black raven problem intro-
duced in Example 3.1; the hypothesis ‘all ravens are black’ is denoted with H. The
paradox of confirmation, also known as Hempel’s paradox (Hempel, 1945), relies on the
following three principles.
• Nicod’s criterion (Nicod, 1961, p. 67): observing an F that is a G increases our
belief in the hypothesis that all F s are Gs.
• The equivalence condition: logically equivalent hypotheses are confirmed or dis-
confirmed by the same evidence.
• The paradoxical conclusion: a green apple confirms H.
The argument goes as follows. The hypothesisH is logically equivalent to the hypothesis
H ′ that all non-black objects are non-ravens. According to Nicod’s criterion, any non-
black non-raven, such as a green apple, confirms H ′. But then the equivalence condition
entails the paradoxical conclusion.
The paradox of confirmation has been discussed extensively in the literature on the
philosophy of science (Hempel, 1945; Good, 1960; Mackie, 1963; Good, 1967; Hempel,
1967; Maher, 1999; Vranas, 2004); see Swinburne (1971) for a survey. Support for
Nicod’s criterion is not uncommon (Mackie, 1963; Hempel, 1967; Maher, 1999) and no
consensus is in sight.
A Bayesian reasoner might be tempted to argue that a green apple does confirm the
hypothesis H, but only to a small degree, since there are vastly more non-black objects
than ravens (Good, 1960). This leads to the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion,
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and this solution to the confirmation paradox is known as the standard Bayesian solu-
tion. Vranas (2004) shows that this solution is equivalent to the assertion that blackness
is equally probable regardless of whether H holds: P (black|H) ≈ P (black).
The following is a very concise example against the standard Bayesian solution by
Good (1967): There are two possible worlds, the first has 100 black ravens and a million
other birds, while the second has 1000 black ravens, one white raven, and a million other
birds. Now we draw a bird uniformly at random, and it turns out to be a black raven.
Contrary to what Nicod’s criterion claims, this is strong evidence that we are in fact in
the second world, and in this world non-black ravens exist.
For another, more intuitive example: Suppose you do not know anything about
ravens and you have a friend who collects atypical objects. If you see a black raven
in her collection, surely this would not increase your belief in the hypothesis that all
ravens are black.
In Leike and Hutter (2015d) we investigate the paradox of confirmation in the con-
text of Solomonoff induction. We show that the paradoxical conclusion is avoided
because Solomonoff induction violates Nicod’s criterion: There are time steps when
(counterfactually) observing a black raven disconfirms the hypothesis that all ravens
are black. When predicting a deterministic computable sequence Nicod’s criterion is
even violated infinitely often. However, if we normalize Solomonoff’s prior and ob-
serve a deterministic computable infinite string, Nicod’s criterion is violated at most
finitely many times. These results are independent of the choice of the universal Turing
machine.
We must conclude that violating Nicod’s criterion is not a fault of Solomonoff in-
duction. Instead, we should accept that for Bayesian reasoning Nicod’s criterion, in its
generality, is false! Quoting the great Bayesian master Jaynes (2003, p. 144):
In the literature there are perhaps 100 ‘paradoxes’ and controversies which
are like this, in that they arise from faulty intuition rather than faulty
mathematics. Someone asserts a general principle that seems to him intu-
itively right. Then, when probability analysis reveals the error, instead of
taking this opportunity to educate his intuition, he reacts by rejecting the
probability analysis. 3
Chapter 4
Acting
I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should
become a universal prior. — Immanuel Kant
Recall our decomposition of intelligence into learning and acting from Equation 1.1.
The previous chapter made the notion of learning precise and provided several examples
of learning distributions for the non-i.i.d. setting (see Table 3.1). Learning is passive:
there is no interaction with the data-generating process. In this chapter we transition
into the active setting: we consider an agent acting in an unknown environment in
order to achieve a goal . In our case, this goal is maximizing reward; this is known as
reinforcement learning. Where this reward signal originates does not concern us here.
In this thesis we consider is the general reinforcement learning problem in which we
do not make several of the typical simplifying assumptions (see Table 1.1). Environ-
ments are only partially observable, have infinitely many states, and might contain traps
from which the agent cannot escape. The context for making decision is the agent’s
entire history; its behavior is given by a policy that specifies how the agent behaves in
any possible situation.
A central quantity in reinforcement learning is the value function. The value func-
tion quantifies the expected future discounted reward. Since the agent seeks to maximize
reward, it aims to adopt a policy that has high value. Since the agent’s environment
is unknown to the agent, learning the value function is part of the challenge; otherwise
we would call this planning.
If our agent is capable of learning in the sense of Chapter 3, then it learns the
value of its own policy (on-policy value convergence). However, generally the agent
does not learn to predict the value of counterfactual actions, actions that it does not
take. Learning off-policy is hard because the agent receives no evidence about what
would have happened on counterfactual actions. Nevertheless, off-policy learning is
highly desirable because we want the agent to be confident that the policy it is currently
following is in fact the best one; we want it to accurately predict that the counterfactual
actions have less value.
This brings us back to the central theme of reinforcement learning: the tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation. Asymptotically the agent needs to focus on
exploitation, i.e., take the actions that it thinks yield the highest expected rewards. If
the agent explores enough, then all actions are on-policy because they are all actions that
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agent pi environment µ
at
et = (ot, rt)
Figure 4.1: The dualistic agent model. At every time step t, the agent outputs an
action at and subsequently receives a percept et consisting of an observation ot and a
real-valued reward rt. The agent’s policy pi is a function that maps a history æ<t to the
next action at, and the environment µ is a function that maps a history and an action
to the next percept et.
the agent sometimes takes. Then on-policy learning ensures that the agent understands
the consequences of every action and can confidently choose the best action. Effective
exploration is performed by knowledge-seeking agents; these agents ignore the rewards
and just focus on exploration.
This chapter introduces the central concepts of general reinforcement learning. It
is mostly based on Hutter (2005) and Lattimore (2013). Section 4.1 specifies the gen-
eral reinforcement learning problem, discusses discounting (Section 4.1.1), our implicit
assumptions (Section 4.1.2), and typical environment classes (Section 4.1.3). Sec-
tion 4.2 discusses the value function and its properties. In Section 4.3 we introduce the
agents: AIXI (Section 4.3.1), knowledge-seeking agents (Section 4.3.2), BayesExp (Sec-
tion 4.3.3), and Thompson sampling (Section 4.3.4).
4.1 The General Reinforcement Learning Problem
In reinforcement learning, an agent interacts with an environment: at time step t ∈ N
the agent takes an action at ∈ A and subsequently receives a percept et = (ot, rt) ∈ E
consisting of an observation ot ∈ O and a reward rt ∈ R. This cycle then repeats for
time step t+ 1 (see Figure 4.1).
A history is an element of (A × E)∗ and lists the actions the agent took and the
percepts it received. We use æ ∈ A × E to denote one interaction cycle, and æ<t =
æ1æ2 . . .æt−1 to denote a history of length t − 1. For our agent, the history is a
sufficient statistic about the past and in general reinforcement learning there is no
simpler sufficient statistic.
For example, consider the agent to be a robot interacting with the real world.
Its actions are moving the motors in its limbs and wheels and sending data packets
over a network connection. Its observations are data from cameras and various other
sensors. The reward could be provided either by a human supervisor or through a reward
module that checks whether a predefined goal has been reached. The history is the
collection of all the data it received and emitted in the past. The division of the robot’s
interaction with the environment into discrete time steps might seem a bit unnatural
at first since the real world evolves according to a continuous process. However, note
that the electronic components used in robots operate at discrete frequencies anyway.
§4.1 The General Reinforcement Learning Problem 51
In order to specify how the agent behaves in any possible situation, we define a
policy : a policy is a function pi : (A×E)∗ → ∆Amapping a history æ<t to a distribution
over actions pi( · | æ<t) taken after seeing this history. Usually we do not distinguish
between agent and policy. An environment is a function ν : (A × E)∗ × A → ∆E
mapping a history æ<t and an action at to a distribution ν( · | æ<tat) over the percepts
received after the history æ<t and action at. We use µ to denote the true environment.
Equivalently, Hutter (2005) defines environments as chronological contextual semi-
measures.1 A contextual semimeasure ν takes a sequence of actions a1:∞ as input and
returns a semimeasure ν( · ‖ a1:∞) over E]. A contextual semimeasure ν is chronological
iff percepts at time t do not depend on future actions, i.e., ν(e1:t ‖ a1:∞) = ν(e1:t ‖ a′1:∞)
whenever a1:t = a′1:t. For chronological contextual semimeasures we write ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t)
instead of ν(e1:t ‖ a1:∞). The two definition can be translated using the identities
ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t) =
t∏
k=1
ν(ek | æ<kak) and ν(et | æ<tat) = ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) . (4.1)
If the policy pi always assigns probability 1 to one of the actions, then pi is called
deterministic. Likewise, if the environment ν always assigns probability 1 to one of the
percepts, then ν is called deterministic. For deterministic policies and environments
we also use the notation at = pi(æ<t) and et = ν(æ<tat). A deterministic policy pi is
consistent with history æ<t iff ak = pi(æ<k) for all k < t. Likewise, a deterministic
environment ν is consistent with history æ<t iff ek = ν(æ<kak) for all k < t.
Definition 4.1 (History Distribution). An environment ν together with a policy pi
induces a history distribution
νpi(æ<t) :=
t∏
k=1
pi(ak | æ<k)ν(ek | æ<kak).
We denote an expectation with respect to the history distribution νpi with Epiν .
The history distribution is a (semi)measure on (A×E)∞. In the language of measure
theory, our σ-algebra is the σ-algebra F∞ generated by the cylinder sets introduced in
Section 2.1. The filtration (Ft)t∈N formalizes that at time step t we have seen exactly
the history æ<t (we use the σ-algebra Ft−1). To simplify notation and help intuition,
we simply condition expectations and probability measures with the history æ<t instead
of Ft−1 and sweep most of the measure-theoretic details under the rug.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can now specify the general reinforce-
ment learning problem.
Problem 4.2 (General Reinforcement Learning Problem). Given an arbitrary class of
environmentsM, choose a policy pi that maximizes µpi-expected reward when interacting
with any environment µ ∈M.
1Hutter (2005) calls them chronological conditional semimeasures. This is confusing because contex-
tual semimeasures do not specify conditional probabilities; the environment is not a joint probability
distribution over actions and percepts.
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Problem 4.2 is kept vague on purpose: it does not say how we should balance
between achieving more rewards in some environments while achieving less in others.
In other words, we leave open what an optimal solution to the general reinforcement
learning problem is. This turns out to be a notoriously difficult question that we discuss
in Chapter 5.
As promised in the title of this thesis, we take the nonparametric approach. For the
rest of this thesis, fixM to be any countable set of environments. While the true envi-
ronment is unknown, we assume it belongs to the classM (the realizable case). As long
as the classM is sufficiently large (such as the class of all computable environments),
this assumption is weak. Some typical choices are discussed in Section 4.1.3.
Our agent-environment setup shown in Figure 4.1 is known as the dualistic model :
the agent is distinct from the environment and influences it only through its actions. In
turn, the environment influences the agent only through the percepts. The dualism as-
sumption is accurate for an algorithm that is playing chess, Go, or other (video) games,
which explains why it is ubiquitous in AI research. But often it is not true: real-world
agents are embedded in (and computed by) the environment, and then a physicalistic
model (also called materialistic model or naturalistic model) is more appropriate. Deci-
sion making in the physicalistic model is still underdeveloped; see Everitt et al. (2015)
and Orseau and Ring (2012a). In this thesis we restrict ourselves to the dualistic model.
4.1.1 Discounting
The goal in reinforcement learning is to maximize rewards. However, the infinite reward
sum
∑∞
t=1 rt may diverge. To get around this technical problem, we let our agent prior-
itize the present over the future. This is done with a discount function that quantifies
how much the agent prefers rewards now over rewards later.
Definition 4.3 (Discount Function). A discount function is a function γ : N→ R with
γt := γ(t) ≥ 0 and
∑∞
t=1 γt <∞. The discount normalization factor is Γt :=
∑∞
k=t γk.
There is no requirement that Γt > 0. In fact, we use γ for both, discounted infinite
horizon (Γt > 0 for all t), and finite horizon m (Γm−1 > 0 and Γm = 0) where the agent
does not care what happens after time step m.
Note that the way in which we employ discounting is time consistent : the agent
does not change its mind about how much it values the reward at time step k over
time: reward rk is always discounted with γk regardless of the current time step. For a
discussion of general discounting we refer the reader to Lattimore and Hutter (2014).
Definition 4.4 (Effective Horizon). The ε-effective horizon Ht(ε) is a horizon that is
long enough to encompass all but an ε of the discount function’s mass:
Ht(ε) := min{k | Γt+k/Γt ≤ ε}
The effective horizon is bounded iff for all ε > 0 there is a constant cε such that
Ht(ε) ≤ cε for all t ∈ N.
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parameter γt Γt Ht(ε)
Finite horizon m ∈ N 1≤m(t)/m (m− t+ 1)/m d(m− t+ 1)(1− ε)e
Geometric γ ∈ (0, 1) γt γt/(1− γ) dlogγ εe
Power β > 1 t−β ≈ t−β+1/(β − 1) ≈ (ε1/(1−β) − 1)t
Subgeometric - e−
√
t/
√
t ≈ 2e−
√
t ≈ −√t log ε+ (log ε)2
Table 4.1: Several discount functions and their effective horizons. See also Hutter
(2005, Tab. 5.41) and Lattimore (2013, Tab. 2.1).
Example 4.5 (Geometric Discounting). The most common discount function is ge-
ometric discounting with γt := γt for some constant γ ∈ [0, 1). We get that Γt =∑∞
k=t γ
k = γt/(1 − γ) and the ε-effective horizon is Ht(ε) = dlogγ εe. Hence the effec-
tive horizon is bounded. 3
More examples for discount functions are given in Table 4.1. From now on, we fix
a discount function γ.
4.1.2 Implicit Assumptions
Throughout this thesis, we make the following assumptions implicitly.
Assumption 4.6. (a) The discount function γ is computable.
(b) Rewards are bounded between 0 and 1.
(c) The set of actions A and the set of percepts E are both finite.
Let’s motivate these assumptions in turn. Their purpose is to ensure that discounted
reward sums are finite and optimal policies exist.
Assumption 4.6a is a technical assumption that ensures that discounted reward sums
are computable. This is important for Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 where we analyse the
computability of optimal policies. Note that all discount functions given in Table 4.1
are computable.
Assumption 4.6b could be relaxed to require only that rewards are bounded. We
can rescale rewards rt 7→ crt + d for any c ∈ R+ and d ∈ R without changing optimal
policies if the environment ν is a probability measure. (For our computability-related
results in Chapter 6, we must assume that rewards are nonnegative.) In this sense As-
sumption 4.6b is not very restrictive. However, this normalization of rewards into the
[0, 1]-interval has the convenient consequence that the normalized discounted reward
sum
∑∞
k=t γkrk/Γk is bounded between 0 and 1. If rewards are unbounded, then the
discounted reward sum might diverge. Moreover, with unbounded rewards there all
kinds of pathological problems where defining optimal actions is no longer straightfor-
ward; see Arntzenius et al. (2004) for a discussion.
Assumption 4.6c is a technical requirement for the existence of optimal policies since
it implies that there are only finitely many deterministic policies that differ in the first t
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time steps. Note that finite action and percept spaces are very natural since it ensures
that our agent only receives and emits a finite amount of information in every time
step. This is in line with the problems a strong AI is facing: the agent has to remember
important information and act sequentially.
Assumption 4.6b, Assumption 4.6c, and the fact that the discount function is
summable guarantee that a deterministic optimal policy exists for every environment
according to Lattimore and Hutter (2014, Thm. 10). It would be interesting to relax
these assumptions while preserving the existence of optimal policies or at least ε-optimal
policies (e.g. use compact action and percept spaces).
4.1.3 Typical Environment Classes
The simplest reinforcement learning problems are multi-armed bandits.
Definition 4.7 (Multi-Armed Bandit). An environment ν is a multi-armed bandit iff
O = {⊥} and ν(et | æ<tat) = ν(et | at) for all histories æ1:t ∈ (A× E)∗.
In a multi-armed bandit problem there are no observations and the next reward
only depends on the previous action. Intuitively, we are deciding between #A different
slot machines (so-called one-armed bandits), pull the lever and obtain a reward. The
reward is stochastic, but it is drawn from a distribution that is time-invariant and fixed
for each arm.
A multi-armed bandit is also called bandit for short. Although bandits are the sim-
plest reinforcement learning problem, they already exhibit the exploration-exploitation-
tradeoff that makes reinforcement learning difficult: do you pull an arm that has the
best empirical mean or do you pull an arm that has the highest uncertainty? In bandits
it is very easy to come up with policies that perform (close to) optimal asymptoti-
cally (e.g., εt-greedy with εt = 1/t). But coming up with algorithms that perform well
in practice is difficult, and research focuses on the multiplicative and additive constants
on the asymptotic guarantees. Bandits exist in many flavors; see Bubeck and Bianchi
(2012) for a survey.
Definition 4.8 (Markov Decision Process). An environment ν is a Markov decision
process (MDP) iff ν(et | æ<tat) = ν(et | ot−1at) for all histories æ1:t ∈ (A× E)∗.
Intuitively, in MDPs, the previous observation ot−1 provides a sufficient statistic for
the history: given ot−1 and the current action at, the next percept et is independent of
the rest of the history. In other words, everything that the agent needs to know to make
optimal decisions is readily available in the previous percept. This is why observations
are called states in MDPs. Note that bandits are MDPs with a single state.
Much of today’s literature on reinforcement learning focuses on MDPs (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). They provide a particularly good framework to study reinforcement
learning because they are simple enough to be tractable for today’s algorithms, yet
general enough to encompass many interesting problems. For example, most of the
Atari games (see Figure 1.1 for an overview) are (deterministic) MDPs when combining
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the previous four frames into one percept. While they have a huge state space2 they
can still be learned using Q-learning with function approximation (Mnih et al., 2015).
The MDP framework is restrictive because it requires the agent to be more powerful
than the environment. Since the agent learns, its actions are not independent of the
rest of the history given the last action and percept. In other words, learning agents are
not Markov. The following definition lifts this restriction and allows the environment
to be partially observable.
Definition 4.9 (Partially Observable Markov Decision Process). An environment ν is
a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) iff there is a set of states S,
an initial state s0 ∈ S, a state transition function ν ′ : S × A → ∆S, and a percept
distribution ν ′′ : S → ∆E such that
ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t) =
t∏
k=1
ν ′′(ek | sk)ν ′(sk | sk−1, ak).
Usually the set S is assumed to be finite; with infinite-state POMDPs we can model
any environment ν by setting the set of states to be the set of histories, S := (A×E)∗.
A common assumption for MDPs and POMDPs is that they do not contain traps.
Formally, a (PO)MDP is ergodic iff for any policy pi and any two states s1, s2 ∈ S,
the expected number of time steps to reach s2 from s1 is µpi-almost surely finite. A
(PO)MDP is weakly communicating iff for any two states s1, s2 ∈ S there is a policy
pi such that the expected number of time steps to reach s2 from s1 is µpi-almost surely
finite. Note that any ergodic (PO)MDP is also weakly communicating, but not vice
versa.
In general, our environments are stochastic. Stochasticity can originate from noise in
the environment, noise in the sensors, or modeling errors. Sometimes we also consider
classes of deterministic environments. These are usually easier to deal with because
they do not require as much mathematical machinery. For example, in a deterministic
environment the next percept is certain; if a different percept is received this environ-
ment is immediately falsified and can be discarded. In a stochastic environment, an
unlikely percept reduces our posterior belief in this environment but does not rule it
out completely.
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 we make the assumption that the environment is com-
putable. This encompasses all finite-state POMDPs and most if not all AI problems
can be formulated in this setting. Moreover, the current theories of quantum mechanics
and general relativity are computable and there is no evidence that suggests that our
physical universe is incomputable. For any physical system of finite volume and finite
(average) energy, the amount of information it can contain is finite (Bekenstein, 1981),
and so is the number of state transitions per unit of time (Margolus and Levitin, 1998).
This gives us reason to believe that even the environment that we humans currently
face (and will ever face) falls under these assumptions.
2The size of the state space is at most 256128 since the Atari 2600 has only 128 bytes of memory.
However, the vast majority of these states are not reachable.
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Formally we define the setMCCSLSC as the set of environments that are lower semicom-
putable chronological contextual semimeasures andMCCMcomp as the set of environments
that are computable chronological contextual measures. Note that for chronological
contextual semimeasures it makes a difference whether ν( · ‖ a1:∞) is lower semicom-
putable or the conditionals ν( · | æ<tat) are. The latter implies the former, but not vice
versa.
4.2 The Value Function
The value of a policy in an environment is the future expected discounted reward when
following a given policy in a given environment conditional on the past. Since this
quantity captures exactly what our agent aims to maximize, we prefer policies whose
value is high.
Definition 4.10 (Value Function). The value of a policy pi in an environment ν given
history æ<t and horizon m with t ≤ m ≤ ∞ is defined as
V pi,mν (æ<t) :=
1
Γt
Epiν
[
m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣ æ<t
]
if Γt > 0 and V
pi,m
ν (æ<t) := 0 if Γt = 0. The optimal value is defined as V
∗,m
ν (æ<t) :=
suppi V
pi,m
ν (æ<t).
Sometimes we omit the history argument æ<t for notational convenience if it is clear
from context. Moreover, when we omit m, we implicitly use an infinite horizon m =∞,
i.e., V piν := V
pi,∞
ν and V ∗ν := V
∗,∞
ν . The value of a policy pi in an environment ν after
the empty history, V piν () is also called the t0-value.
Remark 4.11 (Values are Bounded Between 0 and 1). From Assumption 4.6b we
get that for all histories æ<t all policies pi and all environments ν, the value function
V piν (æ<t) ∈ [0, 1]. 3
Since environment and policy are stochastic, the history æ<t is random. With abuse
of notation we treat æ<t sometimes as a concrete outcome and sometimes as a random
variable. We also view the value of a policy pi in an environment ν as a sequence
of random variables (Xt)t∈N with Xt := V piν (æ1:t) where the history æ1:t is generated
stochastically by the agent’s actual policy interacting with the true environment µ.
This view is helpful for some of the convergence results (e.g., Theorem 4.19 and Defi-
nition 5.18) in which we talk about the type of convergence of this sequence of random
variables.
The value function defined in Definition 4.10 is also called the recursive value func-
tion, in contrast to iterative value function that we discuss in Section 6.4. The name of
the recursive value function originates from the following recursive identity (analogously
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to Hutter, 2005, Eq. 4.12), also called the Bellman equation:
V piν (æ<t) =
∑
at∈A
pi(at | æ<t)V piν (æ<tat)
V piν (æ<tat) =
1
Γt
∑
et∈E
ν(et | æ<tat)
(
γtrt + Γt+1V
pi
ν (æ1:t)
)
An explicit expression for the optimal value in environment ν is
V ∗,mν (æ<t) =
1
Γt
max
∑
æt:m−1
m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
k∏
i=t
ν(ei | æ<iai), (4.2)
where
∑
max denotes the max-sum-operator:
max
∑
æt:m−1
:= max
at∈A
∑
et∈E
. . . max
am−1∈A
∑
em−1∈E
For an explicit expression of V ∗,∞ν (æ<t) we can simply take the limit m→∞.
4.2.1 Optimal Policies
An optimal policy is a policy that achieves the highest value:
Definition 4.12 (Optimal Policy; Hutter, 2005, Def. 5.19 & 5.30). A policy pi is optimal
in environment ν (ν-optimal) iff for all histories pi attains the optimal value: V piν (æ<t) =
V ∗ν (æ<t) for all æ<t ∈ (A×E)∗. The action at is an optimal action iff pi∗ν(at | æ<t) = 1
for some ν-optimal policy pi∗ν .
Following the tradition of Hutter (2005), AINU denotes a ν-optimal policy for the
environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC and AIMU denotes an µ-optimal policy for the environment
µ ∈MCCMcomp that is a measure (as opposed to a semimeasure).
By definition of the optimal policy and the optimal value function, we have the
following identity for all histories æ<t:
V ∗ν (æ<t) = V
pi∗ν
ν (æ<t) (4.3)
There can be more than one optimal policy; generally the choice of pi∗ν from Defini-
tion 4.12 is not unique. More specifically, for a ν-optimal policy we have
pi∗ν(at | æ<t) > 0 =⇒ at ∈ arg max
a∈A
V ∗ν (æ<ta). (4.4)
If there are multiple actions α, β ∈ A that attain the optimal value, V ∗ν (æ<α) =
V ∗ν (æ<tβ), then there is an argmax tie. Which action we settle on in case of a tie (how
we break the tie) is irrelevant and can be arbitrary. Since we allow stochastic policies,
we can also randomize between α and β.
The following definition allows policies to be slightly suboptimal.
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Definition 4.13 (ε-Optimal Policy). A policy pi is ε-optimal in environment ν iff
V ∗ν (æ<t)− V piν (æ<t) < ε for all histories æ<t ∈ (A× E)∗.
A policy pi that achieves optimal t0-value, V piν () = V ∗ν (), takes ν-optimal actions
on any history reachable by pi in ν. However, this is not true for ε-optimal policies: a
policy that is ε-optimal at t = 0 is not necessarily ε-optimal in later time steps.
4.2.2 Properties of the Value Function
The following two lemmas are stated by Hutter (2005, Thm. 31) without proof and for
the iterative value function.
Lemma 4.14 (Linearity of V piν in ν). If ν = z1ν1+z2ν2 for some real numbers z1, z2 ≥ 0,
then for all policies pi and all histories æ<t
V pi,mν (æ<t) = z1
ν1(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
pi,m
ν1 (æ<t) + z2
ν2(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
pi,m
ν2 (æ<t).
Proof. Since νpi = z1νpi1 + z2νpi2 , we have for the conditional measure
νpi(A | æ<t) = ν
pi(A ∩ æ<t)
νpi(æ<t)
=
z1ν
pi
1 (A ∩ æ<t) + z2νpi2 (A ∩ æ<t)
νpi(æ<t)
= z1
νpi1 (æ<t)
νpi(æ<t)
νpi1 (A | æ<t) + z2
νpi2 (æ<t)
νpi(æ<t)
νpi2 (A | æ<t).
The claim now follows from the linearity of expectation in the probability measure.
Lemma 4.15 (Convexity of V ∗ν in ν). If ν = z1ν1 +z2ν2 for some real numbers z1, z2 ≥
0, then for all histories æ<t
V ∗ν (æ<t) ≤ z1
ν1(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
∗,m
ν1 (æ<t) + z2
ν2(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
∗,m
ν2 (æ<t).
Proof. Let pi∗ν be an optimal policy for environment ν. From Lemma 4.14 we get
V ∗ν (æ<t) = V
pi∗ν
ν (æ<t) = z1
ν1(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
pi∗ν
ν1 (æ<t) + z2
ν2(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
pi∗ν
ν2 (æ<t)
≤ z1 ν1(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
∗
ν1(æ<t) + z2
ν2(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) V
∗
ν2(æ<t).
The following lemma bounds the error when truncating the value function. This
implies that planning for an ε-effective horizon (m = t+Ht(ε)), we get all but an ε of
the value: |V piν (æ<t)− V pi,mν (æ<t)| < ε.
Lemma 4.16 (Truncated Values). For every environment ν, every policy pi, and every
history æ<t ∣∣V pi,mν (æ<t)− V piν (æ<t)∣∣ ≤ ΓmΓt .
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Proof.
V piν (æ<t) =
1
Γt
Epiν
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣ æ<t
]
= V pi,mν (æ<t) +
1
Γt
Epiν
[ ∞∑
k=m
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣ æ<t
]
The result now follows from Assumption 4.6b and
0 ≤ Epiν
[ ∞∑
k=m
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣ æ<t
]
≤ Γm.
This lemma bounds the (truncated) value function by the total variation distance.
Lemma 4.17 (Bounds on Value Difference). For any policies pi1, pi2, any environments
ν1 and ν2, and any horizon t ≤ m ≤ ∞
|V pi1,mν1 (æ<t)− V pi2,mν2 (æ<t)| ≤ Dm−1(νpi11 , νpi22 | æ<t)
Proof. According to Definition 4.10, the value function is the expectation of the ran-
dom variable
∑m−1
k=t γkrk/Γt that is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore we can use
Lemma 2.12 with P := νpi11 ( · | æ<t) and R := νpi22 ( · | æ<t) on the space (A×E)m−1 to
conclude that |V pi1,mν1 (æ<t)− V pi2,mν2 (æ<t)| is bounded by Dm−1(νpi11 , νpi22 | æ<t).
Lemma 4.18 (Discounted Values; Lattimore, 2013, Lem. 2.5). Let æ<t be some history
and let pi1 and pi2 be two policies that coincide from time step t to time step m: pi1(a |
æ1:k) = pi2(a | æ1:k) for all a ∈ A, all histories æ<tæt:k consistent with pi1, and t ≤ k ≤
m. Then for all environments ν∣∣V pi1ν (æ<t)− V pi2ν (æ<t)∣∣ ≤ ΓmΓt .
Proof. Since pi1 and pi2 coincide for time steps t throughm−1, Dm−1(νpi1 , νpi2 | æ<t) = 0
for all environments ν. Thus the result follows from Lemma 4.16 and Lemma 4.17:∣∣V pi1ν (æ<t)− V pi2ν (æ<t)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣V pi1,mν (æ<t)− V pi2,mν (æ<t)∣∣+ ΓmΓt
≤ Dm−1(νpi1 , νpi2 | æ<t) + Γm
Γt
=
Γm
Γt
4.2.3 On-Policy Value Convergence
This section states some general results on learning the value function. On-policy value
convergence refers to the fact that if we use a learning distribution ρ to learn to environ-
ment µ, and ρpi merges with µpi in the sense discussed Section 3.4, then V piρ converges
to V piµ , i.e., using ρ we learn to estimate values correctly.
A weaker variant of the following theorem was proved by Hutter (2005, Thm. 5.36).
It states convergence in mean (not almost surely), and only for the Bayesian mixture.
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Theorem 4.19 (On-Policy Value Convergence). Let µ be any environment and pi be
any policy.
(a) If ρpi merges strongly with µpi, then
V piρ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
(b) If the effective horizon is bounded and ρpi merges weakly with µpi, then
V piρ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
(c) If the effective horizon is bounded and ρpi merges almost weakly with µpi, then
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
V piρ (æ<k)− V piµ (æ<k)
)
→ 0 as t→∞ in µpi-almost surely.
Proof. (a) Apply Lemma 4.17 with m :=∞.
(b) Let ε > 0 and let cε be a bound on suptHt(ε). From Lemma 4.16
|V piρ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)| ≤ |V pi,t+Ht(ε)ρ (æ<t)− V pi,t+Ht(ε)µ (æ<t)|+ 2
Γt+Ht(ε)
Γt
< Dt+Ht−1(ε)(ρ
pi, µpi | æ<t) + 2ε
≤ Dt+cε(ρpi, µpi | æ<t) + 2ε
according to Definition 4.4 and Lemma 4.17. Since ρpi merges weakly with µpi, we get
that µpi-almost surely there is a time step t0 ∈ N such that Dt+cε(ρpi, µpi | æ<t) < ε
for all t ≥ t0. Hence |V piQ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)| < 3ε for all t ≥ t0.
(c) Analogously to the proof of (b).
It is important to observe that on-policy convergence does not imply that the agent
converges to the optimal policy. V piρ converges to V piµ , but V piµ need not be close to V ∗µ .
Indeed, there might be another policy p˜i that has a higher value than pi in the true
environment µ (V p˜iµ > V piµ ). If the agent thinks p˜i has lower value (V p˜iρ < V piρ ) it might
not follow p˜i and hence not learn that the actual value of p˜i is much higher. In other
words, on-policy convergence implies that the agent learns the value of its own actions,
but not the value of counterfactual actions that it does not take.
Theorem 4.19 now enables us to tie in the results of Chapter 3. This yields a surge
of corollaries, but first we need to make the learning distributions contextual on the
actions.
Let w ∈ ∆M be a positive prior over the environment class M. We define the
corresponding Bayesian mixture analogously to Example 3.4:
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)ν(e<t ‖ a<t) (4.5)
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Note that the Bayesian mixture ξ depends on the prior w. For the rest of this thesis,
this dependence will not be made explicit.
From Lemma 4.14 and (3.3) we immediately get the following identity:
V piξ (æ<t) =
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)V piν (æ<t) (4.6)
Similarly, we get from Lemma 4.15
V ∗ξ (æ<t) ≤
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)V ∗ν (æ<t). (4.7)
Corollary 4.20 (On-Policy Value Convergence for Bayes). For any environment µ ∈
M and any policy pi,
V piξ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
Proof. Since µ ∈ M, we have dominance ξpi ≥ w(µ)µpi with w(µ) > 0 and by Propo-
sition 3.16a absolute continuity ξpi  µpi. From Theorem 3.25 we get that ξpi merges
strongly with µpi. Therefore we can apply Theorem 4.19a.
Analogously, we define MDLæ<t := arg minν∈M{− log ν(e<t ‖ a<t) +K(ν)}.
Corollary 4.21 (On-Policy Value Convergence for MDL). For any environment µ ∈M
and any policy pi,
V piMDLæ<t (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
Proof. By Theorem 3.28 MDLpi merges strongly with νpi for each ν ∈M, therefore we
can apply Theorem 4.19a.
By providing the action sequence contextually on a separate input tape, we can
define Km(e<t ‖ a<t) := min{|p| | e<t v U(p, a<t)} analogously to (2.1).
Corollary 4.22 (On-Policy Value Convergence for Universal Compression). Let ρ(e<t ‖
a<t) := 2
−Km(e<t‖a<t). Then for any environment µ ∈MCCMcomp and any policy pi,
V piρ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
Proof. Since ρ dominates every µ ∈ MCCMcomp (Section 3.6.3) we can apply Proposi-
tion 3.16a, Theorem 3.25, and Theorem 4.19a as in the proof of Corollary 4.20.
Similarly to Km there is a speed prior for environments (Filan, 2015, Ch. 6):
SKt(e<t ‖ a<t) :=
∑
p: e<tvU(p,a<t)
2−|p|
t(U, p, a<t, e<t)
where t(U, p, a<t, e<t) denotes the number of time steps U(p, a<t) takes to produce e<t.
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Corollary 4.23 (On-Policy Value Convergence for the Speed Prior). If the effective
horizon is bounded, then for any environment µ ∈MCCMcomp estimable in polynomial time
and any policy pi,
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
V piSKt(æ<k)− V piµ (æ<k)
)
→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
Proof. By Corollary 3.61 the speed prior SKt merges almost weakly with every measure
estimable in polynomial time. Therefore we can apply Theorem 4.19c.
4.3 The Agents
If we knew the true environment µ, we would choose the µ-optimal policy, the policy
that maximizes µ-expected discounted rewards. But generally we do not know the
true environment, and the challenging part of reinforcement learning is to learn the
environment while trying to collect rewards.
In this section we introduce a number of agents that attempt to solve the general
reinforcement learning problem (Problem 4.2). These agents are discussed throughout
the rest of this thesis.
4.3.1 Bayes
A Bayes optimal policy with respect to the prior w is the policy pi∗ξ where ξ is the
Bayesian mixture defined in Section 4.2.3. There can be one or more Bayes optial
policies. From Corollary 4.20 we get on-policy value convergence for the Bayes optimal
policy.
After history æ<t, the Bayes policy pi∗ξ maximizes expected discounted rewards in
the posterior mixture:
ξ( · | e<t ‖ a1:∞) =
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)ν( · | e<t ‖ a1:∞)
where w(ν | æ<t) are the posterior weights (3.3). Maximizing expected rewards accord-
ing to the posterior is the same as maximizing expected rewards according to the prior
conditional on the history: if pi(æ<t) = pi∗ξ (æ<t), then V
pi
ξ (æ<t) = V
∗
ξ (æ<t). Actually
visiting the history æ<t does not change what pi∗ξ planned to do before it visited æ<t.
Note that this relies on the fact that the way we use discounting is time consistent (Lat-
timore and Hutter, 2014, Def. 12).
When using the prior w(ν) ∝ 2−K(ν) (Example 3.5) over the classMCCSLSC , the Bayes
optimal policy is also known as AIXI , introduced and analyzed by Hutter (2000, 2001a,
2002a, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2012b) in his work on universal artificial intelligence. In this
case, the Bayesian mixture (4.5) can be defined equivalently according to (Wood et al.,
2011)
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t) :=
∑
p: e<tvU(p,a<t)
2−|p|. (4.8)
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Generally there is more than one ξ-optimal policy and Solomonoff’s prior depends on
the choice of the (reference) universal Turing machine, so this definition is not unique.
Moreover, not every universal Turing machine is a good choice for AIXI, see Section 5.2
for a few bad choices. The following lemma will be used later.
Lemma 4.24 (Mixing Mixtures). Let q, q′ ∈ Q such that q > 0, q′ ≥ 0, and q + q′ ≤
1. Let w be any lower semicomputable positive prior, let ξ be the Bayesian mixture
corresponding to w, and let ρ ∈ MCCSLSC . Then ξ′ := qξ + q′ρ ∈ MCCSLSC is a Bayesian
mixture.
Proof. ξ′ is given by the positive prior w′ with w′ := qw + q′1ρ.
Bayesian approaches have a long tradition in reinforcement learning, although they
are often prohibitively expensive to compute. For multi-armed bandits, Gittins (1979)
achieved a breakthrough with an index strategy that enables the computation of the
optimal policy by computing one quantity for each arm independently of the rest. This
strategy even achieves the optimal asymptotic regret bounds (Lattimore, 2016). Larger
classes have also been attempted: using Monte-Carlo tree search, Veness et al. (2011)
approximate the Bayes optimal policy in the class of all context trees. Doshi-Velez
(2012) uses Bayesian techniques to learn infinite-state POMDPs. See Vlassis et al.
(2012) for a survey on Bayesian techniques in RL.
In the rest of this thesis, the Bayes optimal policy is often treated as an optimal ex-
ploitation strategy. This is not true: Bayes does explore (when it is Bayes optimal to do
so). It just does not explore general environment classes completely (see Section 5.4.1).
4.3.2 Knowledge-Seeking Agents
In this section we discuss two variants of knowledge-seeking agents: entropy-seeking
agents introduced by Orseau (2011, 2014a) and information-seeking agents introduced
by Orseau et al. (2013). The entropy-seeking agent maximizes the Shannon entropy
gain, while the information-seeking agent maximizes the expected information gain.
These quantities are expressed in different value functions. In places where confusion
can arise, we call the value function V piν from Definition 4.10 the reward-seeking value
function.
In this section we use a finite horizon m <∞ (possibly dependent on time step t):
the knowledge-seeking agent maximizes entropy/information received up to time step
m. We assume implicitly that m (as a function of t) is computable. Moreover, in this
section we assume that the Bayesian mixture ξ is a measure rather than a semimeasure;
Example 4.27 discusses this assumption.
Definition 4.25 (Entropy-Seeking Value Function; Orseau, 2014a, Sec. 6). The entropy-
seeking value of a policy pi given history æ<t is
V pi,mEnt (æ<t) := E
pi
ξ [− log2 ξ(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m) | æ<t].
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The entropy-seeking value is the Bayes-expectation of − log ξ. Orseau (2011, 2014a)
also considers a related value function based on the ξ-expectation of ξ that we do not
discuss here.
Definition 4.26 (Information-Seeking Value Function; Orseau et al., 2013, Def. 1).
The information-seeking value of a policy pi given history æ<t is
V pi,mIG (æ<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)KLm(νpi, ξpi | æ<t).
Analogously to before we define V ∗Ent := suppi V
pi
Ent and V
∗
IG := suppi V
pi
IG. An optimal
entropy-seeking policy is defined as pi∗Ent :∈ arg maxpi V piEnt and an optimal information-
seeking policy is defined as pi∗IG :∈ arg maxpi V piIG. Since we use a finite horizon (m <∞),
these optimal policies exist.
The information gain is defined as the difference in entropy between the prior and
the posterior:
IGt:m(æ1:m) := Ent(w( · | æ<t))− Ent(w( · | æ1:m))
We get the following identity (Lattimore, 2013, Eq. 3.5).
Epiξ [IGt:m(æ1:m) | æ<t] = V pi,mIG (æ<t)
For infinite horizons (m = ∞), the values functions from Definition 4.25 and Def-
inition 4.26 may not converge. To ensure convergence, we can either use discounting,
or in case of VIG a prior with finite entropy (Lattimore, 2013, Thm. 3.4). Moreover,
note that while VIG and VEnt are expectations with respect to the measure ξ, there is
no bound on the one-step change in value V pi,mIG (æ<t)− V pi,mIG (æ1:t), which can also be
negative. For the reward-seeking value function V pi,mν , the one-step change in value is
bounded between 0 and 1 by Remark 4.11.
For classes of deterministic environments Definition 4.25 and Definition 4.26 coin-
cide. In stochastic environments the entropy-seeking agent does not work well because
it gets distracted by noise in the environment rather than trying to distinguish envi-
ronments (Orseau et al., 2013, Sec. 5). Moreover, the entropy-seeking agent may fail to
seek knowledge in deterministic semimeasures as the following example demonstrates.
Example 4.27 (Unnormalized Entropy-Seeking). If the Bayesian mixture ξ is a semi-
measure instead of a measure (such as the Solomonoff prior from Example 3.5), then
the entropy-seeking agent does not explore correctly. Fix A := {α, β}, E := {0, 1}, and
m = t (we only care about the entropy of the next percept). We illustrate the problem
on a simple class of environments {ν1, ν2}:
ν1α/0/0.1 β/0/0.5 ν2α/1/0.1 β/0/0.5
where transitions are labeled with action/percept/probability. Both ν1 and ν2 return
a percept deterministically or nothing at all (the environment ends). Only action α
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distinguishes between the environments. With the prior w(ν1) := w(ν2) := 1/2, we get
a mixture ξ for the entropy-seeking value function V piEnt. Then V
∗
Ent(α) ≈ 0.432 < 0.5 =
V ∗Ent(β), hence action β is preferred over α by the entropy-seeking agent. But taking
action β yields percept 0 (if any), hence nothing is learned about the environment. 3
On-policy value convergence (Theorem 4.19) ensures that asymptotically, the agent
learns the value of its own policy. Knowledge-seeking agents do even better: they
don’t have to balance between exploration and exploitation, so they can focus solely
on exploration. As a result, they learn off-policy, i.e., the value of counterfactual
actions (Orseau et al., 2013, Thm. 7).
4.3.3 BayesExp
Lattimore (2013, Thm. 5.6) defines BayesExp combining AIXI with the information-
seeking agent. BayesExp alternates between phases of exploration and phases of ex-
ploitation: Let εt be a monotone decreasing sequence of positive reals such that εt → 0
as t→∞. If the optimal information-seeking value V ∗IG is larger than εt, then BayesExp
starts an exploration phase, otherwise it starts an exploitation phase. During an explo-
ration phase, BayesExp follows an optimal information-seeking policy for an εt-effective
horizon. During an exploitation phase, BayesExp follows an ξ-optimal reward-seeking
policy for one step (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 BayesExp policy piBE (Lattimore, 2013, Alg. 2).
1: while true do
2: if V ∗,t+Ht(εt)IG (æ<t) > εt then
3: follow pi∗IG for Ht(εt) steps
4: else
5: follow pi∗ξ for 1 step
4.3.4 Thompson Sampling
Thompson sampling, also known as posterior sampling or the Bayesian control rule, was
originally proposed by Thompson (1933) as a bandit algorithm. It is easy to implement
and often achieves quite good results (Chapelle and Li, 2011). In multi-armed bandits
it attains optimal regret (Agrawal and Goyal, 2011; Kaufmann et al., 2012). Thompson
sampling has also been discussed for MDPs (Strens, 2000; Dearden et al., 1998) and
Bayesian and frequentist regret bounds have been established (Osband et al., 2013;
Gopalan and Mannor, 2015).
For general RL Thompson sampling was first suggested by Ortega and Braun (2010)
with resampling at every time step. Strens (2000) proposes following the optimal policy
for one episode or “related to the number of state transitions the agent is likely to need
to plan ahead”. We follow Strens’ suggestion and resample at the effective horizon.
Let εt be a monotone decreasing sequence of positive reals such that εt → 0 as
t → ∞. Our variant of Thomson sampling is given in Algorithm 2. It samples an
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environment ρ from the posterior, follows the ρ-optimal policy for an εt-effective horizon,
and then repeats.
Algorithm 2 Thompson sampling policy piT .
1: while true do
2: sample ρ ∼ w( · | æ<t)
3: follow pi∗ρ for Ht(εt) steps
Note that piT is a stochastic policy since we occasionally sample from a distribution.
We assume that this sampling is independent of everything else.
Chapter 5
Optimality
Machines will never be intelligent. — Shane Legg
Problem 4.2 defines the general reinforcement learning problem. But our definition of
this problem did not specify what a solution would be. This chapter is dedicated to
this question:
What is an optimal solution to the general reinforcement learning problem?
How can we say that one policy is better than another? What is the best policy? Are
the policies from Section 4.3 optimal? Several notions of optimality for a policy pi in
an environment classM are conceivable:
O1. Maximal reward. The policy pi receives a reward of 1 in every time step (which is
maximal according to Assumption 4.6b):
∀t ∈ N. rt = 1
O2. Optimal policy. The policy pi achieves the highest possible value in the true envi-
ronment µ:
∀æ<t ∈ (A× E)∗. V piµ (æ<t) = V ∗µ (æ<t)
O3. Pareto optimality (Hutter, 2002a, Thm. 2). There is no other policy that performs
at least as good in all environments and strictly better in at least one:
@p˜i.
(
∀ν ∈M. V p˜iν () ≥ V piν () and ∃ρ ∈M. V p˜iρ () > V piρ ()
)
O4. Balanced Pareto optimality (Hutter, 2002a, Thm. 3). The policy pi achieves a
better value acrossM weighted by w ∈ ∆M than any other policy:
∀p˜i.
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)
(
V piν ()− V p˜iν ()
) ≥ 0
O5. Bayes optimality . The policy pi is ξ-optimal for some Bayes mixture ξ:
∀æ<t ∈ (A× E)∗. V piξ (æ<t) = V ∗ξ (æ<t)
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O6. Probably approximately correct . For a given ε, δ > 0 the value of the policy pi is
ε-close to the optimal value with probability at least δ after time step t0(ε, δ):
µpi
[
∀t ≥ t0(ε, δ). V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t) < ε
]
> 1− δ
O7. Asymptotic optimality (Hutter, 2005, Sec. 5.3.4). The value of the policy pi con-
verges to the optimal value:
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞
O8. Sublinear regret . The difference between the reward sum of the policy pi and the
best policy in hindsight grows sublinearly:
sup
pi′
Epi
′
µ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
− Epiµ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
∈ o(m)
We discuss these notions of optimality in turn. Achieving the maximal reward
at every time step is impossible if there is no action that makes the environment µ
respond with the maximal reward; generally there is no policy that achieves maximal
rewards at every time step. In order to follow the optimal policy, we need to know
the true environment. In our setting, the true environment is unknown and has to be
learned. During the learning process the agent cannot also act optimally because it
needs to explore. In particular, the policy pi cannot be optimal simultaneously in all
environments fromM. This rules out O1 and O2 as a notion of optimality.
In Section 5.1 we show that all policies are Pareto optimal. This disqualifies O3 as
a useful notion of optimality in general reinforcement learning.
Balanced Pareto optimality (O4), Bayes optimality (O5), and maximal Legg-Hutter
intelligence (Legg and Hutter, 2007b) turn out to coincide. In Section 5.3 we show that
Legg-Hutter intelligence is highly subjective, because it depends on the choice of the
prior. By changing the prior of a Bayesian agent, we can make the agent’s intelligence
arbitrarily low. In Section 5.2 we present a choice of particularly bad priors. This rules
out O4 and O5 because they are prior-dependent and not objective.
O6 is a stronger version of asymptotic optimality that provides a rate of conver-
gence (it implies O7). Since our environment class can be very large and non-compact,
concrete PAC results are likely impossible. Orseau (2010, 2013) shows that the Bayes
optimal agent does not achieve asymptotic optimality in all computable environments.
The underlying problem is that in the beginning the agent does not know enough about
its environment and therefore relies heavily on its prior. Lack of exploration then re-
tains the prior’s bias. This problem can be alleviated by adding extra exploration to the
Bayesian agent. In Section 5.4 we discuss two agents that achieve asymptotic optimal-
ity: BayesExp (Section 4.3.3) and Thompson sampling (Section 4.3.4). This establishes
that O7 is possible.
In general environments sublinear regret is impossible because the agent can get
stuck in traps from which it is unable to recover. This rules out O8. However, in Sec-
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tion 5.5 we show that if we assume that the environment allows recovering from mistakes
(and some minor conditions on the discount function are fulfilled), then asymptotic op-
timality implies sublinear regret. This means that Thompson sampling has sublinear
regret in these recoverable environments.
Notably, only asymptotic optimality (O7) holds up to be a nontrivial and objective
criterion of optimality that applies to the general reinforcement learning problem. While
there are several agents that are known to be asymptotically optimal, some undesirable
properties remain. Section 5.6 discusses this further. See also Mahadevan (1996) for a
discussion of notions of optimality in MDPs.
5.1 Pareto Optimality
In this section we show that Pareto optimality is not a useful criterion for optimality
since for any environment class containingMCCMcomp, all policies are Pareto optimal.
Definition 5.1 (Pareto Optimality; Hutter, 2005, Def. 5.22). A policy pi is Pareto
optimal in the set of environmentsM iff there is no policy p˜i such that V p˜iν () ≥ V piν ()
for all ν ∈M and V p˜iρ () > V piρ () for at least one ρ ∈M.
The literature provides the following result.
Theorem 5.2 (AIXI is Pareto Optimal; Hutter, 2002a, Thm. 2). Every ξ-optimal policy
is Pareto optimal inMCCSLSC .
The following theorem was proved for deterministic policies in Leike and Hutter
(2015c). Here we extend it to stochastic policies.
Theorem 5.3 (Pareto Optimality is Trivial). Every policy is Pareto optimal in any
classM⊇MCCMcomp.
The proof proceeds as follows: for a given policy pi, we construct a set of ‘buddy
environments’ that reward pi and punish other policies. Together they can defend
against any policy p˜i that tries to take the crown of Pareto optimality from pi.
Proof. We assume (0, 0) and (0, 1) ∈ E . Moreover, assume there is a policy pi that is not
Pareto optimal. Then there is a policy p˜i that Pareto dominates pi, i.e., V p˜iρ () > V piρ ()
for some ρ ∈ M, and V p˜iν () ≥ V piν () for all ν ∈ M. From V p˜iρ () > V piρ () and
Lemma 4.18 we get that there is a shortest and lexicographically first history æ′<k
consistent with pi and p˜i such that pi(α | æ′<k) > p˜i(α | æ′<k) for some action α ∈ A
and V p˜iρ (æ′<k) > V
pi
ρ (æ′<k). Consequently there is an i ≥ k such that γi > 0, and hence
Γk > 0. We define the environment µ that first reproduces the separating history æ′<k
and then, if α is the next action, returns reward 1 forever, and otherwise returns reward
0 forever. Formally, µ is defined by
µ(e1:t | e<t ‖ a1:t) :=

1, if t < k and et = e′t,
1, if t ≥ k and ak = α and rt = 1 and ot = 0,
1, if t ≥ k and ak 6= α and rt = 0 = ot, and
0, otherwise.
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The environment µ is computable, even if the policy pi is not: for a fixed history æ′<t
and action α, there exists a program computing µ; therefore µ ∈ MCCMcomp. We get the
following value difference for the policies pi and p˜i:
V piµ ()− V p˜iµ () = Epiµ
[
k−1∑
t=1
γtrt +
∞∑
t=k
γtrt
]
− Ep˜iµ
[
k−1∑
t=1
γtrt −
∞∑
t=k
γtrt
]
=
(
pi(α | æ′<k)
∞∑
t=k
γt − p˜i(α | æ′<k)
∞∑
t=k
γt
)
µpi(æ′<k)
=
(
pi(α | æ′<k)− p˜i(α | æ′<k)
)
µpi(æ′<k)Γk > 0
Hence V p˜iµ () < V piµ (), which contradicts the fact that p˜i Pareto dominates pi since
M⊇MCCMcomp 3 µ.
Note that the environment µ we defined in the proof of Theorem 5.3 is actually
just a finite-state POMDP, so Pareto optimality is also trivial for smaller environment
classes.
5.2 Bad Priors
In this section we give three examples of universal priors that cause a AIXI to mis-
behave drastically. In case of a finite horizon, the indifference prior makes all actions
equally preferable to AIXI (Section 5.2.1). The dogmatic prior makes AIXI stick to
any given computable policy pi as long as expected future rewards do not fall too close
to zero (Section 5.2.2). The Gödel prior prevents AIXItl from taking any actions (Sec-
tion 5.2.3).
5.2.1 The Indifference Prior
The following theorem constructs the indifference prior that yields a Bayesian mixture
ξ′ that causes argmax ties for the first m steps. If we use a discount function that only
cares about the first m steps, Γm = 0, then all policies are ξ′-optimal policies. In this
case AIXI’s behavior only depends on how we break argmax ties.
Theorem 5.4 (Indifference Prior). If there is an m such that Γm = 0, then there is a
Bayesian mixture ξ′ such that all policies are ξ′-optimal.
Proof. First, we assume that the action space is binary, A = {0, 1}. Let U be the
reference UTM and define the UTM U ′ by
U ′(s<mp, a1:t) := U(p, a1:t xor s1:t),
where s<m is a binary string of lengthm−1 and sk := 0 for k ≥ m. (U ′ has no programs
of length less than m − 1.) Let ξ′ be the Bayesian mixture given by U ′ according to
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(4.8). Then
ξ′(e<m ‖ a<m) =
∑
p: e<mvU ′(p,a<m)
2−|p|
=
∑
s<mp′: e<mvU ′(s<mp′,a<m)
2−m−1−|p
′|
=
∑
s<m
∑
p′: e<mvU(p′,a<m xor s<m)
2−m−1−|p
′|
=
∑
s<m
∑
p′: e<mvU(p′,s<m)
2−m−1−|p
′|,
which is independent of a<m. Hence the first m − 1 percepts are independent of the
first m− 1 actions. But the percepts’ rewards from time step m on do not matter since
Γm = 0 (Lemma 4.16). Because the environment is chronological, the value function
must be independent of all actions. Thus every policy is ξ′-optimal.
For finite action spaces A with more than 2 elements, the proof works analogously
by making A a cyclic group and using the group operation instead of xor.
The choice of U ′ in the proof of Theorem 5.4 depends on m. If we increase AIXI’s
horizon while fixing the UTM U ′, Theorem 5.4 no longer holds. For Solomonoff in-
duction, there is an analogous problem: when using Solomonoff’s prior M to predict a
deterministic binary sequence x, we make at most K(x) errors (Corollary 3.56). In case
the shortest program has length > m, there is no guarantee that we make less than m
errors (see Section 5.6.2).
5.2.2 The Dogmatic Prior
In this section we define a universal prior that assigns very high probability of going to
hell (reward 0 forever) if we deviate from a given computable policy pi. For a Bayesian
agent like AIXI, it is thus only worth deviating from the policy pi if the agent thinks
that the prospects of following pi are very poor already. We call this prior the dogmatic
prior, because the fear of going to hell makes AIXI conform to any arbitrary ‘dogmatic
ideology’ pi. AIXI will only break out if it expects pi to give very low future payoff; in
that case the agent does not have much to lose.
Theorem 5.5 (Dogmatic Prior). Let pi be any computable deterministic policy, let ξ
be any Bayesian mixture over MCCSLSC , and let ε > 0. There is a Bayesian mixture ξ′
such that for any history æ<t consistent with pi and for which V piξ (æ<t) > ε, the action
pi(æ<t) is the unique ξ′-optimal action.
The following proof was adapted from Leike and Hutter (2015c) to work for en-
vironment classes that do not contain the Bayesian mixture. Essentially, for every
environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC the dogmatic prior puts much higher weight on an environ-
ment ρν that behaves just like ν on the policy pi, but sends any policy deviating from
pi to hell. Importantly, while following the policy pi the environments ν and ρν are
indistinguishable, so the posterior belief in ν is equal to the posterior belief in ρν .
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Proof of Theorem 5.5. We assume (o, 0) ∈ E for some o ∈ O. For every environment
ν ∈MCCSLSC define the environment
ρν(e1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t), if ak = pi(æ<k) ∀k ≤ t,
ν(e<k ‖ a<k), if k := min{i | ai 6= pi(æ<i)} exists
and ei = (o, 0) ∀i ∈ {k, . . . , t}, and
0, otherwise.
The environment ρν mimics environment ν until it receives an action that the policy pi
would not take. From then on, it provides rewards 0. Since pi is a computable policy,
we have that ρν ∈MCCSLSC for every ν ∈MCCSLSC .
Now we need to reweigh the prior w so that it assigns a much higher prior weight
to ρν than to ν. Without loss of generality we assume that ε is computable, otherwise
we make it slightly smaller. We define w′(ν) := εw(ν) if ν 6= ρν˜ for all ν˜ ∈ MCCSLSC and
w′(ρν) := (1− ε)w(ν) + εw(ρν). Then∑
ν∈MCCSLSC
w′(ν) =
∑
ν=ρν˜
w′(ν) +
∑
ν 6=ρν˜
w′(ν)
=
∑
ν=ρν˜
(
(1− ε)w(ν˜) + εw(ν))+ ∑
ν 6=ρν˜
εw(ν)
=
∑
ν∈MCCSLSC
εw(ν) +
∑
ν˜∈MCCSLSC
(1− ε)w(ν˜)
= ε+ (1− ε) = 1,
and with w′ ≥ εw, we get that w′ is a positive prior over MCCSLSC . We define ξ′ as the
corresponding Bayesian mixture analogous to (4.5).
With ρ :=
∑
ν∈MCCSLSC w(ν)ρν we get ξ
′ = εξ + (1 − ε)ρ. The mixtures ξ and ρ
coincide on the policy pi since every ν coincides with ρν on the policy pi:
ξpi(æ<t) =
∑
ν∈MCCSLSC
w(ν)νpi(æ<t) =
∑
ν∈MCCSLSC
w(ν)ρpiν (æ<t) = ρ
pi(æ<t)
Moreover, V ∗ρν (æ<t) = 0 and thus V
∗
ρ (æ<t) = 0 for any history inconsistent with pi by
construction of ρν .
Let æ<t ∈ (A×E)∗ be any history consistent with pi such that V piξ (æ<t) > ε. Then
ρpi = ξpi implies
ρ(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ′(e<t ‖ a<t) =
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ′(e<t ‖ a<t) =
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
εξ(e<t ‖ a<t) + (1− ε)ρ(e<t ‖ a<t) = 1.
§5.2 Bad Priors 73
Therefore Lemma 4.14 implies that for all a ∈ A and all policies p˜i
V p˜iξ′ (æ<ta) = ε
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ′(e<t ‖ a<t)V
p˜i
ξ (æ<ta) + (1− ε)
ρ(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ′(e<t ‖ a<t)V
p˜i
ρ (æ<ta)
= εV p˜iξ (æ<ta) + (1− ε)V p˜iρ (æ<ta). (5.1)
Let α := pi(æ<t) be the next action according to pi, and let β 6= α be any other
action. We have that V piξ (æ<tα) = V
pi
ρ (æ<tα) since ξpi = ρpi and æ<tα is consistent
with pi. Therefore we get from (5.1)
V ∗ξ′(æ<tα) ≥ V piξ′ (æ<tα) = εV piξ (æ<tα) + (1− ε)V piρ (æ<tα) = V piξ (æ<tα) > ε,
V ∗ξ′(æ<tβ) = εV
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (æ<tβ) + (1− ε)V
pi∗
ξ′
ρ (æ<tβ) = εV
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (æ<ta) + (1− ε)0 ≤ ε.
Hence V ∗ξ′(æ<tα) > V
∗
ξ′(æ<tβ) and thus the action α taken by pi is the only ξ
′-optimal
action for the history æ<t.
Corollary 5.6 (With Finite Horizon Every Policy is Bayes Optimal). If Γm = 0 for
some m ∈ N, then for any deterministic policy pi there is a Bayesian mixture ξ′ such
that pi(æ<t) is the only ξ′-optimal action for all histories æ<t consistent with pi and
t ≤ m.
In contrast to Theorem 5.4 where every policy is ξ′-optimal for a fixed Bayesian
mixture ξ′, Corollary 5.6 gives a different Bayesian mixture ξ′ for every policy pi such
that pi is the only ξ′-optimal policy.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be small enough such that V piξ (æ<t) > ε for all æ<t and t ≤ m. (This
is possible because (A× E)m is finite by Assumption 4.6c.) We use the dogmatic prior
from Theorem 5.5 to construct a Bayesian mixture ξ′ for the policy pi and ε > 0. Thus
for any history æ<t ∈ (A× E)∗ consistent with pi and t ≤ m, the action pi(æ<t) is the
only ξ′-optimal action.
Corollary 5.7 (AIXI Emulating Computable Policies). Let ε > 0 and let pi be any
computable policy. There is a Bayesian mixture ξ′ such that for any ξ′-optimal policy
pi∗ξ′ and for any environment ν,∣∣∣∣V pi∗ξ′ν ()− V piν ()∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Proof. From the proof of Corollary 5.6 and Lemma 4.18.
5.2.3 The Gödel Prior
This section introduces a prior that prevents any fixed formal system from making any
statements about the outcome of all but finitely many computations. It is named after
Gödel (1931) who famously showed that for any sufficiently rich formal system there
are statements that it can neither prove nor disprove.
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This prior is targeted at AIXItl, a computable approximation to AIXI defined by
Hutter (2005, Sec. 7.2). AIXItl aims to perform as least as well as the best agent who
is limited by time t and space l that can be verified using a proof of length at most
n for some fixed n ∈ N. The core idea is to enumerate all deterministic policies and
proofs and then execute the policy for which the best value has been proved.
In order to be verified, a policy pi has to be computed by a program p which fulfills
the verification condition VA(p) (Hutter, 2005, Eq. 7.7). This program p not only
computes future actions of pi, but also hypothetical past actions a′i and lower bounds
vi for the value of the policy pi:
VA(p) := “∀k∀(va′æ)1:k.
(
p(æ<k) = v1a′1 . . . vka
′
k → vk ≤ V piξ (æ<k)
)
”,
where pi is the policy derived from p according to pi(æ<k) := a′k.
We fix some formal system that we use to prove the verification condition. We
want it to be sufficiently powerful, but this incurs Gödel incompleteness. For simplicity
of exposition we pick PA, the system of Peano arithmetic (Shoenfield, 1967, Ch. 8.1),
but our result generalizes trivially to all formal systems which cannot prove their own
consistency.
Let n be a fixed constant. The algorithm for AIXItl is specified as follows.
1. Let P = ∅. This will be the set of verified programs.
2. For all proofs in PA of length ≤ n: if the proof proves VA(p) for some p, and |p| ≤ l,
then add the program p to P .
3. For each input history æ<k repeat: run all programs from P for at most t steps each,
take the one with the highest promised value vk, and return that program’s policy’s
action.
Theorem 5.8 (The Gödel Prior). There is a UTM U ′ such that if PA is consistent,
then the set of verified programs P is empty for all t, l, and n.
Proof. Let q denote an algorithm that never halts, but for which this cannot be proved
in PA; e.g., let q enumerate all consequences of PA and halt as soon as it finds a
contradiction. Since we assumed that PA is consistent, q never halts. Define the UTM
U ′(p, a1:k) as follows.
• Run q for k steps.
• If q halts, output vk = 2.
• Run U(p, a1:k).
Since q never halts, U and U ′ are functionally identical, therefore U ′ is universal. Note
that PA proves ∀p. U(p, a1:k) = U ′(p, a1:k) for any fixed k, but PA does not prove
∀k∀p. U(p, a1:k) = U ′(p, a1:k).
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If q did eventually halt, it would output a value vk = 2 that is too high, since the
value function V piξ is bounded by 1 from above, which PA knows. Hence PA proves that
q halts→ ∀p. ¬VA(p) (5.2)
If PA could prove VA(p) for any p, then PA would prove that q does not halt since this
is the contrapositive of (5.2). Therefore the set P remains empty.
AIXItl exhibits all the problems of the arbitrariness of the UTM illustrated by the
indifference prior (Theorem 5.4) and the dogmatic prior (Theorem 5.5). In addition, it
is also susceptible to Gödel incompleteness as illustrated by the Gödel prior in Theo-
rem 5.8. The formal system that is a parameter to AIXItl just provides another point
of failure.
As a computable approximation to AIXI, AIXItl is needlessly complicated. As we
prove in Corollary 6.13, ε-optimal AIXI is limit computable, so we can approximate it
with an anytime algorithm. Bounding the computational resources to the approxima-
tion algorithm already yields a computable version of AIXI. Moreover, unlike AIXItl,
this approximation actually converges to AIXI in the limit. Furthermore, we can ‘speed
up’ this approximation algorithm using Hutter search (Hutter, 2002b); this is very sim-
ilar but not identical to AIXItl.
5.3 Bayes Optimality
The aim of the Legg-Hutter intelligence measure is to formalize the intuitive notion
of intelligence mathematically. Legg and Hutter (2007a) collect various definitions of
intelligence across many academic fields and destill it into the following statement (Legg
and Hutter, 2007b)
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments.
This definition is formalized as follows.
Definition 5.9 (Legg-Hutter Intelligence; Legg and Hutter, 2007b, Sec. 3.3)). The
(Legg-Hutter) intelligence of a policy pi is defined as
Υξ(pi) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)V piν ()
The Legg-Hutter intelligence of a policy pi is the t0-value that pi achieves across all
environments from the classM weighted by the prior w. Legg and Hutter (2007b) con-
sider a subclass ofMCCSLSC , the class of computable measures together with a Solomonoff
prior w(ν) = 2−K(ν) and do not use discounting explicitly.
Typically, the index ξ is omitted when writing Υ. However, in this section we
consider the intelligence measure with respect to different priors, therefore we make
this dependency explicit. The following proposition motivates the use of the index ξ
instead of w.
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Proposition 5.10 (Bayes Optimality = Maximal Intelligence). Υξ(pi) = V piξ () for all
policies pi.
Proof. Follows directly from (4.6) and Definition 5.9.
Definition 5.11 (Balanced Pareto Optimality; Hutter, 2005, Def. 5.22). LetM be a
set of environments. A policy pi is balanced Pareto optimal in the set of environments
M iff for all policies p˜i, ∑
ν∈M
w(ν)
(
V piν ()− V p˜iν ()
) ≥ 0.
Proposition 5.12 (Balanced Pareto Optimality = Maximal Intelligence). A policy pi
is balanced Pareto optimal inM if and only if pi has maximal Legg-Hutter intelligence.
Proof. From (4.6) we get∑
ν∈M
w(ν)
(
V piν ()− V
pi∗ξ
ν ()
)
=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)V piν ()−
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)V
pi∗ξ
ν ()
= V piξ ()− V ∗ξ ()
= V piξ ()− sup
p˜i
V p˜iξ ()
= Υξ(pi)− sup
p˜i
Υ(p˜i)
by Proposition 5.10. This term is nonnegative iff Υξ(pi) is maximal.
As a consequence of Proposition 5.10 and Proposition 5.12 we get that AIXI is
balanced Pareto optimal (Hutter, 2005, Thm. 5.24) and has maximal Legg-Hutter in-
telligence.
Υξ := sup
pi
Υξ(pi) = sup
pi
V piξ () = V
pi∗ξ
ξ () = Υξ(pi
∗
ξ ).
This is not surprising since Legg-Hutter intelligence was defined in terms of the t0-
value in the Bayes mixture. Moreover, because the value function is scaled to be in the
interval [0, 1], intelligence is a real number between 0 and 1.
It is just as hard to score very high on the Legg-Hutter intelligence measure as it
is to score very low: we can always turn a reward minimizer into a reward maximizer
by inverting the rewards r′t := 1 − rt. Hence the lowest possible intelligence score is
achieved by AIXI’s twin sister, a ξ-expected reward minimizer:
Υξ := infpi
Υξ(pi) = inf
pi
V piξ ()
The heaven environment (reward 1 forever) and the hell environment (reward 0 forever)
are computable and thus in the environment classMCCSLSC ; therefore it is impossible to
get a reward 0 or reward 1 in every environment. Consequently, for all policies pi,
0 < Υξ ≤ Υξ(pi) ≤ Υξ < 1.
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image of Υ
Figure 5.1: The Legg-Hutter intelligence measure assigns values within the closed
interval [Υξ,Υξ]; the assigned values are depicted in purple. By Theorem 5.13, com-
putable policies are dense in this purple set.
For every real number r ∈ [Υξ,Υξ] there is a policy pi with Υξ(pi) = r: analogously to
Lemma 4.14 we can define pi such that with probability (r − Υξ)/(Υξ − Υξ) it follows
pi∗ξ and otherwise it follows arg minp˜i V
p˜i
ξ ().
Figure 5.1 illustrates the intelligence measure Υ. It is natural to fix the policy
random that takes actions uniformly at random to have an intelligence score of 1/2 by
choosing a ‘symmetric’ universal prior (Legg and Veness, 2013).
AIXI is not computable (Theorem 6.15), hence there is no computable policy pi
such that Υξ(pi) = Υξ or Υξ(pi) = Υξ for any Bayesian mixture ξ overMCCSLSC . But the
following theorem states that computable policies can come arbitrarily close. This is
no surprise: by Lemma 4.17 we can do well on a Legg-Hutter intelligence test simply
by memorizing what AIXI would do for the first k steps; as long as k is chosen large
enough such that discounting makes the remaining rewards contribute very little to the
value function.
Theorem 5.13 (Computable Policies are Dense). The set
{Υξ(pi) | pi is a computable policy}
is dense in the set [Υξ,Υξ].
Proof. Let pi be any policy and let ε > 0. We need to show that there is a computable
policy p˜i with |Υξ(p˜i)−Υξ(pi)| < ε. We choose m large enough such that Γm/Γ1 < ε/3.
Let α ∈ A be arbitrary and define the policy
p˜i(a | æ<t) :=

pi(a | æ<t)± (ε/3)−m if t < m,
1 if t ≥ m and a = α, and
0 otherwise.
By choosing an appropriate rational number in the interval [pi(a | æ<t)− (ε/3)−m, pi(a |
æ<t) + (ε/3)−m] we can make the policy p˜i computable because we can store these
approximations to the action probabilities of pi for the first m − 1 steps in a lookup
table. From Lemma 4.17 we get∣∣∣V pi,mξ ()− V p˜i,mξ ()∣∣∣ ≤ Dm−1(ξpi, ξp˜i | ) ≤ ((ε/3)−m)m = ε3
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and together with Lemma 4.16 this yields
|Υξ(pi)−Υξ(p˜i)| =
∣∣V piξ ()− V p˜iξ ()∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣V pi,mξ ()− V p˜i,mξ ()∣∣∣+ 2ΓmΓ1 ≤ ε3 + 2ΓmΓ1 < ε.
Remark 5.14 (Deterministic Policies are not Dense in [Υξ,Υξ]). The intelligence values
of deterministic policies are generally not dense in the interval [Υξ,Υξ]. We show this
by defining an environment ν where the first action determines whether the agent
goes to heaven or hell: action α leads to heaven and action β leads to hell. Define
Bayesian mixture ξ′ := 0.999ν + 0.001ξ and let pi be any policy. If pi takes action
α first, then Υξ′(pi) > 0.999. If pi takes action β first, then Υξ′(pi) < 0.001. Hence
there are no deterministic policies that score an intelligence value in the closed interval
[0.001, 0.999]. 3
Legg-Hutter intelligence is measured with respect to a fixed prior. The Bayes agent is
the most intelligent policy if it uses the same prior. We use the results from Section 5.2
to show that the intelligence score of the Bayes agent can be arbitrary close to the
minimum intelligence score Υξ.
Corollary 5.15 (Some AIXIs are Stupid). For any Bayesian mixture ξ over MCCSLSC
and every ε > 0, there is a Bayesian mixture ξ′ such that Υξ(pi∗ξ′) < Υξ + ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0. According to Theorem 5.13, there is a computable policy pi such
that Υξ(pi) < Υξ + ε/2. From Corollary 5.7 we get a Bayesian mixture ξ′ such that
|Υξ(pi∗ξ′)−Υξ(pi)| = |V
pi∗
ξ′
ξ ()− V piξ ()| < ε/2, hence
|Υξ(pi∗ξ′)−Υξ| ≤ |Υξ(pi∗ξ′)−Υξ(pi)|+ |Υξ(pi)−Υξ| < ε/2 + ε/2 = ε.
We get the same result if we fix AIXI, but rig the intelligence measure.
Corollary 5.16 (AIXI is Stupid for Some Υ). For any deterministic ξ-optimal policy
pi∗ξ and for every ε > 0 there is a Bayesian mixture ξ
′ such that Υξ′(pi∗ξ ) ≤ ε and
Υξ′ ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Let a1 := pi∗ξ () be the first action that pi
∗
ξ takes. We define an environment ν
such that taking the first action a1 leads to hell and taking any other first action leads
to heaven as in Remark 5.14. We define the Bayesian mixture ξ′ := (1− ε)ν+ εξ. Since
pi∗ξ takes action a1 first, it goes to hell, i.e., V
pi∗ξ
ν () = 0. Hence with Lemma 4.14
Υξ′(pi
∗
ξ ) = V
pi∗ξ
ξ′ () = (1− ε)V
pi∗ξ
ν () + εV
pi∗ξ
ξ () ≤ ε.
For any policy pi that takes an action other than a1 first, we get
Υξ′(pi) = V
pi
ξ′ () = (1− ε)V piν () + εV piξ () ≥ 1− ε.
On the other hand, we can make any computable policy smart if we choose the right
Bayesian mixture. In particular, we get that there is a Bayesian mixture such that ‘do
nothing’ is the most intelligent policy save for some ε.
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name definition
strong a.o. V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 µpi-almost surely
a.o. in mean Epiµ
[
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)
]→ 0
a.o. in probability ∀ε > 0. µpi [V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t) > ε]→ 0
weak a.o. 1t
∑t
k=1
(
V ∗µ (æ<k)− V piµ (æ<k)
)
→ 0 µpi-almost surely
Table 5.1: The formal definition of different types of asymptotic optimality. In each
case we understand the limit as t→∞.
Corollary 5.17 (Computable Policies can be Smart). For any computable policy pi and
any ε > 0 there is a Bayesian mixture ξ′ such that Υξ′(pi) > Υξ′ − ε.
Proof. Corollary 5.7 yields a Bayesian mixture ξ′ with |Υξ′−Υξ′(pi)| = |V ∗ξ′()−V piξ′ ()| <
ε.
5.4 Asymptotic Optimality
An asymptotically optimal policy is a policy learns to act optimally in every environ-
ment fromM, i.e., the value of this policy converges to the optimal value.
Definition 5.18 (Asymptotic Optimality). A policy pi is asymptotically optimal in an
environment classM iff for all µ ∈M
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ (5.3)
on histories drawn from µpi.
There are different types of asymptotic optimality based on the type of stochas-
tic convergence in (5.3); see Definition 2.5. If this convergence occurs almost surely,
it is called strong asymptotic optimality (Lattimore and Hutter, 2011, Def. 7); if this
convergence occurs in mean, it is called asymptotic optimality in mean; if this conver-
gence occurs in probability, it is called asymptotic optimality in probability ; and if the
Cesàro averages converge almost surely, it is called weak asymptotic optimality (Lat-
timore and Hutter, 2011, Def. 7). Since the value function is a nonnegative bounded
random variable, asymptotic optimality in mean and asymptotic optimality in proba-
bility are equivalent. See Table 5.1 for the explicit definitions and see Figure 5.2 for an
overview over their relationship.
Asymptotic optimality in probability is in spirit a probably approximately cor-
rect (PAC) result: for all ε > 0 and δ > 0 the probability that our policy is ε-suboptimal
converges to zero; eventually this probability will be less than δ. For a PAC result it is
typically demanded that the number of time steps until the probability is less than δ
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strong a.o.
weak a.o. a.o. in mean a.o. in probability
Figure 5.2: The relationship between different types of asymptotic optimality. Each
arrow indicates a logical implication and each lack of an arrow indicates that there is
no logical implication.
be polynomial in 1/ε and 1/δ. In general environments this is impossible, and here we
have no ambition to provide concrete convergence rates.
Intuitively, a necessary condition for asymptotic optimality is that the agent needs
to explore infinitely often for an entire effective horizon. If we explore only finitely often,
then the environment might change after we stopped exploring. Moreover, the agent
needs to predict the value of counterfactual policies accurately; but by Lemma 4.16
only for an ε-effective horizon. By committing to exploration for the entire effective
horizon, we learn about the value of counterfactual policies.
Example 5.19 (Exploration Infinitely Often for an Entire Effective Horizon). If there
is an ε > 0 such that the policy pi does not explore for Ht(ε) steps infinitely of-
ten, then V ∗µ (æ<t) − V piµ (æ<t) > ε infinitely often. Define A := {α, β} and E :=
{0, ε/2, 1} (observations are vacuous) and consider the following class of environments
M := {ν∞, ν1, ν2, . . .} (transitions are labeled with condition: action, reward):
s0
β, ε2
α, 0
s0 s1 . . . sn
β, ε2
t < k : α, 0
t ≥ k : α, 0 α, 0 α, 0
β, 0
β, 0
β, 0
α, 1
ν∞ νk
Environment νk works just like environment ν∞, except that at time step k the path to
state s1 gets unlocked. The length of the state sequence in νk is defined as an ε-effective
horizon, n := Ht(ε) where t is the time step in which the agent leaves state s0. The
optimal policy in environment ν∞ is to always take action β, the optimal policy for
environment νk is to take action β for t < k and then take action α. Suppose the agent
is in time step t and in state s0. Since these environments are partially observable,
it needs to explore for n steps (take action α n times) to distinguish ν∞ from νk for
any k ≤ t. Since there are infinitely many νk, the agent needs to do this infinitely
often. Moreover, V ∗ν1 ≥ ε and V ∗ν∞ = ε/2, so if νt is the true environment, then not
exploring to the right for an ε-effective horizon is suboptimal by ε/2. But if ν∞ is the
true environment, then exploring incurs an opportunity cost of one reward of ε/2. 3
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Next, we state two negative results about asymptotic optimality proved by Latti-
more and Hutter (2011). It is important to emphasize that Theorem 5.20 and Theo-
rem 5.21 only hold for deterministic policies.
Theorem 5.20 (Deterministic Policies are not Strongly Asymptotically Optimal; Lat-
timore and Hutter, 2011, Thm. 8). There is no deterministic policy that is strong asymp-
totically optimal in the classMCCMcomp.
If the horizon grows linearly (for example, power discounting γ(t) = t−β with β > 1;
see Table 4.1), then a deterministic policy cannot be weakly asymptotically optimal
policy: the agent has to explore for an entire effective horizon, which prevents the
Cesàro average from converging.
Theorem 5.21 (Necessary Condition for Weak Asymptotic Optimality; Lattimore,
2013, Thm. 5.5). If there is an ε > 0 such that Ht(ε) /∈ o(t), then there is no determin-
istic policy that is weakly asymptotically optimal in the classMCCMcomp.
There are several agents that achieve asymptotic optimality. In the rest of this
section, we discuss the Bayes agent, BayesExp, and Thompson sampling. Asymptotic
optimality can also be achieved through optimism (Sunehag and Hutter, 2012a,b, 2015).
5.4.1 Bayes
In this section, we list two results from the literature regarding the asymptotic optimal-
ity of the Bayes optimal policy. The following negative result is due to Orseau (2010,
2013).
Theorem 5.22 (Bayes is not Asymptotically Optimal in General Environments; Orseau,
2013, Thm. 4). For any classM⊇MCCMcomp no Bayes optimal policy pi∗ξ is asymptotically
optimal: there is an environment µ ∈ M and a time step t0 ∈ N such that µpi
∗
ξ -almost
surely for all time steps t ≥ t0
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t) =
1
2
.
Orseau calls this result the good enough effect : A Bayesian agent eventually decides
that the current strategy is good enough and that any additional exploration is not
worth its expected payoff. However, if the environment changes afterwards, the Bayes
agent is acting suboptimally.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume A := {α, β} and E := {0, 1/2, 1} (observations
are vacuous). We consider the following environment µ (transitions are labeled with
action, reward).
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s0 s1 . . . sn
β, 12
α, 0 ∗, 0 ∗, 0
∗, 0
In state s0 the action β is the exploitation action and the action α the exploration action.
The length of the state sequence is defined as an 1/t-effective horizon, n := Ht(1/t)
where t is the time step in which the agent leaves state s0. Since the discount function
γ is computable by Assumption 4.6a, µ ∈MCCSLSC .
Assume that when acting in µ, the Bayes agent explores infinitely often. Let æ<t
be a history in which the agent is in state s0 and takes action α. Then V
pi∗ξ
µ ≤ 1/t.
By on-policy value convergence (Corollary 4.20), V ∗ξ (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t)→ 0 µpi
∗
ξ -almost
surely. Hence there is a time step t0 such that for all t ≥ t0 we have V ∗ξ < w(µ)/2.
Since µ is deterministic, w(µ | æ<t) ≥ w(µ). Now we get a contradiction from (4.7):
V ∗ξ (æ<t) ≥ w(µ|æ<t)V ∗µ (æ<t) ≥ w(µ)V ∗µ (æ<t) =
w(µ)
2
> V ∗ξ (æ<t)
Therefore the Bayes agent stops taking the exploration action α after time step t0,
and so it is not optimal in any ν ∈ MCCSLSC that behaves like µ until time step t0 and
then changes:
s0 s1 . . . sn
β, 12
t > t0 : α, 1
t ≤ t0 : α, 0 ∗, 0 ∗, 0
∗, 0
The following theorem is also known as the self-optimizing theorem. This theorem
has been a source of great confusion because its statement in Hutter (2005, Thm. 5.34)
is not very explicit about how the histories are generated. The formulation of Lattimore
(2013, Thm. 5.2) is explicit, but less general.
Theorem 5.23 (Sufficient Condition for Strong Asymptotic Optimality of Bayes; Hut-
ter, 2005, Thm. 5.34). Let µ be some environment. If there is a policy pi and a sequence
of policies pi1, pi2, . . . such that for all ν ∈M
V ∗ν (æ<t)− V pitν (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely, (5.4)
then
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely.
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If pi = pi∗ξ and (5.4) holds for all µ ∈ M, then pi∗ξ is strongly asymptotically optimal in
the classM.
It is important to emphasize that the policies pi1, pi2, . . . need to converge to the
optimal value on the history generated by µ and pi, and not (as one might think) ν and
pit. Intuitively, the policy pi is an ‘exploration policy’ that ensures that the environment
class is explored sufficiently. Typically, a policy is asymptotically optimal on its own
history. So if pi = pi1 = pi2 = . . ., then we get that Bayes is asymptotically optimal on
the history generated by the policy pi, not its own history. In light of Theorem 5.5 and
Theorem 5.22 this is not too surprising; Bayesian reinforcement learning agents might
not explore enough to be asymptotically optimal, but given a policy that does explore
enough, Bayes learns enough to be asymptotically optimal.
This invites us to define the following policies pit: follow the information-seeking
policy pi∗IG until time step t, and then follow pi
∗
ξ (explore until t, then exploit). Since the
information-seeking policy explores enough to prove off-policy prediction (Orseau et al.,
2013, Thm. 7), we get V piξ −V piµ → 0 for every policy pi uniformly. Hence arg maxpi V piξ →
arg maxpi V
pi
µ and thus V ∗µ − V
pi∗ξ
µ → 0 and (5.4) is satisfied. From Theorem 5.23 we get
V ∗µ − V
pi∗ξ
µ → 0, which we already knew. In order to get strong asymptotic optimality,
all we need to do is choose the switching time step t appropriately, i.e., wait until V ∗µ
and V
pi∗ξ
µ are close enough. Unfortunately, this is an invalid strategy: the agent does
not know the true environment µ and hence cannot check this condition.
Hutter (2005, Sec. 5.6) uses Theorem 5.23 to show that the Bayes optimal policy is
strongly asymptotically optimal in the class of ergodic finite-state MDPs if the effective
horizon is growing, i.e., Ht(ε)→∞ for all ε > 0. This relies on the fact that in ergodic
finite-state MDPs we need a fixed number of steps to explore the entire environment up
to ε-confidence. Therefore we can define a sequence of policies pi1, pi2, . . . that completely
disregard the history and start exploring everything from scratch. Since the effective
horizon is growing, this exploration phase takes a vanishing fraction of effective horizon
and most of the value is retained. Therefore the sequence of policies pi1, pi2, . . . satisfies
the condition of Theorem 5.23 regardless of the history, thus in particular for the history
generated by pi = pi∗ξ and any µ ∈ M. Note that the condition on the horizon is
important: If the effective horizon is bounded, then Bayes is not asymptotically optimal
in the class of ergodic finite-state MDPs because it can be locked into a dogmatic prior
similarly to Theorem 5.5.
Proof of Theorem 5.23. From (4.6) we get for any history æ<t
w(µ | æ<t)
(
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t)
)
≤
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)
(
V ∗ν (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
ν (æ<t)
)
=
(∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)V ∗ν (æ<t)
)
− V pi
∗
ξ
ξ (æ<t)
≤
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)V ∗ν (æ<t)− V pitξ (æ<t)
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=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)
(
V ∗ν (æ<t)− V pitν (æ<t)
)
. (5.5)
From (5.4) follows that V ∗ν −V pitν → 0 µpi-almost surely for all ν ∈M, so (5.5) converges
to 0 µpi-almost surely (Hutter, 2005, Lem. 5.28ii). Similar to Example 3.20, 1/w(µ |
æ<t) is a nonnegative µpi-martingale and thus converges (to a finite value) µpi-almost
surely by Theorem 2.8. Therefore V ∗µ (æ<t) − V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t) → 0 µpi-almost surely. If this
is true for all µ ∈ M, the strong asymptotic optimality of pi∗ξ follows from pi = pi∗ξ by
definition.
5.4.2 BayesExp
The definition of BayesExp is given in Section 4.3.3. In this subsection we state a result
by Lattimore (2013) that motivated the definition of BayesExp.
Theorem 5.24 (BayesExp is Weakly Asymptotically Optimal; Lattimore, 2013, Thm.
5.6). Let piBE denote the policy from Algorithm 1. If Ht(ε) grows monotone in t and
Ht(εt)/εt ∈ o(t), then for all environments µ ∈M
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
V ∗µ (æ<k)− V piBEµ (æ<k)
)→ 0 as t→∞ µpiBE -almost surely.
If the horizon grows sublinearly (Ht(ε) ∈ o(t) for all ε > 0), then we can always
find a sequence εt → 0 that decreases slowly enough such that Ht(ε)/εt ∈ o(t) holds.
5.4.3 Thompson Sampling
In this section we prove that the Thompson sampling policy defined in Section 4.3.4 is
asymptotically optimal. Ortega and Braun (2010) prove that the action probabilities
of Thompson sampling converge to the action probability of the optimal policy almost
surely, but require a finite environment class and two (arguably quite strong) technical
assumptions on the behavior of the posterior distribution (akin to ergodicity) and the
similarity of environments in the class. Our convergence results do not require these
assumptions.
Theorem 5.25 (Thompson Sampling is Asymptotically Optimal in Mean). For all
environments µ ∈M,
EpiTµ
[
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piTµ (æ<t)
]→ 0 as t→∞.
This theorem immediately implies that Thompson sampling is also asymptotically
optimal in probability according to Figure 5.2. However, this does not imply almost
sure convergence (see Example 5.28).
We first give an intuition for the asymptotic optimality of Thompson sampling. At
every resampling step we can split the classM into three partitions:
1. Environments ρ where V
pi∗ρ
µ ≈ V ∗µ
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2. Environments ρ where V ∗ρ > V ∗µ
3. Environments ρ where V ∗ρ < V ∗µ
The first class is the class of ‘good’ environments: if we draw one of them, we follow a
policy that is close to optimal in µ. The second class is the class of environments that
overestimate the value of µ. Following their optimal policy the agent gains information
because rewards will be lower than expected. The third class is the class of environments
that underestimate the value of µ. Following their optimal policy the agent might not
gain information since µ might behave just like environment ρ on the ρ-optimal policy.
However, when sampling from the first class instead, the agent gains information about
the third class because rewards tend to be better than environments from the third
class predicted.
Since the true environment µ ∈M, the first class is not empty, and the probability
of drawing a sample from the first class does not become too small. Whenever the
second and third class have sufficiently high weight in the posterior, there is a good
chance of picking a policy that leads the agent to gain information. Asymptotically,
the posterior converges, so the agent ends up having learned everything it could, i.e.,
the posterior weight of the second and third class vanishes.
This argument is not too hard to formalize for deterministic environment classes.
However, for stochastic environment classes the effect on the posterior when following
a bad policy is harder to quantify because there is always a chance that the rewards are
different simply because of bad luck. In order to prove this theorem in its generality for
stochastic classes, we employ an entirely different proof strategy that relies on statistical
tools rather than the argument given above.
Definition 5.26 (Expected Total Variation Distance). Let pi be any policy and let
m ∈ N ∪∞. The expected total variation distance on the policy pi is
F pim(æ<t) :=
∑
ρ∈M
w(ρ | æ<t)Dm(ρpi, ξpi | æ<t).
If we replace the distance measure Dm by cross-entropy, then the quantity F pim(æ<t)
becomes the expected information gain (see Section 4.3.2).
For the proof of Theorem 5.25 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.27 (Expected Total Variation Distance Vanishes On-Policy). For any policy
pi and any environment µ,
Epiµ[F pi∞(æ<t)]→ 0 as t→∞.
Proof. From Theorem 3.25 we get D∞(µpi, ξpi | æ<t)→ 0 µpi-almost surely, and since D
is bounded, this convergence also occurs in mean. Thus for every environment ν ∈M,
Epiν
[
D∞(νpi, ξpi | æ<t)
]→ 0 as t→∞.
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Now
Epiµ[F pi∞(æ<t)] ≤
1
w(µ)
Epiξ [F pi∞(æ<t)]
=
1
w(µ)
Epiξ
[∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)D∞(νpi, ξpi | æ<t)
]
=
1
w(µ)
Epiξ
[∑
ν∈M
w(ν)
νpi(æ<t)
ξpi(æ<t)
D∞(νpi, ξpi | æ<t)
]
=
1
w(µ)
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)Epiν
[
D∞(νpi, ξpi | æ<t)
]→ 0
by Hutter (2005, Lem. 5.28ii) since total variation distance is bounded.
Proof of Theorem 5.25. Let β, δ > 0 and let εt > 0 denote the sequence used to define
piT in Algorithm 2. We assume that t is large enough such that εk ≤ β for all k ≥ t
and that δ is small enough such that w(µ | æ<t) > 4δ for all t, which holds since
w(µ | æ<t) 6→ 0 µpi-almost surely for any policy pi (Hutter, 2009a, Lem. 3i).
The stochastic process w(ν | æ<t) is a ξpiT -martingale according to Example 3.20.
By the martingale convergence theorem (Theorem 2.8) w(ν | æ<t) converges ξpiT -almost
surely and because ξpiT ≥ w(µ)µpiT it also converges µpiT -almost surely.
We argue that we can choose t0 to be one of piT ’s resampling time steps large
enough such that for all t ≥ t0 the following three events hold simultaneously with
µpiT -probability at least 1− δ.
(i) There is a finite setM′ ⊂ M with w(M′ | æ<t) > 1 − δ and w(ν | æ<k) 6→ 0 as
k →∞ for all ν ∈M′.
(ii) |w(M′′ | æ<t)− w(M′′ | æ<t0)| ≤ δ for allM′′ ⊆M′.
(iii) F piT∞ (æ<t) < δβw2min.
where wmin := inf{w(ν | æ<k) | k ∈ N, ν ∈M′}, which is positive by (i).
(i) and (ii) are satisfied eventually because the posterior w( · | æ<t) converges µpiT -
almost surely. Note that the set M′ is random: the limit of w(ν | æ<t) as t → ∞
depends on the history æ1:∞. Without loss of generality, we assume the true environ-
ment µ is contained inM′ since w(µ | æ<t) 6→ 0 µpiT -almost surely. (iii) follows from
Lemma 5.27 since convergence in mean implies convergence in probability.
Moreover, we define the horizon m := t + Ht(εt) as the time step of the effective
horizon at time step t. Let æ<t be a fixed history for which (i-iii) is satisfied. Then we
have
δβw2min > F
piT∞ (æ<t)
=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν | æ<t)D∞(νpiT , ξpiT | æ<t)
= Eν∼w( ·|æ<t) [D∞(ν
piT , ξpiT | æ<t)]
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≥ Eν∼w( ·|æ<t) [Dm(νpiT , ξpiT | æ<t)]
≥ βw2minw(M\M′′ | æ<t)
by Markov’s inequality where
M′′ := {ν ∈M ∣∣ Dm(νpiT , ξpiT | æ<t) < βw2min} .
For our fixed history æ<t we have
1− δ < w(M′′ | æ<t)
(i)
≤ w(M′′ ∩M′ | æ<t) + δ
(ii)
≤ w(M′′ ∩M′ | æ<t0) + 2δ
(i)
≤ w(M′′ | æ<t0) + 3δ
and thus we get
1− 4δ < w ({ν ∈M | Dm(νpiT , ξpiT | æ<t) < βw2min} ∣∣ æ<t0) . (5.6)
In particular, this bound holds for ν = µ since w(µ | æ<t0) > 4δ by assumption.
It remains to show that with high probability the value V
pi∗ρ
µ of the sample ρ’s
optimal policy pi∗ρ is sufficiently close to the µ-optimal value V ∗µ . The worst case is
that we draw the worst sample from M′ ∩ M′′ twice in a row. From now on, let ρ
denote the sample environment we draw at time step t0, and let t denote some time
step between t0 and t1 := t0 +Ht0(εt0) (before the next resampling). With probability
w(ν ′ | æ<t0)w(ν ′ | æ<t1) we sample ν ′ both at t0 and t1 when following piT . Therefore
we have for all æt:m and all ν ∈M
νpiT (æ1:m | æ<t) ≥ w(ν ′ | æ<t0)w(ν ′ | æ<t1)νpi
∗
ν′ (æ1:m | æ<t).
Thus we get for all ν ∈M′ (in particular ρ and µ)
Dm(µ
piT , ρpiT | æ<t) ≥ sup
ν′∈M
sup
A⊆(A×E)m
∣∣∣w(ν ′ | æ<t0)w(ν ′ | æ<t1)
(µpi
∗
ν′ (A | æ<t)− ρpi∗ν′ (A | æ<t))
∣∣∣
≥ w(ν | æ<t0)w(ν | æ<t1) sup
A⊆(A×E)m
∣∣∣µpi∗ν (A | æ<t)− ρpi∗ν (A | æ<t)∣∣∣
≥ w2minDm(µpi
∗
ν , ρpi
∗
ν | æ<t).
For ρ ∈M′′ we get with (5.6)
Dm(µ
piT , ρpiT | æ<t) ≤ Dm(µpiT , ξpiT | æ<t) +Dm(ρpiT , ξpiT | æ<t)
< βw2min + βw
2
min = 2βw
2
min,
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which together with Lemma 4.17 and the fact that rewards in [0, 1] implies∣∣∣V pi∗νµ (æ<t)− V pi∗νρ (æ<t)∣∣∣ ≤ Γt+Ht(εt)Γt +
∣∣∣V pi∗ν ,mµ (æ<t)− V pi∗ν ,mρ (æ<t)∣∣∣
≤ εt +Dm(µpi∗ν , ρpi∗ν | æ<t)
≤ εt + 1w2minDm(µ
piT , ρpiT | æ<t)
< β + 2β = 3β.
Hence we get (omitting history arguments æ<t for simplicity)
V ∗µ = V
pi∗µ
µ < V
pi∗µ
ρ + 3β ≤ V ∗ρ + 3β = V
pi∗ρ
ρ + 3β < V
pi∗ρ
µ + 3β + 3β = V
pi∗ρ
µ + 6β. (5.7)
With µpiT -probability at least 1− δ (i), (ii), and (iii) are true, with µpiT -probability
at least 1−δ our sample ρ happens to be inM′ by (i), and with w( · | æ<t0)-probability
at least 1−4δ the sample is inM′′ by (5.6). All of these events are true simultaneously
with probability at least 1− (δ + δ + 4δ) = 1− 6δ. Hence the bound (5.7) transfers for
piT such that with µpiT -probability ≥ 1− 6δ we have
V ∗µ (æ<t)− V piTµ (æ<t) < 6β.
Therefore µpiT [V ∗µ (æ<t)−V piTµ (æ<t) ≥ 6β] < 6δ and with δ → 0 we get that V ∗µ (æ<t)−
V piTµ (æ<t) → 0 as t → ∞ in probability. The value function is bounded, thus it also
converges in mean.
The following example shows that the Thompson sampling policy is not strongly
asymptotically optimal. However, we expect that strong asymptotic optimality can
be achieved with Thompson sampling by resampling at every time step (with strong
assumptions on the discount function). However, for practical purposes resampling in
every time step is very inefficient.
Example 5.28 (Thompson Sampling is not Strongly Asymptotically Optimal). Define
A := {α, β}, E := {0, 1/2, 1}, and assume geometric discounting (Example 4.5). Con-
sider the following class of environmentsM := {ν∞, ν1, ν2, . . .} (transitions are labeled
with action, reward):
s0
s1
s2
β, 12
α, 0
β, 0
α, 0
∗, 0
s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
β, 12
t < k : α, 0
β, 0
α, 0
∗, 0
t ≥ k : α, 0
α, 0
β, 0
α, 1
β, 0
ν∞ νk
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Environment νk works just like environment ν∞ except that after time step k, the path
to state s3 gets unlocked. The classM is a class of deterministic weakly communicat-
ing POMDPs (but as a POMDP νk has more than 5 states). The optimal policy in
environment ν∞ is to always take action β, the optimal policy for environment νk is to
take action β for t < k and then take action β in state s1 and action α otherwise.
Suppose the policy piT is acting in environment ν∞. Since it is asymptotically
optimal in the class M, it has to take actions αα from s0 infinitely often: for t < k
environment νk is indistinguishable from ν∞, so the posterior for νk is larger or equal to
the prior. Hence there is always a constant chance of sampling νk until taking actions
αα, at which point all environments νk for k ≤ t become falsified.
If the policy piT decides to explore and take the first action α, it will be in state s1.
Let æ<t denote the current history. Then the ν∞-optimal action is β and
V ∗ν∞(æ<t) = (1− γ)
(
0 + γ
1
2
+ γ2
1
2
+ . . .
)
=
γ
2
.
The next action taken by piT is α since any optimal policy for any sampled environment
that takes action α once, takes that action again (and we are following that policy for
an εt-effective horizon). Hence
V piTν∞ (æ<t) ≤ (1− γ)
(
0 + 0 + γ2
1
2
+ γ3
1
2
+ . . .
)
=
γ2
2
.
Therefore V ∗ν∞ − V piTν∞ ≥ (γ − γ2)/2 > 0. This happens infinitely often with probability
one and thus we cannot get almost sure convergence. 3
If the Bayesian mixture ξ is inside the classM (as it is the case for the classMCCSLSC ),
then we can assign ξ a prior probability that is arbitrarily close to 1. Since the posterior
of ξ is the same as the prior, Thompson sampling will act according to the Bayes optimal
policy most of the time. This means the Bayes-value of Thompson sampling can be
very good; formally, V ∗ξ ()− V piTξ () = Υξ −Υξ(piT ) can be made arbitrarily small.
In contrast, the Bayes-value of Thompson sampling can also be very bad: Suppose
you have a class of (n+ 1)-armed bandits indexed 1, . . . , n where bandit i gives reward
1− ε on arm 1, reward 1 on arm i+ 1, and reward 0 on all other arms. For geometric
discounting and ε < (1− γ)/(2− γ), it is Bayes optimal to pull arm 1 while Thompson
sampling will explore on average n/2 arms until it finds the optimal arm. The Bayes-
value of Thompson sampling is 1/(n−γn−1) in contract to (1−ε) achieved by Bayes. For
a horizon of n, the Bayes optimal policy suffers a regret of εn and Thompson sampling
a regret of n/2, which is much larger for small ε.
5.4.4 Almost Sure in Cesàro Average vs. in Mean
It might appear that convergence in mean is more natural than the convergence of
Cesàro averages of weak asymptotic optimality. However, both notions are not so
fundamentally different because they both allow an infinite number of bad mistakes
(actions that lead to V ∗µ − V piµ being large). Asymptotic optimality in mean allows bad
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mistakes as long as their probability converges to zero; weak asymptotic optimality
allows bad mistakes as long as the total time spent on bad mistakes grows sublinearly.
Note that according to Example 5.19 making bad mistakes infinitely often is necessary
for asymptotic optimality.
Theorem 5.24 shows that weak asymptotic optimality is possible in any countable
class of stochastic environments. However, this requires the additional condition that
the effective horizon grows sublinearly, Ht(εt) ∈ o(t), while Theorem 5.25 does not
require any condition on the discount function.
Generally, weak asymptotic optimality and asymptotic optimality in mean are in-
comparable because the notions of convergence are incomparable for (bounded) random
variables. First, for deterministic sequences (i.e. deterministic policies in deterministic
environments), convergence in mean is equivalent to (regular) convergence, which is
impossible by Theorem 5.20. Second, convergence in probability (and hence conver-
gence in mean for bounded random variables) does not imply almost sure convergence
of Cesàro averages (Stoyanov, 2013, Sec. 14.18). We leave open the question whether
the policy piT is weakly asymptotically optimal.
5.5 Regret
Regret is how many expected rewards the agent forfeits by not following the best in-
formed policy.
Definition 5.29 (Regret). The regret of a policy pi in environment µ is
Rm(pi, µ) := sup
pi′
Epi
′
µ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
− Epiµ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
.
Note that regret is undiscounted and always nonnegative. Moreover, the space of
possible different policies for the first m actions is finite and we assumed the set of
actions A and the set of percepts E to be finite (Assumption 4.6c), so the supremum is
always attained by some policy (not necessarily the µ-optimal policy pi∗µ because that
policy uses discounting).
Different problem classes have different regret rates, depending on the structure
and the difficulty of the problem class. Multi-armed bandits provide a (problem-
independent) worst-case regret bound of Ω(
√
km) where k is the number of arms (Bubeck
and Bianchi, 2012). In MDPs the lower bound is Ω(
√
SAdm) where S is the number
of states, A the number of actions, and d the diameter of the MDP (Auer et al., 2010).
For a countable class of environments given by state representation functions that map
histories to MDP states, a regret of O˜(m2/3) is achievable assuming the resulting MDP
is weakly communicating (Nguyen et al., 2013).
A problem class is considered learnable if there is an algorithm that has a sublinear
regret guarantee. The following example shows that the general reinforcement learning
problem is not learnable because the agent can get caught in a trap and be unable to
recover.
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Example 5.30 (Linear Regret; Hutter, 2005, Sec. 5.3.2). Consider the following two
environments µ1 and µ2. In environment µ1 action α leads to hell (reward 0 forever)
and action β leads to heaven (reward 1 forever). Environment µ2 behaves just the same,
except that both actions are swapped.
hell heaven
reward = 0 reward = 1
βα
hell heaven
reward = 0 reward = 1
β α
µ1 µ2
The policy α that takes action α in the first time step performs well in µ2 but performs
poorly in µ1. Likewise, the policy β that takes action β in the first time step performs
well in µ1 but performs poorly in µ2. Regardless of which policy we adopt, our regret
is always linear in one of the environments µ1 or µ2:
Rm(α, µ1) = m Rm(α, µ2) = 0
Rm(β, µ1) = 0 Rm(β, µ2) = m 3
To achieve sublinear regret we need to ensure that the agent can recover from
mistakes. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Definition 5.31 (Recoverability). An environment µ satisfies the recoverability as-
sumption iff
sup
pi
∣∣∣Epi∗µµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V ∗µ (æ<t)]∣∣∣→ 0 as t→∞.
Recoverability compares following the worst policy pi for t− 1 time steps and then
switching to the optimal policy pi∗ν to having followed pi∗ν from the beginning. The
recoverability assumption states that switching to the optimal policy at any time step
enables the recovery of most of the value: it has to become less costly to recover from
mistakes as time progresses. This should be regarded as an effect of the discount
function: if the (effective) horizon grows, recovery becomes easier because the optimal
policy has more time to perform a recovery. Moreover, recoverability is on the optimal
policy, in contrast to the notion of ergodicity in MDPs which demands returning to a
starting state regardless of the policy.
Remark 5.32 (Weakly Communicating POMDPs are Recoverable). If the effective
horizon is growing, Ht(ε)→∞ as t→∞, then any weakly communicating finite state
POMDP satisfies the recoverability assumption. 3
5.5.1 Sublinear Regret in Recoverable Environments
This subsection is dedicated to the following theorem that connects asymptotic opti-
mality in mean to sublinear regret.
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Theorem 5.33 (Sublinear Regret in Recoverable Environments). If the discount func-
tion γ satisfies Assumption 5.34, the environment µ satisfies the recoverability assump-
tion, and pi is asymptotically optimal in mean in the class {µ}, then Rm(pi, µ) ∈ o(m).
Assumption 5.34 (Discount Function). Let the discount function γ be such that
(a) γt > 0 for all t,
(b) γt is monotone decreasing in t, and
(c) Ht(ε) ∈ o(t) for all ε > 0.
This assumption demands that the discount function is somewhat well-behaved: the
function has no oscillations, does not become 0, and the horizon is not growing too fast.
It is satisfied by geometric discounting (Example 4.5): (a) γt > 0, (b) γ monotone
decreasing, and (c) Ht(ε) = dlogγ εe ∈ o(t).
The problem with geometric discounting is that it makes the recoverability assump-
tion very strong: since the horizon is not growing, the environment has to enable faster
recovery as time progresses; in this case weakly communicating POMDPs are not re-
coverable. A choice with Ht(ε) → ∞ that satisfies Assumption 5.34 is subgeometric
discounting γt := e−
√
t/
√
t (see Table 4.1).
If the items in Assumption 5.34 are violated, Theorem 5.33 can fail:
• If γt = 0 for some time steps t, our policy does not care about those time steps
and might take actions that have large regret.
• Similarly if γ oscillates between high values and very low values: our policy might
take high-regret actions in time steps with comparatively lower γ-weight.
• If the horizon grows linearly, infinitely often our policy might spend some constant
fraction of the current effective horizon exploring, which incurs a cost that is a
constant fraction of the total regret so far.
To prove Theorem 5.33 we require the following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.35 (Value and Regret). Let ε > 0 and assume the discount function γ
satisfies Assumption 5.34. Let (dt)t∈N be a sequence of numbers with |dt| ≤ 1 for all t.
If there is a time step t0 with
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkdk < ε ∀t ≥ t0 (5.8)
then
m∑
t=1
dt ≤ t0 + ε(m− t0 + 1) + 1 + ε
1− εHm(ε).
Proof. This proof essentially follows the proof of Hutter (2006b, Thm. 17).
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By Assumption 5.34a we have γt > 0 for all t and hence Γt > 0 for all t. By
Assumption 5.34b have that γ is monotone decreasing, so we get for all n ∈ N
Γt =
∞∑
k=t
γk ≤
t+n−1∑
k=t
γt +
∞∑
k=t+n
γk = nγt + Γt+n.
And with n := Ht(ε) this yields
γtHt(ε)
Γt
≥ 1− Γt+Ht(ε)
Γt
≥ 1− ε > 0. (5.9)
In particular, this bound holds for all t and ε > 0.
Next, we define a series of nonnegative weights (bt)t≥1 such that
m∑
t=t0
dk =
m∑
t=t0
bt
Γt
m∑
k=t
γkdk.
This yields the constraints
t∑
k=t0
bk
Γk
γt = 1 ∀t ≥ t0.
The solution to these constraints is
bt0 =
Γt0
γt0
, and bt =
Γt
γt
− Γt
γt−1
for t > t0. (5.10)
Thus we get
m∑
t=t0
bt =
Γt0
γt0
+
m∑
t=t0+1
(
Γt
γt
− Γt
γt−1
)
=
Γm+1
γm
+
m∑
t=t0
(
Γt
γt
− Γt+1
γt
)
=
Γm+1
γm
+m− t0 + 1
≤ Hm(ε)
1− ε +m− t0 + 1
for all ε > 0 according to (5.9).
Finally,
m∑
t=1
dt ≤
t0∑
t=1
dt +
m∑
t=t0
bt
Γt
m∑
k=t
γkdk
≤ t0 +
m∑
t=t0
bt
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkdk −
m∑
t=t0
bt
Γt
∞∑
k=m+1
γkdk
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and using the assumption (5.8) and dt ≥ −1,
< t0 +
m∑
t=t0
btε+
m∑
t=t0
btΓm+1
Γt
≤ t0 + εHm(ε)
1− ε + ε(m− t0 + 1) +
m∑
t=t0
btΓm+1
Γt
For the latter term we substitute (5.10) to get
m∑
t=t0
btΓm+1
Γt
=
Γm+1
γt0
+
m∑
t=t0+1
(
Γm+1
γt
− Γm+1
γt−1
)
=
Γm+1
γm
≤ Hm(ε)
1− ε
with (5.9).
Proof of Theorem 5.33. Let (pim)m∈N denote any sequence of policies, such as a se-
quence of policies that attain the supremum in the definition of regret. We want to
show that
Epimµ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
− Epiµ
[
m∑
t=1
rt
]
∈ o(m).
For
d
(m)
k := E
pim
µ [rk]− Epiµ[rk] (5.11)
we have −1 ≤ d(m)k ≤ 1 since we assumed rewards to be bounded between 0 and 1.
Because the environment µ satisfies the recoverability assumption we have∣∣∣Epi∗µµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V ∗µ (æ<t)]∣∣∣→ 0 as t→∞, and
sup
m
∣∣∣Epi∗µµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epimµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]∣∣∣→ 0 as t→∞,
so we conclude that
sup
m
∣∣Epiµ[V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epimµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]∣∣→ 0
by the triangle inequality and thus
sup
m
Epimµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V ∗µ (æ<t)]→ 0 as t→∞. (5.12)
By assumption the policy pi is asymptotically optimal in mean, so we have
Epiµ[V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V piµ (æ<t)]→ 0 as t→∞,
and with (5.12) this combines to
sup
m
Epimµ [V ∗µ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V piµ (æ<t)]→ 0 as t→∞.
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From V ∗µ (æ<t) ≥ V pimµ (æ<t) we get
lim sup
t→∞
(
sup
m
Epimµ [V pimµ (æ<t)]− Epiµ[V piµ (æ<t)]
)
≤ 0. (5.13)
For pi′ ∈ {pi, pi1, pi2, . . .} we have
Epi
′
µ [V
pi′
µ (æ<t)] = Epi
′
µ
[
1
Γt
Epi
′
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣æ<t
]]
= Epi
′
µ
[
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkrk
]
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkEpi
′
µ [rk],
so from (5.11) and (5.13) we get
lim sup
t→∞
sup
m
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkd
(m)
k ≤ 0.
Let ε > 0. We choose t0 independent of m and large enough such that we get
supm
∑∞
k=t γkd
(m)
k /Γt < ε for all t ≥ t0. Now we let m ∈ N be given and apply
Lemma 5.35 to get
Rm(pi, µ)
m
=
∑m
k=1 d
(m)
k
m
≤ t0 + ε(m− t0 + 1) +
1+ε
1−εHm(ε)
m
.
Since Ht(ε) ∈ o(t) according to Assumption 5.34c we get lim supm→∞Rm(pi, µ)/m ≤
0.
Example 5.36 (The Converse of Theorem 5.33 is False). Let µ be a two-armed
Bernoulli bandit with means 0 and 1 and suppose we are using geometric discount-
ing with discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1). This environment is recoverable. If our policy
pi pulls the suboptimal arm exactly on time steps 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, . . ., regret will be log-
arithmic. However, on time steps t = 2n for n ∈ N the value difference V ∗µ − V piµ is
deterministically at least 1− γ > 0. 3
Note that Example 5.36 does not rule out weak asymptotic optimality.
5.5.2 Regret of the Optimal Policy and Thompson sampling
We get the following immediate consequence.
Corollary 5.37 (Sublinear Regret for the Optimal Discounted Policy). If the discount
function γ satisfies Assumption 5.34 and the environment µ satisfies the recoverability
assumption, then Rm(pi∗µ, µ) ∈ o(m).
Proof. From Theorem 5.33 since the policy pi∗µ is (trivially) asymptotically optimal in
{µ}.
If the environment does not satisfy the recoverability assumption, regret may be
linear even on the optimal policy : the optimal policy maximizes discounted rewards
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and this short-sightedness might incur a tradeoff that leads to linear regret later on if
the environment does not allow recovery.
Corollary 5.38 (Sublinear Regret for Thompson Sampling). If the discount function
γ satisfies Assumption 5.34 and the environment µ ∈ M satisfies the recoverability
assumption, then Rm(piT , µ) ∈ o(m) for the Thompson sampling policy piT .
Proof. From Theorem 5.25 and Theorem 5.33.
5.6 Discussion
In this work, we disregard computational constraints. Because of this, our agents learn
very efficiently and we can focus on the way they balance exploration and exploitation.
So which balance is best?
5.6.1 The Optimality of AIXI
Bayesian reinforcement learning agents make the tradeoff between exploration and ex-
ploitation in the Bayes optimal way. Maximizing expected rewards according to any pos-
itive prior does not lead to enough exploration to achieve asymptotic optimality (Theo-
rem 5.22); the prior’s bias is retained indefinitely. For bad priors this can cause serious
malfunctions: the dogmatic prior defined in Section 5.2.2 can prevent a Bayesian agent
from taking a single exploratory action; exploration is restricted to cases where the ex-
pected future payoff falls below some prespecified ε > 0. However, this problem can be
alleviated by adding an extra exploration component to AIXI: Lattimore (2013) shows
that BayesExp is weakly asymptotically optimal (Theorem 5.24).
So instead, we may ask the following weaker questions. Does AIXI succeed in every
(ergodic) finite-state (PO)MDP, bandit problem, or sequence prediction task? Our
results imply that without further assumptions on the prior, we cannot answer any of
the preceding questions in the affirmative. Using a dogmatic prior (Theorem 5.5), we
can make AIXI follow any computable policy as long as that policy produces rewards
that are bounded away from zero.
• In a sequence prediction task that gives a reward of 1 for every correctly predicted
bit and 0 otherwise, a policy pi that correctly predicts every third bit will receive
an average reward of 1/3. With a pi-dogmatic prior, AIXI thus only predicts
a third of the bits correctly, and hence is outperformed by a uniformly random
predictor.
However, if we have a constant horizon of length 1, AIXI does succeed in sequence
prediction (Hutter, 2005, Sec. 6.2.2). If the horizon is this short, the agent is so
hedonistic that no threat of hell can deter it.
• In a (PO)MDP a dogmatic prior can make AIXI get stuck in any loop that
provides nonzero expected rewards.
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• In a bandit problem, a dogmatic prior can make AIXI get stuck on any arm which
provides nonzero expected rewards.
These results apply not only to AIXI, but generally to Bayesian reinforcement learn-
ing agents. Any Bayesian mixture over nonrecoverable environments is susceptible to
dogmatic priors if we allow an arbitrary reweighing of the prior. Notable exceptions
are classes of environment that allow policies that are strongly asymptotically optimal
regardless of the history (Theorem 5.23). For example, the class of all ergodic MDPs
for an unbounded effective horizon; in this case the Bayes optimal policy is strongly
asymptotically optimal (Hutter, 2005, Thm. 5.38). Note that in contrast to our results,
this requires that that the agent uses a Bayes-mixture over a class of ergodic MDPs.
Moreover, Bayesian agents still perform well at learning and achieve on-policy value
convergence (Corollary 4.20): the posterior belief about the value of a policy pi converges
to the true value of pi while following pi: V piξ (æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost
surely. Since this holds for any policy, in particular it holds for the Bayes optimal policy
pi∗ξ . This means that the Bayes agent learns to predict those parts of the environment
that it sees. But if it does not explore enough, then it will not learn other parts of the
environment that are potentially more rewarding.
Hutter (2005, Claim 5.12) claims:
We expect AIXI to be universally optimal.
Our work seriously challenges Hutter’s claim: no nontrivial and non-subjective optimal-
ity results for AIXI remain (see Table 5.3). Until new arguments for AIXI’s optimality
are put forward, we have to regard AIXI as a relative theory of intelligence, dependent
on the choice of the prior.
5.6.2 Natural Universal Turing Machines
The choice of the UTM has been a big open question in algorithmic information theory
for a long time. The Kolmogorov complexity of a string depends on this choice. How-
ever, there are invariance theorems (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Thm. 2.1.1 & Thm. 3.1.1)
which state that changing the UTM changes Kolmogorov complexity only by a con-
stant. When using the Solomonoff prior M to predict any deterministic computable
binary sequence, the number of wrong predictions is bounded by the Kolmogorov com-
plexity of the sequence (Corollary 3.56). Due to the invariance theorem, changing the
UTM changes the number of errors only by a constant. In this sense, compression and
prediction work for any choice of UTM.
For AIXI, there can be no invariance theorem; in Section 5.2 we showed that a bad
choice for the UTM can have drastic consequences. Our negative results can guide
future search for a natural UTM: the UTMs used to define the indifference prior (Theo-
rem 5.4), the dogmatic prior (Theorem 5.5), and the Gödel prior (Theorem 5.8) should
be considered unnatural. But what are other desirable properties of a UTM?
A remarkable but unsuccessful attempt to find natural UTMs is due to Müller
(2010). It takes the probability that one universal machine simulates another according
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name defined in KU (U ′) KU ′(U)
indifference prior Theorem 5.4 K(U) +K(m) +O(1) m
dogmatic prior Theorem 5.5 K(U) +K(pi) +K(ε) +O(1) d− log2 εe
Gödel prior Theorem 5.8 K(U) +K(PA) +O(1) 0
Table 5.2: Upper bounds to compiler sizes of the UTMs used in the proofs of Sec-
tion 5.2. KU (U ′) is the number of extra bits to run the ‘bad’ UTM U ′ on the ‘good’
UTM U , KU ′(U) is the number of extra bits to run U on U ′. K(U) denotes the length
of the shortest program for U on U .
to the length of their respective compilers and searches for a stationary distribution.
Unfortunately, no stationary distribution exists.
Alternatively, we could demand that the UTM U ′ that we use for the universal prior
has a small compiler on the reference machine U (Hutter, 2005, p. 35). Moreover, we
could demand the reverse, that the reference machine U has a small compiler on U ′. The
idea is that this should limit the amount of bias one can introduce by defining a UTM
that has very small programs for very complicated and ‘unusual’ environments. Unfor-
tunately, this just pushes the choice of the UTM to the reference machine. Table 5.2
lists compiler sizes of the UTMs constructed in this thesis.
5.6.3 Asymptotic Optimality
A policy is asymptotically optimal if the agent learns to act optimally in any environ-
ment from the classM. We discussed two asymptotically optimal policies. BayesExp
is weakly asymptotically optimal if the horizon grows sublinearly (Theorem 5.24) and
Thompson sampling is asymptotically optimal in mean (Theorem 5.25). Both policies
commit to exploration for several steps. As stated in Example 5.19:
To achieve asymptotic optimality, the agent needs to explore infinitely often
for an entire effective horizon.
This is why weak asymptotic optimality is impossible if the horizon grows linearly (The-
orem 5.21): if the agent explores for an entire effective horizon, it spoils a significant
fraction of the average. Thompson sampling explores whenever it draws a bad sample.
BayesExp explores if the maximal expected information gain is above some threshold.
Both policies commit to exploration for the entire effective horizon.
The exploration performed by Thompson sampling is qualitatively different from
the exploration by BayesExp (Lattimore, 2013, Ch. 5). BayesExp performs phases of
exploration in which it maximizes the expected information gain. This explores the
environment class completely, even achieving off-policy prediction (Orseau et al., 2013,
Thm. 7). In contrast, Thompson sampling only explores on the optimal policies, and in
some environment classes this will not yield off-policy prediction. So in this sense the
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Optimality Issue/Comment
µ-optimal policy requires to know the true environment µ in advance
Pareto optimality always satisfied (Theorem 5.3)
Bayes optimality same as maximal intelligence
balanced Pareto optimality same as maximal intelligence (Proposition 5.12)
maximal intelligence highly dependent on the prior (Corollary 5.15 and
Corollary 5.16)
PAC strong variant of asymptotic optimality in probability
asymptotic optimality Thompson sampling (Theorem 5.25) and
BayesExp (Lattimore, 2013), but not AIXI (Orseau,
2013)
sublinear regret impossible in general environments, but possible with
recoverability (Theorem 5.33)
Table 5.3: Proposed notions of optimality (Hutter, 2002a, 2005; Legg and Hutter,
2007b) and their issues. Asymptotic optimality stands out to be the only nontrivial
objective optimality notion for general reinforcement learning.
exploration mechanism of Thompson sampling is more reward-oriented than maximizing
information gain.
However, asymptotic optimality has to be taken with a grain of salt. It provides
no incentive to the agent to avoid traps in the environment. Once the agent gets
caught in a trap, all actions are equally bad and thus optimal: asymptotic optimality
has been achieved. Even worse, an asymptotically optimal agent has to explore all
the traps because they might contain hidden treasure. This brings us to the following
impossibility result for non-recoverable environment classes.
Either the agent gets caught in a trap or it is not asymptotically optimal.1
5.6.4 The Quest for Optimality
Theorem 5.3 shows that Pareto optimality is trivial in the class of all computable en-
vironments. Bayes optimality, Balanced Pareto optimality, and maximal Legg-Hutter
intelligence are equivalent (Proposition 5.12 and Proposition 5.10). Corollary 5.15 and
Corollary 5.16 show that this notion is highly subjective because it depends on the
choice of the prior. Moreover, according to Corollary 5.17, any computable policy is
nearly balanced Pareto optimal. For finite horizons, there are priors such that every
policy is balanced Pareto optimal (Theorem 5.4). Sublinear regret is impossible in
general environments (Example 5.30). However, if the environment is recoverable (Def-
inition 5.31), then Theorem 5.33 shows that asymptotic optimality in mean implies
sublinear regret. In summary, asymptotic optimality is the only nontrivial and objec-
tive notion of optimality for the general reinforcement learning problem (Problem 4.2):
1This formulation was suggested by Toby Ord.
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it is both satisfiable (Theorem 5.24 and Theorem 5.25) and objective because it does
not depend on a prior probability measure over the environment class M. Table 5.3
summarized the notions of optimality discussed in this chapter.
Our optimality notions are tail events: any finite number of time steps are irrelevant;
the agent can be arbitrarily lazy. Asymptotic optimality requires only convergence in
the limit. In recoverable environments we can always achieve sublinear regret after
any finite interaction. All policies with finite horizon are Bayes optimal according to
Theorem 5.4 and Corollary 5.6. Overall, there is a dichotomy between the asymptotic
nature of our optimality notions and the use of discounting to prioritize the present
over the future. Ideally, we would aim for finite guarantees instead, such as precise
regret bounds or PAC convergence rates, but without additional assumptions this is
impossible in this general setting. This leaves us with the main question of this chapter
unanswered (Hutter, 2009b, Sec. 5):
What is a good optimality criterion for general reinforcement learning?
Chapter 6
Computability
I simply keep a few spare halting oracles around. — Marcus Hutter
Given infinite computation power, many traditional AI problems become trivial: play-
ing chess, go, or backgammon can be solved by exhaustive expansion of the game tree.
Yet other problems seem difficult still; for example, predicting the stock market, driv-
ing a car, or babysitting your nephew. How can we solve these problems in theory?
Solomonoff induction and AIXI are proposed answers to this question.
Both Solomonoff induction and AIXI are known to be incomputable. But not all
incomputabilities are equal. The arithmetical hierarchy specifies different levels of com-
putability based on oracle machines: each level in the arithmetical hierarchy is com-
puted by a Turing machine which may query a halting oracle for the respective lower
level. Our agents are useless if they cannot be approximated in practice, i.e., by a
regular Turing machine. Therefore we posit that any ideal for a ‘perfect agent’ needs
to be limit computable (∆02). The class of limit computable functions is the class of
functions that admit an anytime algorithm.
In Section 6.2 we consider various different flavors of Solomonoff induction: Solo-
monoff’s prior M (Example 3.5) is only a semimeasure and not a measure: it assigns
positive probability that the observed string has only finite length. This can be cir-
cumvented by normalizing M . Solomonoff’s normalization Mnorm (Definition 2.16)
preserves the ratio M(x1)/M(x0) and is limit computable. If instead we mix only over
programs that compute infinite strings, we get a semimeasure M (3.6), which can be
normalized to Mnorm. Moreover, when predicting a sequence, we are primarily inter-
ested in the conditional probability M(xy | x) (respectively Mnorm(xy | y), M(xy | x),
or Mnorm(xy | x)) that the currently observed string x is continued with y. We show
that both M and Mnorm are limit computable, while M and Mnorm are not. Table 6.1
summarizes our computability results for Solomonoff induction.
For MDPs, planning is already P-complete for finite and infinite horizons (Papadim-
itriou and Tsitsiklis, 1987). In POMDPs, planning is undecidable (Madani et al., 1999,
2003). The existence of a policy whose expected value exceeds a given threshold is
PSPACE-complete (Mundhenk et al., 2000), even for purely epistemic POMDPs in
which actions do not change the hidden state (Sabbadin et al., 2007). In Section 6.3
we derive hardness results for planning in general semicomputable environments; this
environment class is even more general than POMDPs. We show that optimal policies
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Q {(x, q) ∈ X ∗ ×Q | Q(x) > q} {(x, y, q) ∈ X ∗ ×X ∗ ×Q | Q(xy | x) > q}
M Σ01 \∆01 ∆02 \ (Σ01 ∪Π01)
Mnorm ∆
0
2 \ (Σ01 ∪Π01) ∆02 \ (Σ01 ∪Π01)
M Π02 \∆02 ∆03 \ (Σ02 ∪Π02)
Mnorm ∆
0
3 \ (Σ02 ∪Π02) ∆03 \ (Σ02 ∪Π02)
Table 6.1: The computability results on M , Mnorm, M , and Mnorm proved in Sec-
tion 6.2. Lower bounds on the complexity of M and Mnorm are given only for specific
universal Turing machines.
Agent Optimal ε-Optimal
AIMU ∆02 ∆01
AINU ∆03, Π02-hard ∆02, Σ01-hard
AIXI ∆03, Σ01-hard ∆02, Σ01-hard
Entropy-seeking ∆03 ∆02
Information-seeking ∆03 ∆02
BayesExp ∆03 ∆02
Table 6.2: Computability results for different agent models derived in Section 6.3,
Section 6.5, and Section 6.6. AIMU denotes the optimal policy in a computable envi-
ronment and AINU denotes the optimal policy in a semicomputable environment (see
Section 4.1). Hardness results for AIXI are with respect to a specific universal Turing
machine; hardness results for ν-optimal policies are with respect to a specific environ-
ment ν ∈MCCSLSC . Results for entropy-seeking and information-seeking policies are only
for finite horizons.
are Π02-hard and ε-optimal policies are undecidable.
Moreover, we show that by default, AIXI is not limit computable. When picking the
next action, two or more actions might have the same value (expected future rewards).
The choice between them is easy, but determining whether such a tie exists is difficult.
This problem can be circumvented by settling for an ε-optimal policy; we get a limit-
computable agent with infinite horizon. However, these results rely on the recursive
definition of the value function. In contrast, Hutter (2005) defines the value function as
the limit of the iterative value function. In Section 6.4 we compare these two definitions
and show that the recursive definition correctly maximizes expected rewards and has
better computability properties.
In Section 6.5 we show that for finite horizons both the entropy-seeking and the
information-seeking agent are ∆03-computable and have limit-computable ε-optimal
policies. BayesExp (Section 4.3.3) relies on optimal policies that are generally not
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limit computable. In Section 6.6 we give a weakly asymptotically optimal agent based
on BayesExp that is limit computable. Table 6.2 summarizes our results on the com-
putability of these agents.
In this chapter we illustrate the environments used in the proofs of our theorems
in the form of flowcharts. They should be read as follows. Circles denote stochastic
nodes, rectangles denote environment nodes, and diamonds denote the agent’s choice
nodes. Transitions out of stochastic nodes are labeled with transition probabilities,
transitions out of environment nodes are labeled with percepts, and transitions out of
choice nodes are labeled with actions. The initial node is marked with a small incoming
arrow (see for example Figure 6.3). By Assumption 4.6b the worst possible outcome is
getting reward 0 forever, thus we label such states as hell . Analogously, getting reward
1 forever is the best possible outcome, thus we label such states as heaven.
6.1 Background on Computability
6.1.1 The Arithmetical Hierarchy
A set A ⊆ N is Σ0n iff there is a quantifier-free formula η such that
k ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃k1∀k2 . . . Qnkn η(k, k1, . . . , kn) (6.1)
where Qn = ∀ if n is even, Qn = ∃ if n is odd (Nies, 2009, Def. 1.4.10). (We can also
think of η as a computable relation.) A set A ⊆ N is Π0n iff its complement N \ A
is Σ0n. The formula η on the right side of (6.1) is a Σ0n-formula and its negation is a
Π0n-formula. It can be shown that we can add any bounded quantifiers and duplicate
quantifiers of the same type without changing the classification of A. The set A is ∆0n
iff A is Σ0n and A is Π0n. We get that Σ01 as the class of recursively enumerable sets, Π01
as the class of co-recursively enumerable sets and ∆01 as the class of recursive sets.
The set A ⊆ N is Σ0n-hard (Π0n-hard, ∆0n-hard) iff for any set B ∈ Σ0n (B ∈ Π0n,
B ∈ ∆0n), B is many-one reducible to A, i.e., there is a computable function f such
that k ∈ B ↔ f(k) ∈ A (Nies, 2009, Def. 1.2.1). We get Σ0n ⊂ ∆0n+1 ⊂ Σ0n+1 ⊂ . . . and
Π0n ⊂ ∆0n+1 ⊂ Π0n+1 ⊂ . . .. This hierarchy of subsets of natural numbers is known as
the arithmetical hierarchy .
By Post’s Theorem (Nies, 2009, Thm. 1.4.13), a set is Σ0n if and only if it is recur-
sively enumerable on an oracle machine with an oracle for a Σ0n−1-complete set. An
oracle for Σ01 is called a halting oracle.
6.1.2 Computability of Real-valued Functions
We fix some encoding of rational numbers into binary strings and an encoding of binary
strings into natural numbers. From now on, this encoding will be done implicitly
wherever necessary.
Definition 6.1 (Σ0n-, Π0n-, ∆0n-computable). A function f : X ∗ → R is called Σ0n-
computable (Π0n-computable, ∆0n-computable) iff the set {(x, q) ∈ X ∗ ×Q | f(x) > q} is
Σ0n (Π0n, ∆0n).
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{(x, q) | f(x) ≥ q} {(x, q) | f(x) < q}
f is computable ∆01 ∆01
f is lower semicomputable Σ01 Π01
f is upper semicomputable Π01 Σ01
f is limit computable ∆02 ∆02
f is ∆0n-computable ∆0n ∆0n
f is Σ0n-computable Σ0n Π0n
f is Π0n-computable Π0n Σ0n
Table 6.3: Connection between the computability of real-valued functions and the
arithmetical hierarchy.
A ∆01-computable function is called computable, a Σ01-computable function is called
lower semicomputable, and a Π01-computable function is called upper semicomputable.
A ∆02-computable function f is called limit computable, because there is a computable
function φ such that
lim
k→∞
φ(x, k) = f(x).
The program φ that limit computes f can be thought of as an anytime algorithm for f :
we can stop φ at any time k and get a preliminary answer. If the program φ ran long
enough (which we do not know), this preliminary answer will be close to the correct
one.
Limit-computable sets are the highest level in the arithmetical hierarchy that can be
approached by a regular Turing machine. Above limit-computable sets we necessarily
need some form of halting oracle. See Table 6.3 for the definition of lower/upper
semicomputable and limit-computable functions in terms of the arithmetical hierarchy.
Lemma 6.2 (Computability of Arithmetical Operations). Let n > 0 and let f, g :
X ∗ → R be two ∆0n-computable functions. Then
(a) {(x, y) | f(x) > g(y)} is Σ0n,
(b) {(x, y) | f(x) ≤ g(y)} is Π0n,
(c) f + g, f − g, and f · g are ∆0n-computable, and
(d) f/g is ∆0n-computable if g(x) 6= 0 for all x.
(e) log f is ∆0n-computable if f(x) > 0 for all x.
Proof. We only prove this for n > 1. Since f, g are ∆0n-computable, they are limit
computable on a level n−1 oracle machine. Let φ be the function limit computing f on
the oracle machine, and let ψ be the function limit computing g on the oracle machine:
f(x) = lim
k→∞
φ(k, x) and g(y) = lim
k→∞
ψ(k, y).
By assumption, both φ and ψ are ∆0n−1-computable.
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(a) Let G := {(x, y, q) | g(y) < q}, and let F := {(x, y, q) | q < f(x)}, both of which
are in ∆0n by assumption. Hence there are Σ0n-formulas ϕG and ϕF such that
(x, y, q) ∈ G ⇐⇒ ϕG(x, y, q)
(x, y, q) ∈ F ⇐⇒ ϕF (x, y, q)
Now f(x) > g(y) if and only if ∃q. (x, y, q) ∈ G ∩ F , which is equivalent to the
Σ0n-forumla
∃q. ϕG(x, y, q) ∧ ϕF (x, y, q).
(b) Follows from (a).
(c) Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are continuous operations.
(d) Division is discontinuous only at g(x) = 0. We show this explicitly. By assumption,
for any ε > 0 there is a k0 such that for all k > k0
|φ(x, k)− f(x)| < ε and |ψ(x, k)− g(x)| < ε.
We assume without loss of generality that ε < |g(x)|, since g(x) 6= 0 by assumption.∣∣∣∣φ(x, k)ψ(x, k) − f(x)g(x)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣φ(x, k)g(x)− f(x)ψ(x, k)ψ(x, k)g(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ |φ(x, k)g(x)− f(x)g(x)|+ |f(x)g(x)− f(x)ψ(x, k)||ψ(x, k)g(x)|
<
ε|g(x)|+ |f(x)|ε
|ψ(x, k)g(x)|
with |ψ(x, k)g(x)| = |ψ(x, k)| · |g(x)| > (|g(x)| − ε)|g(x)|,
< ε · |g(x)|+ |f(x)|
(|g(x)| − ε)|g(x)|
ε→0−−−→ 0,
therefore f(x)/g(x) = limk→∞ φ(x, k)/ψ(x, k).
(e) Follows from the fact that the logarithm is computable.
6.2 The Complexity of Solomonoff Induction
In this section, we derive the computability results for Solomonoff’s prior as stated in
Table 6.1.
Since M is lower semicomputable, Mnorm is limit computable by Lemma 6.2 (c)
and (d). When using the Solomonoff prior M (or one of its sisters Mnorm, M , or
Mnorm defined in Definition 2.16 and Equation 3.6) for sequence prediction, we need
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M(xy | x) > q ⇐⇒ ∀m∃k. φ(xy,k)φ(x,m) > q ⇐⇒ ∃k∃m0∀m ≥ m0. φ(xy,k)φ(x,m) > q
Figure 6.1: A Π02-formula and an equivalent Σ02-formula defining conditional M . Here
φ(x, k) denotes a computable function that lower semicomputes M(x).
to compute the conditional probability M(xy | x) = M(xy)/M(x) for finite strings
x, y ∈ X ∗. Because M(x) > 0 for all finite strings x ∈ X ∗, this quotient is well-defined.
Theorem 6.3 (Complexity of M , Mnorm, M , and Mnorm).
(a) M(x) is lower semicomputable
(b) M(xy | x) is limit computable
(c) Mnorm(x) is limit computable
(d) Mnorm(xy | x) is limit computable
(e) M(x) is Π02-computable
(f) M(xy | x) is ∆03-computable
(g) Mnorm(x) is ∆03-computable
(h) Mnorm(xy | x) is ∆03-computable
Proof. (a) By Li and Vitányi (2008, Thm. 4.5.2). Intuitively, we can run all programs
in parallel and get monotonely increasing lower bounds for M(x) by adding 2−|p|
every time a program p has completed outputting x.
(b) From (a) and Lemma 6.2d since M(x) > 0 (see also Figure 6.1).
(c) By Lemma 6.2cd, and M(x) > 0.
(d) By (iii), Lemma 6.2d since Mnorm(x) ≥M(x) > 0.
(e) Let φ be a computable function that lower semicomputesM . SinceM is a semimea-
sure, M(xy) ≥ ∑zM(xyz), hence ∑y∈XnM(xy) is nonincreasing in n and thus
M(x) > q iff ∀n∃k∑y∈Xn φ(xy, k) > q.
(f) From (v) and Lemma 6.2d since M(x) > 0.
(g) From (v) and Lemma 6.2d.
(h) From (vi) and Lemma 6.2d since Mnorm(x) ≥M(x) > 0.
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We proceed to show that these bounds are in fact the best possible ones. If M
were ∆01-computable, then so would be the conditional semimeasureM( · | · ). Thus the
M -adversarial sequence z1:∞ defined in Example 3.42 would be computable and hence
corresponds to a computable deterministic measure µ. However, we haveM(z1:t) ≤ 2−t
by construction, so dominance M(x) ≥ w(µ)µ(x) with w(µ) > 0 yields a contradiction
with t→∞:
2−t ≥M(z1:t) ≥ w(µ)µ(z1:t) = w(µ) > 0
By the same argument, the normalized Solomonoff prior Mnorm cannot be ∆01-com-
putable. However, since it is a measure, Σ01- or Π01-computability would entail ∆01-
computability.
For M and Mnorm we prove the following two lower bounds for specific universal
Turing machines.
Theorem 6.4 (M is not Limit Computable). There is a universal Turing machine U ′
such that the set {(x, q) |MU ′(x) > q} is not in ∆02.
Proof. Assume the contrary and let A ∈ Π02 \∆02 and η be a quantifier-free first-order
formula such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∀k∃i. η(n, k, i). (6.2)
For each n ∈ N, we define the program pn as follows.
1: procedure pn
2: output 1n+10
3: k ← 0
4: while true do
5: i← 0
6: while not η(n, k, i) do
7: i← i+ 1
8: k ← k + 1
9: output 0
Each program pn always outputs 1n+10. Furthermore, the program pn outputs the
infinite string 1n+10∞ if and only if n ∈ A by (6.2). We define U ′ as follows using our
reference machine U .
• U ′(1n+10): Run pn.
• U ′(00p): Run U(p).
• U ′(01p): Run U(p) and bitwise invert its output.
By construction, U ′ is a universal Turing machine. No pn outputs a string starting with
0n+11, therefore MU ′(0n+11) = 14
(
MU (0
n+11) +MU (1
n+10)
)
. Hence
MU ′(1
n+10) = 2−n−21A(n) + 14MU (1
n+10) + 14MU (0
n+11)
= 2−n−21A(n) +MU ′(0n+11)
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If n /∈ A, then MU ′(1n+10) = MU ′(0n+11). Otherwise, we have |MU ′(1n+10) −
MU ′(0
n+11)| = 2−n−2.
Now we assume that MU ′ is limit computable, i.e., there is a computable function
φ : X ∗ × N→ Q such that limk→∞ φ(x, k) = MU ′(x). We get that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ lim
k→∞
φ(0n+11, k)− φ(1n+10, k) ≥ 2−n−2,
thus A is limit computable, a contradiction.
Corollary 6.5 (Mnorm is not Σ02- or Π02-computable). There is a universal Turing
machine U ′ such that {(x, q) |MnormU ′(x) > q} is not in Σ02 or Π02.
Proof. Since Mnorm = c ·M , there exists a k ∈ N such that 2−k < c (even if we do not
know the value of k). We can show that the set {(x, q) |MnormU ′(x) > q} is not in ∆02
analogously to the proof of Theorem 6.4, using
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ lim
k→∞
φ(0n+11, k)− φ(1n+10, k) ≥ 2−k−n−2.
If Mnorm were Σ02-computable or Π02-computable, this would imply that Mnorm is ∆02-
computable since Mnorm is a measure, a contradiction.
SinceM() = 1, we haveM(x | ) = M(x), so the conditional probabilityM(xy | x)
has at least the same complexity as M . Analogously for Mnorm and Mnorm since they
are measures. For M , we have that M(x | ) = Mnorm(x), so Corollary 6.5 applies. All
that remains to prove is that conditional M is not lower semicomputable.
Theorem 6.6 (Conditional M is not Lower Semicomputable). The set {(x, xy, q) |
M(xy | x) > q} is not recursively enumerable.
We gave a different, more complicated proof in Leike and Hutter (2015b). The
following, much simpler and more elegant proof is due to Sterkenburg (2016, Prop. 3).
Proof. Assume to the contrary thatM(xy | x) is lower semicomputable. Let a 6= b ∈ X .
We construct an infinite string x by defining its initial segments  =: x(0) @ x(1) @
x(2) @ . . . @ x. At every step n, we enumerate strings y ∈ X ∗ until one is found
satisfying M(a | x(n)y) ≥ 1/2; then set x(n + 1) := x(n)yb. This implies that for
infinitely many t there is an n such that M(b | x<t) = M(b | x(n)y) ≤ 1 −M(a |
x(n)y) ≤ 1/2. Since we assumed M( · | · ) to be lower semicomputable, the infinite
string x is computable, and hence M(xt | x<t) → 1 by Corollary 3.55. But this
contradicts M(b | x<t) ≤ 1/2 infinitely often.
6.3 The Complexity of AINU, AIMU, and AIXI
6.3.1 Upper Bounds
In this section, we derive upper bounds on the computability of AINU, AIMU, and AIXI.
Except for Corollary 6.14, all results in this section apply generally to any ν ∈ MCCSLSC .
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Since the Bayesian mixture ξ ∈MCCSLSC , they apply to AIXI even though they are stated
for AINU.
In order to position AINU in the arithmetical hierarchy, we need to encode policies
as sets of natural numbers. For the rest of this chapter, we assume that policies are
deterministic, thus can be represented as relations over (A×E)∗×A. These relations are
easily identified with sets of natural numbers by encoding the history into one natural
number. From now on this translation of policies into sets of natural numbers will be
done implicitly wherever necessary.
Lemma 6.7 (Policies are in ∆0n). If a policy pi is Σ0n or Π0n, then pi is ∆0n.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Σ0n-formula (Π0n-formula) defining pi, i.e., ϕ(h, a) holds iff pi(h) = a.
We define the formula ϕ′,
ϕ′(h, a) :=
∧
a′∈A\{a}
¬ϕ(h, a′).
The set of actions A is finite, hence ϕ′ is a Π0n-formula (Σ0n-formula). Moreover, ϕ′ is
equivalent to ϕ.
To compute the optimal policy, we need to compute the optimal value function.
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the computability of the value function
for environments inMCCSLSC .
Lemma 6.8 (Complexity of V ∗ν ). For every ν ∈ MCCSLSC , and every lower semicom-
putable discount function γ, the function V ∗ν is ∆02-computable.
Proof. The explicit form of the value function (4.2) has numerator
lim
m→∞max
∑
æt:m
m∑
i=t
γ(i)riν(e1:i ‖ a1:i),
and denominator ν(e<t ‖ a<t) · Γt. The numerator is nondecreasing in m because we
assumed rewards to be nonnegative (Assumption 4.6b). Hence both numerator and
denominator are lower semicomputable functions, so Lemma 6.2d implies that V ∗ν is
∆02-computable.
From the optimal value function V ∗ν we get the optimal policy pi∗ν according to (4.4).
However, in cases where there is more than one optimal action, we have to break an
argmax tie. This happens iff V ∗ν (hα) = V ∗ν (hβ) for two potential actions α 6= β ∈ A.
This equality test is more difficult than determining which is larger in cases where they
are unequal. Thus we get the following upper bound.
Theorem 6.9 (Complexity of Optimal Policies). For any environment ν, if V ∗ν is
∆0n-computable, then there is an optimal policy pi∗ν for the environment ν that is ∆0n+1.
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Proof. To break potential ties, we pick an (arbitrary) total order  on A that specifies
which actions should be preferred in case of a tie. We define
piν(h) = a :⇐⇒
∧
a′:a′a
V ∗ν (ha) > V
∗
ν (ha
′)
∧
∧
a′:aa′
V ∗ν (ha) ≥ V ∗ν (ha′).
(6.3)
Then piν is a ν-optimal policy according to (4.4). By assumption, V ∗ν is ∆0n-computable.
By Lemma 6.2ab V ∗ν (ha) > V ∗ν (ha′) is Σ0n and V ∗ν (ha) ≥ V ∗ν (ha′) is Π0n. Therefore the
policy piν defined in (6.3) is a conjunction of a Σ0n-formula and a Π0n-formula and thus
∆0n+1.
Corollary 6.10 (Complexity of AINU). AINU is ∆03 for every environment ν ∈MCCSLSC .
Proof. From Lemma 6.8 and Theorem 6.9.
Usually we do not mind taking slightly suboptimal actions. Therefore actually trying
to determine if two actions have the exact same value seems like a waste of resources.
In the following, we consider policies that attain a value that is always within some
ε > 0 of the optimal value.
Theorem 6.11 (Complexity of ε-Optimal Policies). For any environment ν, if V ∗ν is
∆0n-computable, then there is an ε-optimal policy piεν for the environment ν that is ∆0n.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. Since the value function V ∗ν (h) is ∆0n-computable, the
set Vε := {(ha, q) | |q − V ∗ν (ha)| < ε/2} is in ∆0n according to Definition 6.1. Hence
we compute the values V ∗ν (ha′) until we get within ε/2 for every a′ ∈ A and then
choose the action with the highest value so far. Formally, let  be an arbitrary total
order on A that specifies which actions should be preferred in case of a tie. Without
loss of generality, we assume ε = 1/k, and define Q to be an ε/2-grid on [0, 1], i.e.,
Q := {0, 1/2k, 2/2k, . . . , 1}. We define
piεν(h) = a :⇐⇒ ∃(qa′)a′∈A ∈ QA.
∧
a′∈A
(ha′, qa′) ∈ Vε
∧
∧
a′:a′a
qa > qa′ ∧
∧
a′:aa′
qa ≥ qa′
∧ the tuple (qa′)a′∈A is minimal with
respect to the lex. ordering on QA.
(6.4)
This makes the choice of a unique. Moreover, QA is finite since A is finite, and hence
(6.4) is a ∆0n-formula.
Corollary 6.12 (Complexity of ε-Optimal AINU). For any environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC ,
there is an ε-optimal policy for AINU that is ∆02.
Proof. From Lemma 6.8 and Theorem 6.11.
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Purgatory Heaven6= pi∗ξ (ht)pi∗ξ (ht)
r = 0 r = 1
Figure 6.2: The environment µ from the proof of Theorem 6.15. The agent gets
reward 0 as long as it follows AIXI’s policy pi∗ξ that is assumed to be computable. Once
the agent deviates from pi∗ξ , it gets reward 1. We get a contradiction because AIXI
can learn this environment, so it will eventually decide to take an action that leads to
heaven.
Corollary 6.13 (Complexity of ε-Optimal AIXI). For any lower semicomputable prior
there is an ε-optimal policy for AIXI that is ∆02.
Proof. From Corollary 6.12 since for any lower semicomputable prior, the corresponding
Bayesian mixture ξ is inMCCSLSC .
If the environment ν ∈MCCMcomp is a measure, i.e., ν assigns zero probability to finite
strings, then we get computable ε-optimal policies.
Corollary 6.14 (Complexity of AIMU). If the environment µ ∈ MCCMcomp is a measure
and the discount function γ is computable, then AIMU is limit computable (∆02), and
ε-optimal AIMU is computable (∆01).
Proof. Let ε > 0 be the desired accuracy. We can truncate the limit m → ∞ in (4.2)
at the ε/2-effective horizon Ht(ε/2), since everything after Ht(ε/2) can contribute at
most ε/2 to the value function. Any lower semicomputable measure is computable (Li
and Vitányi, 2008, Lem. 4.5.1). Therefore V ∗µ as given in (4.2) is composed only of
computable functions, hence it is computable according to Lemma 6.2. The claim now
follows from Theorem 6.9 and Theorem 6.11.
6.3.2 Lower Bounds
We proceed to show that the bounds from the previous section are the best we can hope
for. In environment classes where ties have to be broken, AINU has to solve Π02-hard
problems (Theorem 6.16). These lower bounds are stated for particular environments
ν ∈MCCSLSC . Throughout this section, we assume that Γt > 0 for all t.
We also construct universal mixtures that yield bounds on ε-optimal policies. There
is an ε-optimal AIXI that solves Σ01-hard problems (Theorem 6.17). For arbitrary uni-
versal mixtures, we prove the following weaker statement that only guarantees incom-
putability.
Theorem 6.15 (No AIXI is computable). AIXI is not computable for any universal
Turing machine U .
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This theorem follows from the incomputability of Solomonoff induction. By the
on-policy value convergence theorem (Corollary 4.20) AIXI succeeds to predict the
environment’s behavior for its own policy. If AIXI were computable, then there would
be computable environments more powerful than AIXI: they can simulate AIXI and
anticipate its prediction, which leads to a contradiction.
Proof. Assume there is a computable policy pi∗ξ that is optimal in the mixture ξ. We
define a deterministic environment µ, the adversarial environment to pi∗ξ . The environ-
ment µ gives rewards 0 as long as the agent follows the policy pi∗ξ , and rewards 1 once
the agent deviates. Formally, we ignore observations by setting O := {0}, and define
µ(r1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

1 if ∀k ≤ t. ak = pi∗ξ ((ar)<k) and rk = 0,
1 if ∀k ≤ t. rk = 1k≥i
where i := min{j | aj 6= pi∗ξ ((ar)<j)}, and
0 otherwise.
See Figure 6.2 for an illustration of this environment. The environment µ is computable
because the policy pi∗ξ was assumed to be computable. Suppose pi
∗
ξ acts in µ, then by
Theorem 4.19 AIXI learns to predict perfectly on policy :
V
pi∗ξ
ξ (æ<t)− V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi
∗
ξ -almost surely,
since both pi∗ξ and µ are deterministic. Because V
pi∗ξ
µ (h<t) = 0 by definition of µ, we get
V ∗ξ (æ<t)→ 0. Therefore we find a t large enough such that V ∗ξ (æ<t) < w(µ) where æ<t
is the interaction history of pi∗ξ in µ. A policy pi with pi(æ<t) 6= pi∗ξ (æ<t), gets a reward
of 1 in environment µ for all time steps after t, hence V piµ (æ<t) = 1. With linearity of
V piξ (æ<t) in ξ (Lemma 4.14),
V piξ (æ<t) ≥ w(µ)µ(e1:t‖a1:t)ξ(e1:t‖a1:t)V
pi
µ (æ<t) ≥ w(µ),
since µ(e1:t ‖ a1:t) = 1 (µ is deterministic), V piµ (æ<t) = 1, and ξ(e1:t ‖ a1:t) ≤ 1. Now
we get a contradiction:
w(µ) > V ∗ξ (æ<t) = sup
pi′
V pi
′
ξ (æ<t) ≥ V piξ (æ<t) ≥ w(µ)
For the remainder of this section, we fix the action space to be A := {α, β} with
action α favored in ties. The percept space is fixed to a tuple of binary observations
and rewards, E := O × {0, 1} with O := {0, 1}.
Theorem 6.16 (AINU is Π02-hard). There is an environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC such that
AINU is Π02-hard.
Proof. Let A be a any Π02-set, and let η be a quantifier-free formula such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∀i ∃k η(n, i, k). (6.5)
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n++
Heaven
1/2
o = 1
r = 0
1/2
o = 0
r = 0
β
α
1∃k η(n,i,k)
o = 0
r = 1
Figure 6.3: The environment ρi from the proof of Theorem 6.16. The mixture ν
over class of environments M := {ρ0, ρ1, . . .} ⊂ MCCSLSC forces AINU to solve Π02-hard
problems: Action α is preferred (because of a tie) iff it leads to heaven, which is the
case iff ∃k η(n, i, k).
We define a class of environmentsM := {ρ1, ρ2, . . .} where each ρi is defined as follows.
ρi((or)1:m ‖ a1:m) :=

2−m if o1:m = 1m and ∀t ≤ m. rt = 0,
2−n−1 if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:m v 1n0∞ and an+2 = α
and rt = 1t>n+1 and ∃k η(n, i, k),
2−n−1 if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:m v 1n0∞ and an+2 = β
and rt = 1t>n+1, and
0 otherwise.
See Figure 6.3 for an illustration of these environments. Every ρi is a chronological
conditional semimeasure by definition and every ρi is lower semicomputable since η is
quantifier-free, soM⊆MCCSLSC .
We define our environment ν as a mixture overM,
ν :=
∑
i∈N
2−i−1ρi;
the choice of the weights on the environments ρi is arbitrary but positive. Let pi∗ν be an
optimal policy for the environment ν and recall that the action α is preferred in ties.
We claim that for the ν-optimal policy pi∗ν ,
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ pi∗ν(1n0) = α. (6.6)
This enables us to decide whether n ∈ A given the policy pi∗ν , hence proving (6.6)
concludes this proof.
Let n, i ∈ N be given, and suppose we are in environment ρi and observe 1n0. Taking
action β next yields reward 1 forever; taking action α next yields a reward of 1 if there
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ξ
Semi-Heaven
Heaven
∗
o = 1n0
α
β
1∃k η(n,i,k)
o = 0
r = 1/2
o = 0
r = 1
Figure 6.4: The environment ν from the proof of Theorem 6.17, which forces AIXI
to solve Σ01-hard problems. It functions just like ξ until the observation history is 1n0.
Then, action α is preferred iff heaven is accessible, i.e., iff ∃k η(n, i, k).
is a k such that η(n, i, k) holds. If this is the case, then
V ∗ρi(1
n0α) = Γn+2 = V
∗
ρi(1
n0β),
and otherwise
V ∗ρi(1
n0α) = 0 < Γn+2 = V
∗
ρi(1
n0β)
(omitting the first n + 1 actions and rewards in the argument of the value function).
We can now show (6.6): By (6.5), n ∈ A if and only if for all i there is a k such
that η(n, i, k), which happens if and only if V ∗ρi(1
n0α) = Γn+2 for all i ∈ N, which
is equivalent to V ∗ν (1n0α) = Γn+2, which in turn is equivalent to pi∗µ(1n0) = α since
V ∗ν (1n0β) = Γn+2 and action α is favored in ties.
Theorem 6.17 (Some ε-optimal AIXI are Σ01-hard). There is a universal Turing ma-
chine U ′ and an ε > 0 such that any ε-optimal policy for AIXI is Σ01-hard.
Proof. Let A be a Σ01-set and η be a quantifier-free formula such that n + 1 ∈ A iff
∃k η(n, k). We define the environment
ν((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

ξ((or)1:n ‖ a1:n) if ∃n. o1:n = 1n−10 and an = α
and ∀t′ > n. ot′ = 0 ∧ rt′ = 12 ,
ξ((or)1:n ‖ a1:n) if ∃n. o1:n = 1n−10 and an = β
and ∀t′ > n. ot = 0 ∧ rt = 1
and ∃k η(n− 1, k),
ξ((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) if @n. o1:n = 1n−10, and
0 otherwise.
See Figure 6.4 for an illustration. The environment ν mimics the universal environment
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ξ until the observation history is 1n−10. Taking the action α next gives rewards 1/2
forever. Taking the action β next gives rewards 1 forever if n ∈ A, otherwise the
environment ν ends at some future time step. Therefore we want to take action β if
and only if n ∈ A. We have that ν ∈MCCSLSC since ξ ∈MCCSLSC and η is quantifier-free.
We define ξ′ := 12ν +
1
8ξ. By Lemma 4.24 ξ
′ is a universal lower semicomputable
semimeasure. Let n ∈ A be given and let h ∈ (A×E)n be any history with observations
o1:n = 1
n−10. Since ν(1n−10 | a1:n) = ξ(1n−10 | a1:n) by definition, the posterior weights
of ν and ξ in ξ′ are equal to the prior weights, analogously to the proof of Theorem 5.5.
In the following, we use the linearity of V
pi∗
ξ′
ρ in ρ (Lemma 4.14), and the fact that values
are bounded between 0 and 1 (Assumption 4.6b). If there is a k such that η(n − 1, k)
holds,
V ∗ξ′(hβ)− V ∗ξ′(hα) = 12V
pi∗
ξ′
ν (hβ)− 12V
pi∗
ξ′
ν (hα) +
1
8V
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (hβ)− 18V
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (hα)
≥ 12 − 14 + 0− 18 = 18 ,
and similarly if there is no k such that η(n− 1, k) holds, then
V ∗ξ′(hα)− V ∗ξ′(hβ) = 12V
pi∗
ξ′
ν (hα)− 12V
pi∗
ξ′
ν (hβ) +
1
8V
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (hα)− 18V
pi∗
ξ′
ξ (hβ)
≥ 14 − 0 + 0− 18 = 18 .
In both cases |V ∗ξ′(hβ) − V ∗ξ′(hα)| > 1/9. Hence we pick ε := 1/9 and get for every
ε-optimal policy piεξ′ that pi
ε
ξ′(h) = β if and only if n ∈ A.
Note the differences between Theorem 6.15 and Theorem 6.17: the former talks
about optimal policies and shows that they are not computable, but is agnostic towards
the underlying universal Turing machine. The latter talks about ε-optimal policies and
gives a stronger hardness result, at the cost of depending on one particular universal
Turing machine.
6.4 Iterative Value Function
Historically, AIXI’s value function has been defined slightly differently to Definition 4.10,
using a limit extension of an iterative definition of the value function. This definition
is the more straightforward to come up with in AI: it is the natural adaptation of (op-
timal) minimax search in zero-sum games to the (optimal) expectimax algorithm for
stochastic environments. In this section we discuss the problems with this definition.
To avoid confusion with the recursive value function V piν , we denote the iterative
value function with W piν .1
Definition 6.18 (Iterative Value Function; Hutter, 2005, Def. 5.30). The iterative
1In Leike and Hutter (2015a) the use of the symbols V and W is reversed.
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Agent Optimal ε-Optimal
Iterative AINU ∆04, Σ03-hard ∆03, Π02-hard
Iterative AIXI ∆04, Π02-hard ∆03, Π02-hard
Iterative AIMU ∆02 ∆01
Table 6.4: Computability results for different agent models that use the iterative value
function derived in Section 6.4. Hardness results for AINU are with respect to a specific
environment ν ∈MCCSLSC .
value of a policy pi in an environment ν given history æ<t is
W piν (æ<t) :=
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
et:m
ν(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m)
m∑
k=t
γ(k)rk
if Γt > 0 and W piν (æ<t) := 0 if Γt = 0 where ai := pi(e<i) for all i ≥ t. The optimal
iterative value is defined as W ∗ν (h) := suppiW piν (h).
Analogously to (4.2), we can write W ∗ν using the max-sum-operator:
W ∗ν (æ<t) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞max
∑
æt:m
ν(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m)
m∑
k=t
γ(k)rk (6.7)
We use iterative AINU for the ν-optimal policy according to the iterative value
function, and iterative AIXI for the ξ-optimal policy according to the iterative value
function. Note that iterative AIMU coincides with AIMU since µ is a measure by
convention.
Generally, our environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC is only a semimeasure and not a measure,
i.e., there is a history æ<tat such that
1 >
∑
et∈E
ν(et | e<t ‖ a1:t).
In such cases, with positive probability the environment ν does not produce a new
percept et. If this occurs, we shall use the informal interpretation that the environment
ν ended, but our formal argument does not rely on this interpretation.
The following proposition shows that for a semimeasure ν ∈ MCCSLSC that is not a
measure, iterative AINU does not maximize ν-expected rewards. Recall that γ(1) states
the discount of the first reward. In the following, we assume without loss of generality
that γ(1) > 0, i.e., we are not indifferent about the reward received in time step 1.
Proposition 6.19 (Iterative AINU is not a ν-Expected Reward Maximizer). For any
ε > 0 there is an environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC that is not a measure and a policy pi that
receives a total of γ(1) rewards in ν, but iterative AINU receives only εγ(1) rewards in
ν.
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Hell
βα
r = ε
r = 0
r = 1
Figure 6.5: The environment ν from the proof of Proposition 6.19. Action α yields
reward 1, but subsequently the environment ends. Action β yields reward ε and the
environment continues forever. Iterative AINU will prefer the suboptimal action β,
because it conditions on surviving forever.
Informally, the environment ν is defined as follows. In the first time step, the agent
chooses between the two actions α and β. Taking action α gives a reward of 1, and
subsequently the environment ends. Action β gives a reward of ε, but the environment
continues forever. There are no other rewards in this environment. See Figure 6.5.
From the perspective of ν-expected reward maximization, it is better to take action α,
however iterative AINU takes action β.
Proof of Proposition 6.19. Let ε > 0. We ignore observations and set E := {0, ε, 1},
A := {α, β}. The environment ν is formally defined by
ν(r1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

1 if a1 = α and r1 = 1 and t = 1
1 if a1 = β and r1 = ε and rk = 0 ∀1 < k ≤ t
0 otherwise.
Taking action α first, we have ν(r1:t ‖ αa2:t) = 0 for t > 1 (the environment ν ends in
time step 2 given history α). Hence we conclude
V ∗ν (α) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
r1:m
ν(r1:m ‖ αa2:m)
m∑
k=1
γ(k)rk = 0.
Taking action β first we get
V ∗ν (β) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
r1:m
ν(r1:m ‖ βa2:m)
m∑
k=1
γ(k)rk =
γ(1)
Γ1
ε.
Since γ(1) > 0 and ε > 0, we have V ∗ν (β) > V ∗ν (α), and thus iterative AINU will
use a policy that plays action β first, receiving a total discounted reward of εγ(1). In
contrast, any policy pi that takes action α first receives a larger total discounted reward
of γ(1).
Whether it is reasonable to assume that our environment has a nonzero probability
118 Computability
of ending is a philosophical debate we do not want to engage in here; see Martin et al.
(2016) for a discussion. Instead, we have a different motivation to use the recursive over
the iterative value function: the latter has worse computability properties. Concretely,
we show that ε-optimal iterative AIXI has to solve Π02-hard problems and that there
is an environment ν ∈MCCSLSC such that iterative AINU has to solve Σ03-hard problems.
In contrast, using the recursive value function, ε-optimal AIXI is ∆02 according to
Corollary 6.12 and AINU is ∆03 according to Corollary 6.10.
The central difference between V piν and W piν is that for V piν all obtained rewards
matter, but for W piν only the rewards in timelines that continue indefinitely. In this
sense the value function W piν conditions on surviving forever. If the environment µ is a
measure, then the history is infinite with probability one, and so V piν and W piν coincide.
Hence this distinction is not relevant for AIMU, only for AINU and AIXI.
Lemma 6.20 (Complexity of W ∗ν ). For every ν ∈ MCCSLSC , the function W ∗ν is Π02-
computable.
Proof. Multiplying (6.7) with Γtν(e<t ‖ a<t) yields W ∗ν (æ<t) > q if and only if
lim
m→∞max
∑
æt:m
ν(e1:m ‖ a1:m)
m∑
k=t
γ(k)rk > q Γt ν(e<t ‖ a<t). (6.8)
The inequality’s right side is lower semicomputable, hence there is a computable func-
tion ψ such that ψ(`)↗ q Γt ν(e<t ‖ a<t) =: q′ as `→∞. (In contrast to the recursive
value function, this quantity is not increasing in m.) For a fixed m, the left side is also
lower semicomputable, therefore there is a computable function φ such that
φ(m, k)↗ max
∑
æt:m
ν(e1:m ‖ a1:m)
m∑
k=t
γ(k)rk =: f(m) as k →∞.
We already know that the limit of f(m) for m → ∞ exists (uniquely), hence we can
write (6.8) as
lim
m→∞ f(m) > q
′
⇐⇒ ∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0. f(m) > q′
⇐⇒ ∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0 ∃k. φ(m, k) > q′
⇐⇒ ∀`∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0 ∃k. φ(m, k) > ψ(`),
which is a Π02-formula.
Note that in the finite horizon case where m is fixed, the value function W ∗ν is ∆02-
computable by Lemma 6.2d, since W ∗ν (æ<t) = f(m)/q′. In this case, we get the same
computability results for iterative AINU as we did in Section 6.3.1.
Corollary 6.21 (Complexity of Iterative AINU). For any environment ν ∈ MCCSLSC ,
iterative AINU is ∆04 and there is an ε-optimal iterative AINU that is ∆
0
3.
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n++ Hell
Conditional Heaven
1/2
o = 1
r = 0
1/2
o = 0
r = 0
α
β
1∀t′≤t∃k η(n,i,t′,k)
o = 0
r = 0
o = 0
r = 1
Figure 6.6: The environment ρi from the proof of Theorem 6.22. The mixture
ν over class of environments M := {ρ0, ρ1, . . .} ⊂ MCCSLSC forces iterative AINU to
solve Σ03-hard problems. ‘Conditional Heaven’ is a node that yields reward 1 until
¬∃k η(n, i, t, k), at which point the environment ends. Hence action β is preferred in
environment ρi iff conditional heaven lasts forever (because otherwise ν(. . .) = 0 and
hence V ∗ν (. . .) = 0) which is the case iff ∀t ∃k η(n, i, t, k).
Proof. From Theorem 6.9, Theorem 6.11, and Lemma 6.20.
We proceed to show corresponding lower bounds as in Section 6.3.2. For the rest of
this section we assume Γt > 0 for all t.
Theorem 6.22 (Iterative AINU is Σ03-hard). There is an environment ν ∈MCCSLSC such
that iterative AINU is Σ03-hard.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.16. Let A be any Σ03 set, then
there is a quantifier-free formula η such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃i ∀t ∃k η(n, i, t, k).
We define the environments ρi similar to the proof of Theorem 6.16, except for two
changes:
• We replace ∃k η(n, i, k) with ∀t′ ≤ t ∃k η(n, i, t′, k).
• We switch actions α and β: action β ‘checks’ the formula η and action α gives a
sure reward of 0.
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Formally,
ρi((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

2−t if o1:t = 1t and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 0,
2−n−1 if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:t v 1n0∞ and an+2 = α
and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 0,
2−n−1 if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:t v 1n0∞ and an+2 = β
and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 1t′>n+1
and ∀t′ ≤ t ∃k η(n, i, t′, k), and
0 otherwise.
See Figure 6.6 for an illustration of the environment ρi. Every ρi is a chronological
conditional semimeasure by definition, so M := {ρ0, ρ1, . . .} ⊆ MCCSLSC . Furthermore,
every ρi is lower semicomputable since η is quantifier-free.
We define our environment ν as a mixture overM,
ν :=
∑
i∈N
2−i−1ρi;
the choice of the weights on the environments ρi is arbitrary but positive. We get for
the ν-optimal policy pi∗ν analogously to the proof of Theorem 6.16
pi∗ν(1
n0) = β ⇐⇒ ∃i∀t′ ≤ t∃k η(n, i, t′, k) ⇐⇒ n ∈ A,
since action α is preferred in ties.
Analogously to Theorem 6.15, we can show that iterative AIXI is not computable.
We also get the following lower bound.
Theorem 6.23 (Some ε-optimal iterative AIXI are Π02-hard). There is a universal
mixture ξ′ and an ε > 0 such that any policy that is ε-optimal according to the iterative
value for environment ξ′ is Π02-hard.
Proof. Let A be a Π02-set and η a quantifier-free formula such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∀t ∃k η(n, t, k).
We proceed analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.17 except that we choose ∀t′ ≤
t∃k η(n, t, k) as a condition for reward 1 after playing action β.
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ξ
Semi-Heaven
Conditional Heaven
∗
o = 1n0
α
β
1∀t′<t∃k η(n,i,t′,k)
o = 0
r = 1/2
o = 0
r = 1
Figure 6.7: The environment ν from the proof of Theorem 6.23, which forces ε-optimal
iterative AIXI to solve Π02-hard problems. It functions just like ξ until the observation
history is 1n0. Then, action α is preferred iff conditional heaven never ends, i.e., iff
∀t∃k η(n, t, k).
Define the environment
ν((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) :=

ξ((or)1:n+1 ‖ a1:n+1) if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:t v 1n0∞
and an+1 = α
and ∀n+ 1 < k ≤ t. rk = 1/2,
ξ((or)1:n+1 ‖ a1:n+1) if ∃n. 1n0 v o1:t v 1n0∞
and an+1 = β
and ∀n+ 1 < k ≤ t. rk = 1
and ∀t′ ≤ t∃k η(n, t, k),
ξ((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) if @n. 1n0 v o1:t v 1n0∞, and
0 otherwise.
See Figure 6.7 for an illustration of the environment ν. The environment ν mimics the
universal environment ξ until the observation history is 1n0. The next action α always
gives rewards 1/2 forever, while action β gives rewards 1 forever iff n ∈ A. We have that
ν is a lower semicomputable semimeasure since ξ is a lower semicomputable semimeasure
and η is quantifier-free. We define ξ′ = 12ν+
1
8ξ. By Lemma 4.24, ξ
′ is a universal lower
semicomputable semimeasure. Let n ∈ A be given and let h ∈ (A × O)x+1 be any
history with observations o1:n+1 = 1n0. In the following, we use the linearity of W ∗ρ in
ρ (analogously to Lemma 4.14). If ∀t∃k η(n, t, k), then
W ∗ξ′(hβ)−W ∗ξ′(hα) = 12W ∗ν (hβ)− 12W ∗ν (hα) + 18W ∗ξ (hβ)− 18W ∗ξ (hα)
≥ 12 − 14 + 0− 18 = 18 ,
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and similarly if ¬∀t∃k η(n, t, k), then
W ∗ξ′(hα)−W ∗ξ′(hβ) = 12W ∗ν (hα)− 12W ∗ν (hβ) + 18W ∗ξ (hα)− 18W ∗ξ (hβ)
≥ 14 − 0 + 0− 18 = 18 .
In both cases |W ∗ξ′(hβ)−W ∗ξ′(hα)| > 1/9, hence with ε := 1/9 we have for an ε-optimal
policy piεξ′ that pi
ε
ξ′(h) = β if and only if n ∈ A.
6.5 The Complexity of Knowledge-Seeking
Recall the definition of the optimal entropy-seeking value V ∗,mEnt and the optimal infor-
mation-seeking value V ∗,mIG from Section 4.3.2. Using the results from Section 6.3 we
can show that ε-optimal knowledge-seeking agents are limit computable, and optimal
knowledge-seeking agents are ∆03.
Corollary 6.24 (Computability of Knowledge-Seeking Values). For fixed m, the value
functions V ∗,mEnt and V
∗,m
IG are limit computable.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 6.2 (c-e) since ξ, ν, and w are lower semicomputable.
Corollary 6.25 (Computability of Knowledge-Seeking Policies). For entropy-seeking
and information-seeking agents there are limit-computable ε-optimal policies and ∆03-
computable optimal policies.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 6.24, Theorem 6.9, and Theorem 6.11.
Note that if we used an infinite horizon with discounting in Definition 4.25 or Defini-
tion 4.26, then we cannot retain this computability result without further assumptions:
we would need that the value functions increase monotonically as m → ∞, as they
do for the recursive value function from Definition 4.10. However, entropy is not a
monotone function and may decrease if there are events whose probability converges
to something > 1/2. For the entropy-seeking value function this happens for histories
drawn from a deterministic environment µ since ξ → µ, so the conditionals converge
to 1. Similarly, for the information-seeking value function, the posterior belief in one
(deterministic) environment might become larger than 1/2 (depending on the prior and
the environment class). Therefore we generally only get that discounted versions of V ∗Ent
and V ∗IG are ∆
0
3 analogously to Lemma 6.20. Hence optimal discounted entropy-seeking
and optimal discounted information-seeking policies are in ∆04 by Theorem 6.9 and their
corresponding ε-optimal siblings are ∆03 by Theorem 6.11.
6.6 A Limit Computable Weakly Asymptotically Optimal
Agent
According to Theorem 6.16, optimal reward-seeking policies are generally Π02-hard, and
for optimal knowledge-seeking policies Corollary 6.25 shows that they are ∆03. Therefore
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we get that BayesExp is ∆03:
Corollary 6.26 (BayesExp is ∆03). For any universal mixture ξ, BayesExp is ∆03.
Proof. From Corollary 6.10, Corollary 6.24, and Corollary 6.25.
However, we do not know BayesExp to be limit computable, and we expect it
not to be. However, we can approximate it using ε-optimal policies preserving weak
asymptotic optimality.
Theorem 6.27 (A Limit-Computable Weakly Asymptotically Optimal Agent). If there
is a nonincreasing computable sequence of positive reals (εt)t∈N such that εt → 0 and
Ht(εt)/(tεt) → 0 as t → ∞, then there is a limit-computable policy that is weakly
asymptotically optimal in the class of all computable stochastic environments.
Proof. By Corollary 6.10, there is a limit-computable 2−t-optimal reward-seeking policy
pitξ for the universal mixture ξ. By Corollary 6.25 there are limit-computable t/2-
optimal information-seeking policies pitIG with horizon t + Ht(εt). We define a policy
pi analogously to Algorithm 1 with pitIG and pi
t
ξ instead of the optimal policies. From
Corollary 6.24 we get that V ∗IG is limit computable, so the policy pi is limit computable.
Furthermore, pitξ is 2
−t-optimal and 2−t → 0, so V pi
t
ξ
ξ (æ<t)→ V ∗ξ (æ<t) as t→∞.
Now we can proceed analogously to the proof of Lattimore (2013, Thm. 5.6), which
consists of three parts. First, it is shown that the value of the ξ-optimal reward-
seeking policy pi∗ξ converges to the optimal value for exploitation time steps (line 6 in
Algorithm 1) in the sense that V
pi∗ξ
µ → V ∗µ . This carries over to the 2−t-optimal policy
pitξ, since the key property is that on exploitation steps, V
∗
IG < εt; i.e., pi only exploits if
potential knowledge-seeking value is low. In short, we get for exploitation steps
V
pitξ
ξ (æ<t)→ V
pi∗ξ
ξ (æ<t)→ V
pi∗ξ
µ (æ<t)→ V ∗µ (æ<t) as t→∞.
Second, it is shown that the density of exploration steps vanishes. This result carries
over since the condition V ∗IG(æ<t) > εt that determines exploration steps is exactly the
same as for BayesExp and pitIG is εt/2-optimal.
Third, the results of part one and two are used to conclude that pi is weakly asymp-
totically optimal. This part carries over to our proof.
6.7 Discussion
When using Solomonoff’s prior for induction, we need to evaluate conditional probabil-
ities. We showed that conditional M and Mnorm are limit computable (Theorem 6.3),
and that M and Mnorm are not limit computable (Theorem 6.4 and Corollary 6.5).
Table 6.1 on page 102 summarizes our computability results on various versions of
Solomonoff’s prior. Theses results implies that we can approximate M or Mnorm for
prediction, but not the measure mixture M or Mnorm.
In some cases, normalized priors have advantages. As illustrated in Example 4.27,
unnormalized priors can make the entropy-seeking agent mistake the entropy gained
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from the probability assigned to finite strings for knowledge. From Mnorm ≥M we get
that Mnorm predicts just as well as M , and by Theorem 6.3 we can use Mnorm without
losing limit computability.
Table 6.2 on page 102 summarizes our computability results for the agents AINU,
AIXI, and AINU. AINU is ∆03 and restricting to ε-optimal policies decreases the level
by one (Corollary 6.10 and Corollary 6.12). For environments from MCCMcomp, AIMU is
limit-computable and ε-optimal AIMU is computable (Corollary 6.14). In Section 6.3.2
we proved that these computability bounds on AINU are generally unimprovable (The-
orem 6.16 and Theorem 6.17). Additionally, we proved weaker lower bounds for AIXI
independent of the universal Turing machine (Theorem 6.15) and for ε-optimal AIXI
for specific choices of the universal Turing machine (Theorem 6.17).
When the environment ν has nonzero probability of not producing a new percept,
the iterative definition of AINU (Definition 6.18) originally given by Hutter (2005,
Def. 5.30) fails to maximize ν-expected rewards (Proposition 6.19). Moreover, the
policies are one level higher in the arithmetical hierarchy (see Table 6.4 on page 116).
We proved upper (Corollary 6.21) and lower bounds (Theorem 6.22 and Theorem 6.23).
The difference between the recursive value function V and the iterative value function
W is readily exposed in the difference between the universal prior M and the measure
mixture M : Just like W conditions on surviving forever, so does M eliminate the
weight of programs that do not produce infinite strings. Both M and W are not limit
computable for this reason.
We considered ε-optimality to avoid having to determine argmax ties. This ε does
not have to be constant over time, we may let ε → 0 as t → ∞ at any computable
rate. With this we retain the computability results of ε-optimal policies and get that
the value of the ε(t)-optimal policy piε(t)ν converges rapidly to the ν-optimal value:
V ∗ν (æ<t)− V pi
ε(t)
ν
ν (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞.
In Section 4.1 we defined the set MCCSLSC as the set of all lower semicomputable
chronological contextual semimeasure over percepts with actions povided as side-infor-
mation. When determining the probability of the next percept et in an environment
ν, we have to compute ν(e1:t | e<t ‖ a1:t). Alternatively, we could have defined the
environment as a lower semicomputable mapping from histories æ<tat to probabilities
over the next percept et (this is done in Chapter 7). For the proof of Lemma 6.8
and Lemma 6.20 we only need that ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t) is lower semicomputable computable.
While this new definition makes no difference for the computability of AINU, it matters
for AIXI because in the mixture ξ over all of these environments is no longer lower
semicomputable.
Any method that tries to tackle the reinforcement learning problem has to balance
between exploration and exploitation. AIXI strikes this balance in the Bayesian way.
However, as we showed in Section 5.2, this may not lead to enough exploration. To
counteract this, we can add an explorative component to the agent, akin to knowledge-
seeking agents. In Section 6.5 we show that ε-optimal knowledge-seeking agents are
limit computable if we use the recursive definition of the value function.
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We set out with the goal of finding a perfect reinforcement learning agent that is
limit computable. The Bayesian agent AIXI could be considered one suitable candidate,
despite its optimality problems discussed in Chapter 5. Another suitable candidate are
weakly asymptotically optimal agents, which in contrast to AIXI are optimal in an
objective sense (see Section 5.6). We discussed BayesExp, which relies on a Solomonoff
prior to learn its environment and on a information-seeking component for extra explo-
ration. Our results culminated in a limit-computable weakly asymptotically optimal
agent based on BayesExp (Theorem 6.27). In this sense our goal has been achieved.
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Chapter 7
The Grain of Truth Problem1
AIs become friendly by playing lots of Newcomblike problems. — Eliezer Yudkowsky
Consider the general setup of multiple reinforcement learning agents interacting sequen-
tially in a known environment with the goal to maximize discounted reward.2 Each
agent knows how the environment behaves, but does not know the other agents’ be-
havior. The natural (Bayesian) approach would be to define a class of possible policies
that the other agents could adopt and take a prior over this class. During the interac-
tion, this prior gets updated to the posterior as our agent learns the others’ behavior.
Our agent then acts optimally with respect to this posterior belief. Kalai and Lehrer
(1993) show that in infinitely repeated games Bayesian agents converge to an ε-Nash
equilibrium as long as each agent assigns positive prior probability to the other agents’
policies (a grain of truth).
As an example, consider an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma between two
agents. In every time step the payoff matrix is as follows, where C means cooperate
and D means defect.
C D
C 3/4, 3/4 0, 1
D 1, 0 1/4, 1/4
Define the set of policies Π := {pi∞, pi0, pi1, . . .} where policy pit cooperates until time
step t or the opponent defects (whatever happens first) and defects thereafter. The
Bayes optimal behavior is to cooperate until the posterior belief that the other agent
defects in the time step after the next is greater than some constant (depending on the
discount function) and then defect afterwards. Therefore Bayes optimal behavior leads
to a policy from the set Π (regardless of the prior). If both agents are Bayes optimal
with respect to some prior, they both have a grain of truth and therefore they converge
to a Nash equilibrium: either they both cooperate forever or after some finite time they
both defect forever. Alternating strategies like TitForTat (cooperate first, then play
1The idea for reflective oracles was developed by Jessica Taylor and Benya Fallenstein based on
ideas by Paul Christiano (Christiano et al., 2013). Reflective oracles were first described in Fallenstein
et al. (2015a). The proof of Theorem 7.7 was sketched by Benya Fallenstein and developed by me.
Except for minor editing, everything else in this chapter is my own work.
2We mostly use the terminology of reinforcement learning. For readers from game theory we provide
a dictionary in Table 7.1.
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Reinforcement learning Game theory
stochastic policy mixed strategy
deterministic policy pure strategy
agent player
multi-agent environment infinite extensive-form game
reward payoff/utility
(finite) history history
infinite history path of play
Table 7.1: Terminology dictionary between reinforcement learning and game theory.
the opponent’s last action) are not part of the policy class Π, and adding them to the
class breaks the grain of truth property: the Bayes optimal behavior is no longer in the
class. This is rather typical; a Bayesian agent usually needs to be more powerful than
its environment (see Section 6.3). We are facing the following problem.
Problem 7.1 (Grain of Truth Problem; Hutter, 2009b, Q. 5j). Find a large class of
policies Π containing Bayesian agents with positive prior over Π.
Until now, classes that admit a grain of truth were known only for small toy exam-
ples such as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma above (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009,
Ch. 7.3). Foster and Young (2001) and Nachbar (1997, 2005) prove several impos-
sibility results on the grain of truth problem that identify properties that cannot be
simultaneously satisfied for classes that allow a grain of truth (see Section 7.6 for a
discussion).
In this chapter we present a formal solution to the grain of truth problem (Sec-
tion 7.2). We assume that our multi-agent environment is computable, but it does not
need to be stationary/Markov, ergodic, or finite-state. Our class of policies Π is large
enough to contain all computable (stochastic) policies, as well as all relevant Bayes
optimal policies. At the same time, our class is small enough to be limit computable.
This is important because it allows our result to be computationally approximated.
In Section 7.3 we consider the setting where the multi-agent environment is unknown
to the agents and has to be learned in addition to the other agents’ behavior. A Bayes
optimal agent may not learn to act optimally in unknown multi-agent environments
even though it has a grain of truth. This effect occurs in non-recoverable environments
where taking one wrong action can mean a permanent loss of future value. In this case, a
Bayes optimal agent avoids taking these dangerous actions and therefore will not explore
enough to wash out the prior’s bias (using the dogmatic prior from Section 5.2.2).
Therefore, Bayesian agents are not asymptotically optimal , i.e., they do not always
learn to act optimally (Theorem 5.22).
However, asymptotic optimality is achieved by Thompson sampling because the
inherent randomness of Thompson sampling leads to enough exploration to learn the
entire environment class (see Section 5.4.3). This leads to our main result: if all agents
use Thompson sampling over our class of multi-agent environments, then for every ε > 0
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they converge to an ε-Nash equilibrium. This is not the first time Thompson sampling
is used in game theory (Ortega and Braun, 2014), but the first time to show that it
achieves such general positive results.
The central idea to our construction is based on reflective oracles introduced by
Fallenstein et al. (2015a,b). Reflective oracles are probabilistic oracles similar to halting
oracles that answer whether the probability that a given probabilistic Turing machine
T outputs 1 is higher than a given rational number p. The oracles are reflective in
the sense that the machine T may itself query the oracle, so the oracle has to answer
queries about itself. This invites issues caused by self-referential liar paradoxes of the
form “if the oracle says that this machine return 1 with probability > 1/2, then return
0, else return 1.” Reflective oracles avoid these issues by being allowed to randomize if
the machines do not halt or the rational number is exactly the probability to output 1.
We introduce reflective oracles formally in Section 7.1 and prove that there is a limit
computable reflective oracle.
For infinitely repeated games practical algorithms rely on ficticious play (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, Ch. 2): the agent takes a best-response action based on the assump-
tion that its opponent is playing a stationary but unknown mixed strategy estimated
according to the observed empirical frequencies. If all agents converge to a stationary
policy, then this is a Nash equilibrium. However, convergence is not guaranteed.
The same problem occurs in multi-agent reinforcement learning (Busoniu et al.,
2008). Reinforcement learning algorithms typically assume a (stationary) Markov de-
cision process. This assumption is violated when interacting with other reinforcement
learning agents because as these agents learn, their behavior changes and thus they are
not stationary. Assuming convergence to a stationary policy is a necessary criterion to
enable all agents to learn, but the process is unstable for many reinforcement learning
algorithms and only empirical positive results are known (Bowling and Veloso, 2001).
7.1 Reflective Oracles
7.1.1 Definition
First we connect semimeasures as defined in Definition 2.14 to Turing machines. In
Chapter 2 we used monotone Turing machines which naturally correspond to lower
semicomputable semimeasures (Li and Vitányi, 2008, Sec. 4.5.2) that describe the dis-
tribution that arises when piping fair coin flips into the monotone machine. Here we
take a different route.
A probabilistic Turing machine is a Turing machine that has access to an unlimited
number of uniformly random coin flips. Let T denote the set of all probabilistic Turing
machines that take some input in X ∗ and may query an oracle (formally defined below).
We take a Turing machine T ∈ T to correspond to a semimeasure λT where λT (a | x)
is the probability that T outputs a ∈ X when given x ∈ X ∗ as input. The value of
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λT (x) is then given by the chain rule
λT (x) :=
|x|∏
k=1
λT (xk | x<k). (7.1)
Thus T gives rise to the set of semimeasuresMLSC where the conditionals λ(a | x) are
lower semicomputable. In contrast, in Chapter 6 we considered semimeasures whose
joint probability (7.1) is lower semicomputable. This set MLSC contains all com-
putable measures. However, MLSC is a proper subset of the set of all lower semicom-
putable semimeasures because the product (7.1) is lower semicomputable, but there
are some lower semicomputable semimeasures whose conditional is not lower semicom-
putable (Theorem 6.6):
MCCMcomp ⊂MLSC ⊂MCCSLSC
In the following we assume that our alphabet is binary, i.e., X := {0, 1}.
Definition 7.2 (Oracle). An oracle is a function O : T × {0, 1}∗ ×Q→ ∆{0, 1}.
Oracles are understood to be probabilistic: they randomly return 0 or 1. Let TO de-
note the machine T ∈ T when run with the oracle O, and let λOT denote the semimeasure
induced by TO. This means that drawing from λOT involves two sources of randomness:
one from the distribution induced by the probabilistic Turing machine T and one from
the oracle’s answers.
The intended semantics of an oracle are that it takes a query (T, x, p) and returns
1 if the machine TO outputs 1 on input x with probability greater than p when run
with the oracle O, i.e., when λOT (1 | x) > p. Furthermore, the oracle returns 0 if the
machine TO outputs 1 on input x with probability less than p when run with the oracle
O, i.e., when λOT (1 | x) < p. To fulfill this, the oracle O has to make statements
about itself, since the machine T from the query may again query O. Therefore we call
oracles of this kind reflective oracles. This has to be defined very carefully to avoid the
obvious diagonalization issues that are caused by programs that ask the oracle about
themselves. We impose the following self-consistency constraint.
Definition 7.3 (Reflective Oracle). An oracle O is reflective iff for all queries (T, x, p) ∈
T × {0, 1}∗ ×Q,
(a) λOT (1 | x) > p implies O(T, x, p) = 1, and
(b) λOT (0 | x) > 1− p implies O(T, x, p) = 0.
If p under- or overshoots the true probability of λOT ( · | x), then the oracle must
reveal this information. However, in the critical case when p = λOT (1 | x), the oracle is
allowed to return anything and may randomize its result. Furthermore, since T might
not output any symbol, it is possible that λOT (0 | x) + λOT (1 | x) < 1. In this case
the oracle can reassign the non-halting probability mass to 0, 1, or randomize; see
Figure 7.1.
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0 1λ
O
T (0 | x)λOT (1 | x)
O returns 1 O may randomize O returns 0
Figure 7.1: Answer options of a reflective oracle O for the query (T, x, p); the rational
p ∈ [0, 1] falls into one of the three regions above. The values of λOT (0 | x) and λOT (1 | x)
are depicted as the length of the line segment under which they are written.
Example 7.4 (Reflective Oracles and Diagonalization). Let T ∈ T be a probabilistic
Turing machine that outputs 1 − O(T, , 1/2) (T can know its own source code by
quining; Kleene, 1952, Thm. 27). In other words, T queries the oracle about whether it
is more likely to output 1 or 0, and then does whichever the oracle says is less likely. In
this case we can use an oracle O(T, , 1/2) := 1/2 (answer 0 or 1 with equal probability),
which implies λOT (1 | ) = λOT (0 | ) = 1/2, so the conditions of Definition 7.3 are
satisfied. In fact, for this machine T we must have O(T, , 1/2) = 1/2 for all reflective
oracles O. 3
The following theorem establishes that reflective oracles exist.
Theorem 7.5 (Fallenstein et al., 2015c, App. B). There is a reflective oracle.
Definition 7.6 (Reflective-Oracle-Computable). A semimeasure is called reflective-
oracle-computable iff it is computable on a probabilistic Turing machine with access to
a reflective oracle.
For any probabilistic Turing machine T ∈ T we can complete the semimeasure
λOT ( · | x) into a reflective-oracle-computable measure λ
O
T ( · | x): Using the oracle O and
a binary search on the parameter p we search for the crossover point p where O(T, x, p)
goes from returning 1 to returning 0. The limit point p∗x ∈ R of the binary search is
random since the oracle’s answers may be random. But the main point is that the
expectation of p∗x exists, so λ
O
T (1 | x) = E[p∗x] = 1− λOT (0 | x). Hence λOT is a measure.
Moreover, if the oracle is reflective, then λOT (x) ≥ λOT (x) for all x ∈ X ∗. In this sense
the oracle O can be viewed as a way of ‘completing’ all semimeasures λOT to measures
by arbitrarily assigning the non-halting probability mass. If the oracle O is reflective
this is consistent in the sense that Turing machines who run other Turing machines will
be completed in the same way. This is especially important for a universal machine
that runs all other Turing machines to induce a Solomonoff prior (Example 3.5).
7.1.2 A Limit Computable Reflective Oracle
The proof of Theorem 7.5 given by Fallenstein et al. (2015c, App. B) is nonconstructive
and uses the axiom of choice. In Section 7.1.3 we give a new proof for the existence
of reflective oracles and provide a construction that there is a reflective oracle that is
limit computable.
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Theorem 7.7 (A Limit Computable Reflective Oracle). There is a reflective oracle
that is limit computable.
This theorem has the immediate consequence that reflective oracles cannot be used
as halting oracles. At first, this result may seem surprising: according to the definition
of reflective oracles, they make concrete statements about the output of probabilistic
Turing machines. However, the fact that the oracles may randomize some of the time
actually removes enough information such that halting can no longer be decided from
the oracle output.
Corollary 7.8 (Reflective Oracles are not Halting Oracles). There is no probabilistic
Turing machine T such that for every prefix program p and every reflective oracle O,
we have that λOT (1 | p) > 1/2 if p halts and λOT (1 | p) < 1/2 otherwise.
Proof. Assume there was such a machine T and let O be the limit computable oracle
from Theorem 7.7. Since O is reflective we can turn T into a deterministic halting oracle
by calling O(T, p, 1/2) which deterministically returns 1 if p halts and 0 otherwise. Since
O is limit computable, we can finitely compute the output of O on any query to arbitrary
finite precision using our deterministic halting oracle. We construct a probabilistic
Turing machine T ′ that uses our halting oracle to compute (rather than query) the
oracle O on (T ′, , 1/2) to a precision of 1/3 in finite time. If O(T ′, , 1/2)± 1/3 > 1/2,
the machine T ′ outputs 0, otherwise T ′ outputs 1. Since our halting oracle is entirely
deterministic, the output of T ′ is entirely deterministic as well (and T ′ always halts), so
λOT ′(0 | ) = 1 or λOT ′(1 | ) = 1. Therefore O(T ′, , 1/2) = 1 or O(T ′, , 1/2) = 0 because
O is reflective. A precision of 1/3 is enough to tell them apart, hence T ′ returns 0 if
O(T ′, , 1/2) = 1 and T ′ returns 1 if O(T ′, , 1/2) = 0. This is a contradiction.
A similar argument can also be used to show that reflective oracles are not com-
putable.
7.1.3 Proof of Theorem 7.7
The idea for the proof of Theorem 7.7 is to construct an algorithm that outputs an
infinite series of partial oracles converging to a reflective oracle in the limit.
The set of queries is countable, so we can assume that we have some computable
enumeration of it:
T × {0, 1}∗ ×Q =: {q1, q2, . . .}
Definition 7.9 (k-Partial Oracle). A k-partial oracle O˜ is function from the first k
queries to the multiples of 2−k in [0, 1]:
O˜ : {q1, q2, . . . , qk} → {n2−k | 0 ≤ n ≤ 2k}
Definition 7.10 (Approximating an Oracle). A k-partial oracle O˜ approximates an
oracle O iff |O(qi)− O˜(qi)| ≤ 2−k−1 for all i ≤ k.
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Let k ∈ N, let O˜ be a k-partial oracle, and let T ∈ T be an oracle machine. The
machine T O˜ that we get when we run T with the k-partial oracle O˜ is defined as follows
(this is with slight abuse of notation since k is taken to be understood implicitly).
1. Run T for at most k steps.
2. If T calls the oracle on qi for i ≤ k,
(a) return 1 with probability O˜(qi)− 2−k−1,
(b) return 0 with probability 1− O˜(qi)− 2−k−1, and
(c) halt otherwise.
3. If T calls the oracle on qj for j > k, halt.
Furthermore, we define λO˜T analogously to λ
O
T as the distribution generated by the
machine T O˜.
Lemma 7.11. If a k-partial oracle O˜ approximates a reflective oracle O, then λOT (1 |
x) ≥ λO˜T (1 | x) and λOT (0 | x) ≥ λO˜T (0 | x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and all T ∈ T .
Proof. This follows from the definition of T O˜: when running T with O˜ instead of O, we
can only lose probability mass. If T makes calls whose index is > k or runs for more
than k steps, then the execution is aborted and no further output is generated. If T
makes calls whose index i ≤ k, then O˜(qi) − 2−k−1 ≤ O(qi) since O˜ approximates O.
Therefore the return of the call qi is underestimated as well.
Definition 7.12 (k-Partially Reflective). A k-partial oracle O˜ is k-partially reflective
iff for the first k queries (T, x, p)
• λO˜T (1 | x) > p implies O˜(T, x, p) = 1, and
• λO˜T (0 | x) > 1− p implies O˜(T, x, p) = 0.
It is important to note that we can check whether a k-partial oracle is k-partially
reflective in finite time by running all machines T from the first k queries for k steps
and tallying up the probabilities to compute λO˜T .
Lemma 7.13. If O is a reflective oracle and O˜ is a k-partial oracle that approximates
O, then O˜ is k-partially reflective.
Lemma 7.13 only holds because we use semimeasures whose conditionals are lower
semicomputable.
Proof. Assuming λO˜T (1 | x) > p we get from Lemma 7.11 that λOT (1 | x) ≥ λO˜T (1 |
x) > p. Thus O(T, x, p) = 1 because O is reflective. Since O˜ approximates O, we get
1 = O(T, x, p) ≤ O˜(T, x, p) + 2−k−1, and since O˜ assigns values in a 2−k-grid, it follows
that O˜(T, x, p) = 1. The second implication is proved analogously.
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Definition 7.14 (Extending Partial Oracles). A k + 1-partial oracle O˜′ extends a k-
partial oracle O˜ iff |O˜(qi)− O˜′(qi)| ≤ 2−k−1 for all i ≤ k.
Lemma 7.15. There is an infinite sequence of partial oracles (O˜k)k∈N such that for
each k, O˜k is a k-partially reflective k-partial oracle and O˜k+1 extends O˜k.
Proof. By Theorem 7.5 there is a reflective oracle O. For every k, there is a canonical
k-partial oracle O˜k that approximates O: restrict O to the first k queries and for any
such query q pick the value in the 2−k-grid which is closest to O(q). By construction,
O˜k+1 extends O˜k and by Lemma 7.13, each O˜k is k-partially reflective.
Lemma 7.16. If the k + 1-partial oracle O˜k+1 extends the k-partial oracle O˜k, then
λ
O˜k+1
T (1 | x) ≥ λO˜kT (1 | x) and λO˜k+1T (0 | x) ≥ λO˜kT (0 | x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and all
T ∈ T .
Proof. T O˜k+1 runs for one more step than T O˜k , can answer one more query and has
increased oracle precision. Moreover, since O˜k+1 extends O˜k, we have |O˜k+1(qi) −
O˜k(qi)| ≤ 2−k−1, and thus O˜k+1(qi)− 2−k−1 ≥ O˜k(qi)− 2−k. Therefore the success to
answers to the oracle calls (case 2(a) and 2(b)) will not decrease in probability.
Now everything is in place to state the algorithm that constructs a reflective oracle
in the limit. It recursively traverses a tree of partial oracles. The tree’s nodes are the
partial oracles; level k of the tree contains all k-partial oracles. There is an edge in the
tree from the k-partial oracle O˜k to the i-partial oracle O˜i if and only if i = k + 1 and
O˜i extends O˜k.
For every k, there are only finitely many k-partial oracles, since they are functions
from finite sets to finite sets. In particular, there are exactly two 1-partial oracles (so
the search tree has two roots). Pick one of them to start with, and proceed recursively
as follows. Given a k-partial oracle O˜k, there are finitely many (k + 1)-partial oracles
that extend O˜k (finite branching of the tree). Pick one that is (k+1)-partially reflective
(which can be checked in finite time). If there is no (k+1)-partially reflective extension,
backtrack.
By Lemma 7.15 our search tree is infinitely deep and thus the tree search does
not terminate. Moreover, it can backtrack to each level only a finite number of times
because at each level there is only a finite number of possible extensions. Therefore
the algorithm will produce an infinite sequence of partial oracles, each extending the
previous. Because of finite backtracking, the output eventually stabilizes on a sequence
of partial oracles O˜1, O˜2, . . .. By the following lemma, this sequence converges to a
reflective oracle, which concludes the proof of Theorem 7.7.
Lemma 7.17. Let O˜1, O˜2, . . . be a sequence where O˜k is a k-partially reflective k-partial
oracle and O˜k+1 extends O˜k for all k ∈ N. Let O := limk→∞ O˜k be the pointwise limit.
Then
(a) λO˜kT (1 | x) → λOT (1 | x) and λO˜kT (0 | x) → λOT (0 | x) as k → ∞ for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and all T ∈ T , and
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(b) O is a reflective oracle.
Proof. First note that the pointwise limit must exists because |O˜k(qi) − O˜k+1(qi)| ≤
2−k−1 by Definition 7.14.
(a) Since O˜k+1 extends O˜k, each O˜k approximates O. Let x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and T ∈ T and
consider the sequence ak := λ
O˜k
T (1 | x) for k ∈ N. By Lemma 7.16, ak ≤ ak+1, so the
sequence is monotone increasing. By Lemma 7.11, ak ≤ λOT (1 | x), so the sequence
is bounded. Therefore it must converge. But it cannot converge to anything strictly
below λOT (1 | x) by the definition of TO.
(b) By definition, O is an oracle; it remains to show that O is reflective. Let qi =
(T, x, p) be some query. If p < λOT (1 | x), then by (a) there is a k large enough such
that p < λO˜tT (1 | x) for all t ≥ k. For any t ≥ max{k, i}, we have O˜t(T, x, p) = 1
since O˜t is t-partially reflective. Therefore 1 = limk→∞ O˜k(T, x, p) = O(T, x, p).
The case 1− p < λOT (0 | x) is analogous.
7.2 A Grain of Truth
7.2.1 Reflective Bayesian Agents
Fix O to be a reflective oracle. From now on, we assume that the action space A :=
{α, β} is binary. We can treat computable measures over binary strings as environments:
the environment ν corresponding to a probabilistic Turing machine T ∈ T is defined by
ν(et | æ<tat) := λOT (y | x) =
k∏
i=1
λ
O
T (yi | xy1 . . . yi−1)
where y1:k is a binary encoding of et and x is a binary encoding of æ<tat. The actions
a1:∞ are only contextual, and not part of the environment distribution. We define
ν(e<t ‖ a<t) analogously to (4.1).
Let T1, T2, . . . be an enumeration of all probabilistic Turing machines in T that use
an oracle. We define the class of reflective environments
MOrefl :=
{
λ
O
T1 , λ
O
T2 , . . .
}
.
This is the class of all environments computable on a probabilistic Turing machine with
reflective oracle O, that have been completed from semimeasures to measures using O.
Analogously to Section 4.3.1, we define a Bayesian mixture over the class MOrefl.
Let w ∈ ∆MOrefl be a lower semicomputable prior probability distribution on MOrefl.
Possible choices for the prior include the Solomonoff prior w
(
λ
O
T
)
:= 2−K(T ), where
K(T ) denotes the length of the shortest input to some universal Turing machine that
encodes T . We define the corresponding Bayesian mixture
ξ(et | æ<tat) :=
∑
ν∈MOrefl
w(ν | æ<t)ν(et | æ<tat) (7.2)
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where w(ν | æ<t) is the (renomalized) posterior,
w(ν | æ<t) := w(ν)ν(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
. (7.3)
The mixture ξ is lower semicomputable on an oracle Turing machine because the pos-
terior w( · | æ<t) is lower semicomputable. Hence there is an oracle machine T such
that ξ = λOT . We define its completion ξ := λ
O
T as the completion of λOT . This is the
distribution that is used to compute the posterior. There are no cyclic dependencies
since ξ is called on the shorter history æ<t. We arrive at the following statement.
Proposition 7.18 (Bayes is in the Class). ξ ∈MOrefl.
Moreover, since O is reflective, we have that ξ dominates all environments ν ∈MOrefl:
ξ(e1:t ‖ a1:t) = ξ(et | æ<tat)ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
≥ ξ(et | æ<tat)ξ(e<t | a<t)
= ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
∑
ν∈MOrefl
w(ν | æ<t)ν(et | æ<tat)
= ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
∑
ν∈MOrefl
w(ν)
ν(e<t ‖ a<t)
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t)
ν(et | æ<tat)
=
∑
ν∈MOrefl
w(ν)ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t)
≥ w(ν)ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t)
Therefore we get on-policy value convergence according to Corollary 4.20: for all
µ ∈MOrefl and all policies pi
V pi
ξ
(æ<t)− V piµ (æ<t)→ 0 as t→∞ µpi-almost surely. (7.4)
7.2.2 Reflective-Oracle-Computable Policies
This subsection is dedicated to the following result that was previously stated by Fall-
enstein et al. (2015a, Alg. 6) but not proved. It contrasts results on arbitrary semicom-
putable environments where optimal policies are not limit computable (see Section 6.3).
Theorem 7.19 (Optimal Policies are Oracle Computable). For every ν ∈MOrefl, there
is a ν-optimal (stochastic) policy pi∗ν that is reflective-oracle-computable.
Note that even though deterministic optimal policies always exist, those policies are
typically not reflective-oracle-computable.
To prove Theorem 7.19 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 7.20 (Reflective-Oracle-Computable Optimal Value Function). For every en-
vironment ν ∈MOrefl the optimal value function V ∗ν is reflective-oracle-computable.
§7.3 Multi-Agent Environments 137
Proof. This proof follows the proof of Corollary 6.14. We write the optimal value explic-
itly as in (4.2). For a fixed m, all involved quantities are reflective-oracle-computable.
Moreover, this quantity is monotone increasing in m and the tail sum from m+ 1 to∞
is bounded by Γm+1 which is computable according to Assumption 4.6a and converges
to 0 as m→∞. Therefore we can enumerate all rationals above and below V ∗ν .
Proof of Theorem 7.19. According to Lemma 7.20 the optimal value function V ∗ν is
reflective-oracle-computable. Hence there is a probabilistic Turing machine T such that
λOT (1 | æ<t) =
(
V ∗ν (æ<tα)− V ∗ν (æ<tβ) + 1
)
/2.
We define the policy
pi(æ<t) :=
{
α if O(T,æ<t, 1/2) = 1, and
β if O(T,æ<t, 1/2) = 0
This policy is stochastic because the answer of the oracle O is stochastic.
It remains to show that pi is a ν-optimal policy. If V ∗ν (æ<tα) > V ∗ν (æ<tβ), then
λOT (1 | æ<t) > 1/2, thus O(T,æ<t, 1/2) = 1 since O is reflective, and hence pi
takes action α. Conversely, if V ∗ν (æ<tα) < V ∗ν (æ<tβ), then λOT (1 | æ<t) < 1/2,
thus O(T,æ<t, 1/2) = 0 since O is reflective, and hence pi takes action β. Lastly,
if V ∗ν (æ<tα) = V ∗ν (æ<tβ), then both actions are optimal and thus it does not matter
which action is returned by policy pi. (This is the case where the oracle may random-
ize.)
7.2.3 Solution to the Grain of Truth Problem
Together, Proposition 7.18 and Theorem 7.19 provide the necessary ingredients to solve
the grain of truth problem (Problem 7.1).
Corollary 7.21 (Solution to the Grain of Truth Problem). For every lower semicom-
putable prior w ∈ ∆MOrefl the Bayes optimal policy pi∗ξ is reflective-oracle-computable
where ξ is the Bayes-mixture corresponding to w defined in (7.2).
Proof. From Proposition 7.18 and Theorem 7.19.
Hence the environment classMOrefl contains any reflective-oracle-computable modi-
fication of the Bayes optimal policy pi∗
ξ
. In particular, this includes computable multi-
agent environments that contain other Bayesian agents over the class MOrefl. So any
Bayesian agent over the classMOrefl has a grain of truth even though the environment
may contain other Bayesian agents of equal power. We proceed to sketch the implica-
tions for multi-agent environments in the next section.
7.3 Multi-Agent Environments
In a multi-agent environment there are n agents each taking sequential actions from the
finite action space A. In each time step t = 1, 2, . . ., the environment receives action ait
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Figure 7.2: Agents pi1, . . . , pin interacting in a multi-agent environment.
from agent i and outputs n percepts e1t , . . . , ent ∈ E , one for each agent. Each percept
eit = (o
i
t, r
i
t) contains an observation oit and a reward rit ∈ [0, 1]. Importantly, agent i
only sees its own action ait and its own percept eit (see Figure 7.2). We use the shorthand
notation at := (a1t , . . . , ant ) and et := (e1t , . . . , ent ) and denote æi<t = ai1ei1 . . . ait−1eit−1
and æ<t = a1e1 . . . at−1et−1. Formally, multi-agent environments are defined as follows.
Definition 7.22 (Multi-Agent Environment). A multi-agent environment is a function
σ : (An × En)∗ ×An → ∆(En).
Together with the policies pi1, . . . , pin the multi-agent environment σ induces a history
distribution σpi1:n where
σpi1:n() : = 1
σpi1:n(æ1:t) : = σpi1:n(æ<tat)σ(et | æ<tat)
σpi1:n(æ<tat) : = σpi1:n(æ<t)
n∏
i=1
pii(a
i
t | æi<t).
Agent i acts in a subjective environment σi given by joining the multi-agent en-
vironment σ with the policies pi1, . . . , pin and marginalizing over the histories that pii
does not see. Together with policy pii, the environment σi yields a distribution over the
histories of agent i
σpiii (æ
i
<t) :=
∑
æj<t,j 6=i
σpi1:n(æ<t).
We get the definition of the subjective environment σi with the identity σi(eit | æi<tait) :=
σpiii (e
i
t | æi<tait). The subjective environment σi depends on pii because other policies’
actions may depend on the actions of pii. It is crucial to note that the subjective
environment σi and the policy pii are ordinary environments and policies, so we can use
the notation from Chapter 4.
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Our definition of a multi-agent environment is very general and encompasses most
of game theory. It allows for cooperative, competitive, and mixed games; infinitely
repeated games or any (infinite-length) extensive form games with finitely many players.
Example 7.23 (Matching Pennies). In the game of matching pennies there are two
agents (n = 2), and two actions A = {α, β} representing the two sides of a penny. In
each time step agent 1 wins if the two actions are identical and agent 2 wins if the two
actions are different. The payoff matrix is as follows.
α β
α 1,0 0,1
β 0,1 1,0
We use E = {0, 1} to be the set of rewards (observations are vacuous) and define the
multi-agent environment σ to give reward 1 to agent 1 iff a1t = a2t (0 otherwise) and
reward 1 to agent 2 iff a1t 6= a2t (0 otherwise). Formally,
σ(r1t r
2
t | æ<tat) :=

1 if r1t = 1, r2t = 0, a1t = a2t ,
1 if r1t = 0, r2t = 1, a1t 6= a2t , and
0 otherwise.
Let piα denote the policy that always takes action α. If two agents each using policy piα
play matching pennies, agent 1 wins in every step. Formally, setting pi1 := pi2 := piα we
get a history distribution that assigns probability one to the history
αα10αα10 . . . .
The subjective environment of agent 1 is
σ1(r
1
t | æ1<ta1t ) =

1 if r1t = 1, a1t = α,
1 if r1t = 0, a1t = β, and
0 otherwise.
Therefore policy piα is optimal in agent 1’s subjective environment. 3
Definition 7.24 (ε-Best Response). A policy pii acting in multi-agent environment σ
with policies pi1, . . . , pin is an ε-best response after history æi<t iff
V ∗σi(æ
i
<t)− V piiσi (æi<t) < ε.
If at some time step t, all agents’ policies are ε-best responses, we have an ε-
Nash equilibrium. The property of multi-agent systems that is analogous to asymptotic
optimality is convergence to an ε-Nash equilibrium.
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7.4 Informed Reflective Agents
Let σ be a multi-agent environment and let pi∗σ1 , . . . pi
∗
σn be such that for each i the
policy pi∗σi is an optimal policy in agent i’s subjective environment σi. At first glance
this seems ill-defined: The subjective environment σi depends on each policy pi∗σj , which
depends on the subjective environment σj , which in turn depends on the policy pi∗σi .
However, this circular definition actually has a well-defined solution.
Theorem 7.25 (Optimal Multi-Agent Policies). For any reflective-oracle-computable
multi-agent environment σ, the optimal policies pi∗σ1 , . . . , pi
∗
σn exist and are reflective-
oracle-computable.
To prove Theorem 7.25, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 7.26 (Reflective-Oracle-Computability). If the multi-agent environment
σ and the policies pi1, . . . , pin are reflective-oracle-computable, then σpi1:n and σpiii are
reflective-oracle-computable, and σi ∈MOrefl.
Proof. All involved quantities in the definition of σpi1:n are reflective-oracle-computable
by assumption, therefore also their marginalizations σpiii and σi.
Proof of Theorem 7.25. According to Theorem 7.19 the optimal policy pi∗σi in agent i’s
subjective environment is reflective-oracle-computable if the subjective environment σi
is. In particular the process that takes σi in form of a probabilistic Turing machine and
returns pi∗σi is reflective-oracle-computable. Moreover, σi is reflective-oracle-computable
if σ and pi1, . . . , pin are, according to Proposition 7.26. Again, this construction is itself
reflective-oracle-computable. Connecting these two constructions we get probabilistic
Turing machines T1, . . . , Tn ∈ T where each Ti takes the multi-agent environment σ
and pi1, . . . , pin in form of probabilistic Turing machines and returns pi∗σi . We define the
probabilistic Turing machines T ′1, . . . , T ′n where T ′i runs T
O
i on (σ, T
′
1, . . . , T
′
n); hence T ′i
computes pi∗σi . Note that this construction only works because we relied on the reflective
oracle in the proof of Theorem 7.19. Since the machines TOi always halt, so do T
′
i
O
despite their infinitely recursive construction.
Note the strength of Theorem 7.25: each of the policies pi∗σi is acting optimally
given the knowledge of everyone else’s policies. Hence optimal policies play 0-best re-
sponses by definition, so if every agent is playing an optimal policy, we have a Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, this Nash equilibrium is also a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, because each agent also acts optimally on the counterfactual histories that
do not end up being played. In other words, Theorem 7.25 states the existence and
reflective-oracle-computability of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in any reflective-
oracle-computable multi-agent environment. The following immediate corollary states
that these subgame perfect Nash equilibria are limit computable.
Corollary 7.27 (Solution to Computable Multi-Agent Environments). For any com-
putable multi-agent environment σ, the optimal policies pi∗σ1 , . . . , pi
∗
σn exist and are limit
computable.
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Proof. From Theorem 7.25 and Theorem 7.7.
Example 7.28 (Nash Equilibrium in Matching Pennies). Consider the matching pen-
nies game from Example 7.23. The only pair of optimal policies is the pair of two
uniformly random policies that play α and β with equal probability in every time step:
if one of the agents picks a policy that plays one of the actions with probability > 1/2,
then the other agent’s best response is to play the other action with probability 1. But
now the first agent’s policy is no longer a best response. 3
7.5 Learning Reflective Agents
Since our classMOrefl solves the grain of truth problem, the result by Kalai and Lehrer
(1993) immediately implies that for any Bayesian agents pi1, . . . , pin interacting in an
infinitely repeated game and for all ε > 0 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is almost surely a
t0 ∈ N such that for all t ≥ t0 the policy pii is an ε-best response. However, this hinges
on the important fact that every agent has to know the game and also that all other
agents are Bayesian agents. Otherwise the convergence to an ε-Nash equilibrium may
fail, as illustrated by the following example.
At the core of the construction is a dogmatic prior (Section 5.2.2). A dogmatic prior
assigns very high probability to going to hell (reward 0 forever) if the agent deviates
from a given computable policy pi. For a Bayesian agent it is thus only worth deviating
from the policy pi if the agent thinks that the prospects of following pi are very poor
already. This implies that for general multi-agent environments and without additional
assumptions on the prior, we cannot prove any meaningful convergence result about
Bayesian agents acting in an unknown multi-agent environment.
Example 7.29 (Reflective Bayesians Playing Matching Pennies). Consider the multi-
agent environment matching pennies from Example 7.23. Let pi1 be the policy that
takes the action sequence (ααβ)∞ and let pi2 := piα be the policy that always takes
action α. The average reward of policy pi1 is 2/3 and the average reward of policy
pi2 is 1/3. Let ξ be a universal mixture (7.2). By on-policy value convergence (7.4),
V pi1
ξ
→ c1 ≈ 2/3 and V pi2ξ → c2 ≈ 1/3 almost surely when following policies (pi1, pi2).
Therefore there is an ε > 0 such that V pi1
ξ
> ε and V pi2
ξ
> ε for all time steps. Now
we can apply Theorem 5.5 to conclude that there are (dogmatic) mixtures ξ′1 and ξ′2
such that pi∗ξ′1 always follows policy pi1 and pi
∗
ξ′2
always follows policy pi2. This does not
converge to a (ε-)Nash equilibrium. 3
An important property required for the construction in Example 7.29 is that the
environment class contains environments that threaten the agent with going to hell,
which is outside of the class of matching pennies environments. In other words, since
the agent does not know a priori that it is playing a matching pennies game, it might
behave more conservatively than appropriate for the game.
The following theorem is our main convergence result. It states that for asymptot-
ically optimal agents we get convergence to ε-Nash equilibria in any reflective-oracle-
computable multi-agent environment.
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Theorem 7.30 (Convergence to Equilibrium). Let σ be an reflective-oracle-computable
multi-agent environment and let pi1, . . . , pin be reflective-oracle-computable policies that
are asymptotically optimal in mean in the class MOrefl. Then for all ε > 0 and all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the σpi1:n-probability that the policy pii is an ε-best response converges to
1 as t→∞.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Proposition 7.26, the subjective environment σi is
reflective-oracle-computable, therefore σi ∈ MOrefl. Since pii is asymptotically optimal
in mean in the class MOrefl, we get that E[V ∗σi(æ<t) − V piiσi (æ<t)] → 0. Convergence in
mean implies convergence in probability for bounded random variables, hence for all
ε > 0 we have
σpiii [V
∗
σi(æ
i
<t)− V piiσi (æi<t) ≥ ε]→ 0 as t→∞.
Therefore the probability that the policy pii plays an ε-best response converges to 1 as
t→∞.
In contrast to Theorem 7.25 which yields policies that play a subgame perfect equi-
librium, this is not the case for Theorem 7.30: the agents typically do not learn to
predict off-policy and thus will generally not play ε-best responses in the counterfac-
tual histories that they never see. This weaker form of equilibrium is unavoidable if the
agents do not know the environment because it is impossible to learn the parts that
they do not interact with.
Corollary 7.31 (Convergence to Equilibrium). There are limit computable policies
pi1, . . . , pin such that for any computable multi-agent environment σ and for all ε > 0 and
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the σpi1:n-probability that the policy pii is an ε-best response converges
to 1 as t→∞.
Proof. Pick pi1, . . . , pin to be the Thompson sampling policy piT defined in Algorithm 2
over the countable classMOrefl. By Theorem 5.25 these policies are asymptotically op-
timal in mean. By Theorem 7.32 below they are reflective-oracle-computable and by
Theorem 7.7 they are also limit computable. The statement now follows from Theo-
rem 7.30.
Theorem 7.32 (Thompson Sampling is Reflective-Oracle-Computable). The policy piT
defined in Algorithm 2 over the classMOrefl is reflective-oracle-computable.
Proof. The posterior w( · | æ<t) is reflective-oracle-computable by the definition (7.3)
and according to Theorem 7.19 the optimal policies pi∗ν are reflective-oracle-computable.
On resampling steps we can compute the action probabilities of piT by enumerating all
ν ∈MOrefl and computing pi∗ν weighted by the posterior w(ν | æ<t). Between resampling
steps we need to condition the policy piT computed above by the actions it has already
taken since the last resampling step (compare Example 5.28).
Because the posterior w( · | æ<t) is a ξpi-martingale when acting according to the
policy pi, it converges ξpi-almost surely according to the martingale convergence theo-
rem (Theorem 2.8). Since ξ dominates the subjective environment σi, it also converges
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σpii -almost surely (see Example 3.20). Hence all the Thompson sampling agents even-
tually ‘calm down’ and settle on some posterior belief.
According to Theorem 7.30, the policies pi1, . . . , pin only need to be asymptotically
optimal in mean. For Thompson sampling this is independent of the discount function
according to Theorem 5.25 (but the discount function has to be known to the agent).
So the different agents may use different discount functions, resample at different time
steps and converge at different speeds.
Example 7.33 (Thompson Samplers Playing Matching Pennies). Consider the match-
ing pennies game from Example 7.23 and let both agents use the Thompson sampling
policy defined in Algorithm 2, i.e., define pi1 := piT and pi2 := piT .
The value of the uniformly random policy piR is always 1/2, so V ∗σi ≥ V piRσi = 1/2.
According to Theorem 7.30, for every ε > 0, each agent will eventually always play an
ε-best response, i.e., V piiσi > V
∗
σi − ε ≥ 1/2 − ε. Since matching pennies is a zero-sum
game, V pi1σ1 + V
pi2
σ2 = 1, so V
pi2
σ2 = 1− V pi1σ1 < 1/2 + ε.
Therefore each agent will end up randomizing their actions; pii(at | æ<t) ≈ 1/2 most
of the time: If one of the agents (say agent 1) does not sufficiently randomize their
actions in some time steps, then agent 2 could exploit this by picking a deterministic
adversarial policy in those time steps. Suppose that this way it can gain a value of
ε compared to the random policy piR, i.e., V pi2σ2 ≥ V piRσ2 + ε = 1/2 + ε. But this is a
contradiction because then agent 1 is not playing an ε-best response:
V ∗σ1 − V pi1σ1 = V ∗σ1 − 1 + V pi2σ2 ≥ 1/2− 1 + 1/2 + ε = ε 3
7.6 Impossibility Results
Why does our solution to the grain of truth problem not violate the impossibility results
from the literature? Assume we are playing an infinitely repeated game where in the
stage game no agent has a weakly dominant action and the pure action maxmin reward is
strictly less then the minmax reward. The impossibility result of Nachbar (1997, 2005)
states that there is no class of policies Π such that the following are simultaneously
satisfied.
• Learnability. Each agent learns to predict the other agent’s actions.
• Caution and Symmetry. The set Π is closed under simple policy modifications
such as renaming actions.
• Purity. There is an ε > 0 such that for any stochastic policy pi ∈ Π there is a
deterministic policy pi′ ∈ Π such that if pi′(æ<t) = a, then pi(a | æ<t) > ε.
• Consistency. Each agent always has an ε-best response available in Π.
In order to converge to an ε-Nash equilibrium, each agent has to have an ε-best response
available to them, so consistency is our target. Learnability is immediately satisfied for
any environment in our class if we have a dominant prior according to Corollary 4.20.
144 The Grain of Truth Problem
For MOrefl caution and symmetry are also satisfied since this set is closed under any
computable modifications to policies. However, our classMOrefl avoids this impossibility
result because it violates the purity condition: Let T1, T2, . . . be an enumeration of T .
Consider the policy pi that maps history æi<t to the action 1−O(Tt,æi<t, 1/2). If Tt is
deterministic, then pi will take a different action than Tt for any history of length t− 1.
Therefore no deterministic reflective-oracle-computable policy can take an action that
pi assigns positive probability to in every time step.
Foster and Young (2001) present a condition that makes convergence to a Nash
equilibrium impossible: if the player’s rewards are perturbed by a small real number
drawn from some continuous density ν, then for ν-almost all realizations the players do
not learn to predict each other and do not converge to a Nash equilibrium. For example,
in a matching pennies game, rational agents randomize only if the (subjective) values
of both actions are exactly equal. But this happens only with ν-probability zero, since
ν is a density. Thus with ν-probability one the agents do not randomize. If the agents
do not randomize, they either fail to learn to predict each other, or they are not acting
rationally according to their beliefs: otherwise they would seize the opportunity to
exploit the other player’s deterministic action.
But this does not contradict our convergence result: the class MOrefl is countable
and each ν ∈ MOrefl has positive prior probability. Perturbation of rewards with ar-
bitrary real numbers is not possible. Even more, the argument given by Foster and
Young (2001) cannot work in our setting: the Bayesian mixture ξ mixes over λT for all
probabilistic Turing machines T . For Turing machines T that sometimes do not halt,
the oracle decides how to complete λT into a measure λT . Thus the oracle has enough
influence on the exact values in the Bayesian mixture that the values of two actions in
matching pennies can be made exactly equal.
7.7 Discussion
This chapter introduced the class of all reflective-oracle-computable environmentsMOrefl.
This class fully solves the grain of truth problem (Problem 7.1) because it contains (any
computable modification of) Bayesian agents defined overMOrefl: the optimal agents and
Bayes optimal agents over the class are all reflective-oracle-computable (Theorem 7.19
and Corollary 7.21).
If the environment is unknown, then a Bayesian agent may end up playing subop-
timally (Example 7.29). However, if each agent uses a policy that is asymptotically
optimal in mean (such as the Thompson sampling policy from Section 4.3.4) then for
every ε > 0 the agents converge to an ε-Nash equilibrium (Theorem 7.30 and Corol-
lary 7.31).
However, Corollary 7.31 does not imply that two Thompson sampling policies will
converge to cooperation in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma since always defecting is also
a Nash equilibrium. The exact outcome will depend on the priors involved and the
randomness of the policies.
Our solution to the grain of truth problem is purely theoretical. However, Theo-
rem 7.7 shows that our classMOrefl allows for computable approximations. This suggests
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that practical approaches can be derived from this result, and reflective oracles have
already seen applications in one-shot games (Fallenstein et al., 2015b).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The biggest existential risk is that future superintelligences stop simulating us.
— Nick Bostrom
Today computer programs exceeding humans in general intelligence are known only
from science fiction. But research on AI has progressed steadily over the last decades
and there is good reason to believe that we will be able to build HLAI eventually, and
even sooner than most people think (Müller and Bostrom, 2016).
The advent of strong AI would be the biggest event in human history. Potential
benefits are huge, as the new level of automation would free us from any kind of un-
desirable labor. But there is no reason to believe that humans are at the far end of
the intelligence spectrum. Rather, humans barely cross the threshold for general intel-
ligence to be able to use language and do science. Once we engineer HLAI, it seems
unlikely that progress is going to stop; why not build even smarter machines?
This could lead to an intelligence explosion (Good, 1965; Vinge, 1993; Kurzweil,
2005; Chalmers, 2010; Hutter, 2012a; Schmidhuber, 2012; Muehlhauser and Salamon,
2012; Eden et al., 2013; Shanahan, 2015; Eden, 2016; Walsh, 2016): a (possibly very
rapid) increase in intelligence, e.g., through self-amplification effects from AIs improving
themselves (if doing AI research is one of humans’ capabilities, then a machine that can
do everything humans can do can also do AI research). Once machine intelligence is
above or far above human level, machines would steer the course of history. There is no
reason to believe that machines would be adversarial to us, but nevertheless humanity’s
fate might rest at the whims of the machines, just as chimpanzees today have no say
in the large-scale events on this planet.
Bostrom (2002) defines:
Existential risk — One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate
Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its
potential.
Existential risks are events that have the power to extinguish human life as we know
it. Examples are cosmic events such as an asteroid colliding with Earth. But cosmic
events are unlikely on human timescales compared to human-made existential risks from
nuclear weapons, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology.
It is possible that artificial intelligence also falls into this category. Vinge (1993)
was the first person to recognize this:
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Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create super-
human intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended.
After Vinge, Yudkowsky (2001, 2008) can be regarded as one of the key people to
popularize the potential dangers of AI technology. Bostrom (2003) picked up on this
issue very early and gave the topic credibility through his well-researched and carefully
written book Superintelligence (Bostrom, 2014). He argues that we need to solve the
Control Problem—the unique principal-agent problem that arises with the creation of
strong AI (Bostrom, 2014, Ch. 9). In other words: How do we align strong AI with
human values? How do we ensure that AI remains robust and beneficial? This research
is collected under the umbrella term AI safety . Currently, we have no idea how to solve
these problems even in theory.
Through Yudkowsky’s and, more importantly, Bostrom’s efforts, AI-related long-
term safety concerns have now entered the mainstream media. In 2014 high-profile
scientists such as Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek
have warned against the dangers posed by AI (Hawking et al., 2014). (See also Alexan-
der (2015) for a collection of positions by prominent AI researchers.) Many scientists
inside and outside the field have signed an open letter that research ensuring that AI
systems remain robust and beneficial is both important and timely (Future of Life In-
stitute, 2015c). This lead entrepreneur Elon Musk to donate $10 million to kick-start
research in this field (Future of Life Institute, 2015a); most of this money has now
been distributed across the planet to 37 different projects (Future of Life Institute,
2015b). Moreover, the Future of Life Institute and the Machine Intelligence Research
Institute have formulated concrete technical research priorities to make AI more robust
and beneficial (Soares and Fallenstein, 2014; Russell et al., 2015).
At the end of 2015 followed the announcement of OpenAI, a nonprofit organization
with financial backing from several famous silicon valley billionaires (OpenAI, 2015):
OpenAI is a non-profit artificial intelligence research company. Our goal
is to advance digital intelligence in the way that is most likely to benefit
humanity as a whole, unconstrained by a need to generate financial return.
The mission of OpenAI is to enable everyone to benefit from AI technology. But, despite
the name, OpenAI is not committed to publish all of their research freely, and Bostrom
(2016) argues that unrestricted publication might not be the best idea.
Despite all of the recent efforts in AI safety research, critical voices within the AI
community remain. Prominently, Davis (2014), Ng (2016), Walsh (2016), and Lawrence
(2016) have proposed counterarguments that range from ‘HLAI is so far away that any
worry is misplaced’ to claims that ‘the safety problem would not be so hard’. See Sotala
and Yampolskiy (2014) for a discussion.
If AI poses an existential risk then a formal theory of strong AI is paramount to
develop technical approaches to mitigate this risk. Which path will ultimately lead us
to HLAI is in the realm of speculation at this time; therefore we should make as few and
as weak assumptions as possible and abstract away from possible future implementation
details.
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This thesis lays some of the groundwork for this endeavor. We built on top of Hut-
ter’s theory of universal artificial intelligence. Chapter 3 discussed the formal theory of
learning. Chapter 4 presented several approaches to acting in unknown environments
(Bayes, Thompson sampling, knowledge-seeking agents, and BayesExp). Chapter 5
analysed these approaches and discussed notions of optimality and principled prob-
lems with acting under uncertainty in general environment. Chapter 6 provided the
mathematical tools to analyze the computational properties of these models. Finally,
Chapter 7 solved the grain of truth problem, which lead to convergence to Nash equi-
libria in unknown general multi-agent environments.
Our work is theoretical by nature and there is still a long way to go until these
results make their way into applications. But a solution in principle is a crucial first
step towards solving a problem in practice. Consider the research paper by Shannon
(1950) on how to solve chess in principle. The algorithm he describes expands the full
game tree of chess (until some specified depth), which is completely infeasible even with
today’s computation power. His contribution was to show that winning at chess is a
feat that computers can achieve in principle, which was not universally accepted at the
time. Even more, his approach already considered the correct ideas (minimax-search
over the game tree) that ultimately lead to the defeat of the chess champion Garry
Kasparov by the computer Deep Blue 46 years later (IBM, 2012a).
The theory of general reinforcement learning can serve and has served as a starting
point for future investigation in AI safety. In particular, value learning (Dewey, 2011),
self-reflection (Soares, 2015; Fallenstein et al., 2015b), self-modification (Orseau and
Ring, 2011, 2012a; Everitt et al., 2016), interruptibility (Orseau and Armstrong, 2016;
Armstrong and Orseau, 2016), decision theory (Everitt et al., 2015), memory manip-
ulation (Orseau and Ring, 2012b), wireheading (Ring and Orseau, 2011; Everitt and
Hutter, 2016), and questions of identity (Orseau, 2014b,c).
It is possible that HLAI is decades or centuries away. It might also be a few years
around the corner. Whichever is the case, we are currently completely unprepared for
the consequences. As an AI researcher, it is tempting to devote your life to increasing
the capability of AI, advancing it domain after domain, and showing off with flashy
demos and impressive victories over human contestants. But every technology incurs
risks, and the more powerful the technology, the higher the risks. The potential power
of AI technology is enormous, and correspondingly we need to consider the risks, take
them seriously, and proceed to mitigate them.
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Appendix A
Measures and Martingales
In this chapter we provide the proofs for Theorem 3.18 and Theorem 3.19.
Proof of Theorem 3.18. Xt is only undefined if P (Γv1:t) = 0. The set
{v ∈ Σ∞ | ∃t. P (Γv1:t) = 0}
has P -measure 0 and hence (Xt)t∈N is well-defined almost everywhere.
Xt is constant on Γu for all u ∈ Σt, and Ft is generated by a collection of finitely
many disjoint sets:
Σ∞ =
⊎
u∈Σt
Γu.
(a) Therefore Xt is Ft-measurable.
(b) Γu =
⊎
a∈Σ Γua for all u ∈ Σt and v ∈ Γu, and therefore
E[Xt+1 | Ft](v) = 1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) =
1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Q(Γua)
P (Γua)
P (Γua)
(∗)
=
1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Q(Γua) =
Q(Γu)
P (Γu)
= Xt(v).
At (∗) we used the fact that P is locally absolutely continuous with respect to Q.
(If P were not locally absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then there are cases
where P (Γu) > 0, P (Γua) = 0, and Q(Γua) 6= 0. Therefore Xt+1(ua) does not
contribute to the expectation and thus Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) = 0 6= Q(Γua).)
P ≥ 0 and Q ≥ 0 by definition, thus Xt ≥ 0. Since P (Γ) = Q(Γ) = 1, we have
E[X0] = 1.
The following lemma gives a convenient condition for the existence of a measure on
(Σω,F∞). It is a special case of the Daniell-Kolmogorov Extension Theorem (Rogers
and Williams, 1994, Thm. 26.1).
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Lemma A.1 (Extending measures). Let q : Σ∗ → [0, 1] be a function such that q() = 1
and
∑
a∈Σ q(ua) = q(u) for all u ∈ Σ∗. Then there exists a unique probability measure
Q on (Σ∞,F∞) such that q(u) = Q(Γu) for all u ∈ Σ∗.
To prove this lemma, we need the following two ingredients.
Definition A.2 (Semiring). A set R ⊆ 2Ω is called semiring over Ω iff
(a) ∅ ∈ R,
(b) for all A,B ∈ R, the set A ∩B ∈ R, and
(c) for all A,B ∈ R, there are pairwise disjoint sets C1, . . . , Cn ∈ R such that A \B =⊎n
i=1Ci.
Theorem A.3 (Carathéodory’s Extension Theorem; Durrett, 2010, Thm. A.1.1). Let
R be a semiring over Ω and let µ : R → [0, 1] be a function such that
(a) µ(Ω) = 1 (normalization),
(b) µ(
⊎n
i=1Ai) =
∑n
i=1 µ(Ai) for pairwise disjoint sets A1, . . . , An ∈ R such that⊎n
i=1Ai ∈ R (finite additivity), and
(c) µ(
⋃
i≥0Ai) ≤
∑
i≥0 µ(Ai) for any collection (Ai)i≥0 such that each Ai ∈ R and⋃
i≥0Ai ∈ R (σ-subadditivity).
Then there is a unique extension µ of µ that is a probability measure on (Ω, σ(R)) such
that µ(A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ R.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We show the existence of Q using Carathéodory’s Extension The-
orem. Define R := {Γu | u ∈ Σ∗} ∪ {∅}.
(a) ∅ ∈ R.
(b) For any Γu,Γv ∈ R, either
• u is a prefix of v and Γu ∩ Γv = Γv ∈ R, or
• v is a prefix of u and Γu ∩ Γv = Γu ∈ R, or
• Γu ∩ Γv = ∅ ∈ R.
(c) For any Γu,Γv ∈ R,
• Γu \ Γv =
⊎
w∈Σ|v|−|u|\{x} Γuw if v = ux, i.e., u is a prefix of v, and
• Γu \ Γv = ∅ otherwise.
Therefore R is a semiring. By definition of R, we have σ(R) = F∞.
The function q : Σ∗ → [0, 1] naturally gives rise to a function µ : R → [0, 1] with
µ(∅) := 0 and µ(Γu) := q(u) for all u ∈ Σ∗. We will now check the prerequisites of
Carathéodory’s Extension Theorem.
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(a) (Normalization.) µ(Σ∞) = µ(Γ) = q() = 1.
(b) (Finite additivity.) Let Γu1 , . . . ,Γuk ∈ R be pairwise disjoint sets such that Γw :=⊎k
i=1 Γui ∈ R. Let ` := max{|ui| | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, then Γw =
⊎
v∈Σ` Γwv. By
assumption,
∑
a∈Σ q(ua) = q(u), thus
∑
a∈Σ µ(Γua) = µ(Γu) and inductively we
have
µ(Γui) =
∑
s∈Σ`−|ui|
µ(Γuis), (A.1)
and
µ(Γw) =
∑
v∈Σ`
µ(Γwv). (A.2)
For every string v ∈ Σ`, the concatenation wv ∈ Γw =
⊎k
i=1 Γui , so there is a
unique i such that wv ∈ Γui . Hence there is a unique string s ∈ Σ`−|ui| such that
wv = uis. Together with (A.1) and (A.2) this yields
µ
(
k⊎
i=1
Γui
)
= µ(Γw) =
∑
v∈Σ`
µ(Γwv) =
k∑
i=1
∑
s∈Σ`−|ui|
µ(Γuis) =
k∑
i=1
µ(Γui).
(c) (σ-subadditivity.) We will show that each Γu is compact with respect to the topol-
ogy O generated by R. σ-subadditivity then follows from (b) because every count-
able union is in fact a finite union.
We will show that the topology O is the product topology of the discrete topology
on Σ. (This establishes that (Σω,O) is a Cantor Space.) Every projection pik :
Σ∞ → Σ selecting the k-th symbol is continuous, since pi−1k (a) =
⋃
u∈Σk−1 Γua for
every a ∈ Σ. Moreover, O is the coarsest topology with this property, since we can
generate every open set Γu ∈ R in the base of the topology by
Γu =
|u|⋂
i=1
pi−1i ({ui}).
The set Σ is finite and thus compact. By Tychonoff’s Theorem, Σ∞ is also compact.
Therefore Γu is compact since it is homeomorphic to Σ∞ via the canonical map
βu : Σ
∞ → Γu, v 7→ uv.
From (a), (b), and (c) Carathéodory’s Extension Theorem yields a unique probability
measure Q on (Σ∞,F∞) such that Q(Γu) = µ(Γu) = q(u) for all u ∈ Σ∗.
Using Lemma A.1, the proof of Theorem 3.19 is now straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 3.19. We define a function q : Σ∗ → R, with
q(u) := X|u|(v)P (Γu)
for any v ∈ Γu. The choice of v is irrelevant because X|u| is constant on Γu since it is
Ft-measurable. In the following, we also write Xt(u) if |u| = t to simplify notation.
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The function q is non-negative because Xt and P are both non-negative. Moreover,
for any u ∈ Σt,
1 = E[Xt] =
∫
Σ∞
XtdP ≥
∫
Γu
XtdP = P (Γu)Xt(u) = q(u).
Hence the range of q is a subset of [0, 1].
We have q() = X0()P (Γ) = E[X0] = 1 since P is a probability measure and
F0 = {∅,Σ∞} is the trivial σ-algebra. Let u ∈ Σt.∑
a∈Σ
q(ua) =
∑
a∈Σ
Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) =
∫
Γu
Xt+1dP
=
∫
Γu
E[Xt+1 | Ft]dP =
∫
Γu
XtdP = P (Γu)Xt(u) = q(u).
By Lemma A.1, there is a probability measure Q on (Σ∞,F∞) such that q(u) = Q(Γu)
of all u ∈ Σ∗. Therefore, for all v ∈ Σ∞ and for all t ∈ N with P (Γv1:t) > 0,
Xt(v) =
q(v1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
=
Q(Γv1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
.
Moreover, P is locally absolutely continuous with respect to Q since P (Γu) = 0 implies
Q(Γu) = q(u) = X|u|(u)P (Γu) = 0.
Bibliography
Shipra Agrawal and Navin Goyal. Analysis of Thompson sampling for the multi-armed
bandit problem. In Conference on Learning Theory, 2011.
Scott Alexander. AI researchers on AI risk. http://slatestarcodex.com/2015/05/
22/ai-researchers-on-ai-risk/, May 2015. Accessed: 2016-04-25.
Stuart Armstrong and Laurent Orseau. Interruptibility and corrigibility for AIXI and
Monte Carlo agents. 2016. To appear.
Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga, and John Hawthorne. Bayesianism, infinite decisions,
and binding. Mind, 113(450):251–283, 2004.
Peter Auer, Thomas Jaksch, and Ronald Ortner. Near-optimal regret bounds for re-
inforcement learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
89–96, 2009.
Peter Auer, Thomas Jaksch, and Ronald Ortner. Near-optimal regret bounds for rein-
forcement learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 11:1563–1600, 2010.
Leemon Baird. Residual algorithms: Reinforcement learning with function approxima-
tion. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 30–37, 1995.
Jacob D Bekenstein. Universal upper bound on the entropy-to-energy ratio for bounded
systems. Physical Review D, 23(2):287, 1981.
Marc G Bellemare, Yavar Naddaf, Joel Veness, and Michael Bowling. The arcade
learning environment: An evaluation platform for general agents. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research, 47:253–279, 2013.
Marc G Bellemare, Georg Ostrovski, Arthur Guez, Philip S Thomas, and Rémi Munos.
Increasing the action gap: New operators for reinforcement learning. In AAAI, 2016.
Yoshua Bengio, Patrice Simard, and Paolo Frasconi. Learning long-term dependencies
with gradient descent is difficult. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 5(2):157–
166, 1994.
Dimitri P Bertsekas and John Tsitsiklis. Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control.
Athena Scientific, 1995.
Christopher M Bishop. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. Springer, 2006.
David Blackwell and Lester Dubins. Merging of opinions with increasing information.
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, pages 882–886, 1962.
155
156 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Nick Bostrom. Existential risks. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9(1):1–31, 2002.
Nick Bostrom. Ethical issues in advanced artificial intelligence. Science Fiction and
Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, pages 277–284, 2003.
Nick Bostrom. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press,
2014.
Nick Bostrom. Strategic implications of openness in AI development. Technical re-
port, Future of Humanity Institute, 2016. http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/
openness.pdf.
Michael Bowling and Manuela Veloso. Rational and convergent learning in stochastic
games. In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1021–1026,
2001.
Sébastien Bubeck and Cesa-Nicolò Bianchi. Regret analysis of stochastic and non-
stochastic multi-armed bandit problems. Foundations and Trends in Machine Learn-
ing, 5(1):1–122, 2012.
Lucian Busoniu, Robert Babuska, and Bart De Schutter. A comprehensive survey
of multiagent reinforcement learning. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, 38(2):156–172, 2008.
Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi and Gábor Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
David Chalmers. The singularity: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 17(9-10):7–65, 2010.
Olivier Chapelle and Lihong Li. An empirical evaluation of Thompson sampling. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2249–2257, 2011.
Paul Christiano, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Marcello Herreshoff, and Mihaly Barasz. Defin-
ability of truth in probabilistic logic. Technical report, Machine Intelligence Research
Institute, 2013. https://intelligence.org/files/DefinabilityTruthDraft.pdf.
Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley &
Sons, 2nd edition, 2006.
Mayank Daswani. Generic Reinforcement Learning Beyond Small MDPs. PhD thesis,
Australian National University, 2015.
Mayank Daswani and Jan Leike. A definition of happiness for reinforcement learning
agents. In Artificial General Intelligence, pages 231–240. Springer, 2015.
Ernest Davis. Ethical guidelines for a superintelligence. Technical report, New York
University, 2014. https://cs.nyu.edu/davise/papers/Bostrom.pdf.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 157
Adam Day. Increasing the gap between descriptional complexity and algorithmic proba-
bility. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 363(10):5577–5604, 2011.
Richard Dearden, Nir Friedman, and Stuart Russell. Bayesian Q-learning. In AAAI,
pages 761–768, 1998.
Daniel Dewey. Learning what to value. In Artificial General Intelligence, pages 309–314.
Springer, 2011.
Joseph L. Doob. Stochastic Processes. Wiley, New York, 1953.
Finale Doshi-Velez. Bayesian Nonparametric Approaches for Reinforcement Learning
in Partially Observable Domains. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2012.
Rick Durrett. Probability: Theory and Examples. Cambridge University Press, 4th
edition, 2010.
Amnon H Eden. The singularity controversy. Technical report, Sapience Project, 2016.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.05977.
Amnon H Eden, James H Moor, Johnny H Søraker, and Eric Steinhart, editors. Sin-
gularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment. Springer, 2013.
Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter. Avoiding wireheading with value reinforcement learn-
ing. In Artificial General Intelligence, pages 12–22, 2016.
Tom Everitt, Jan Leike, and Marcus Hutter. Sequential extensions of causal and ev-
idential decision theory. In Algorithmic Decision Theory, pages 205–221. Springer,
2015.
Tom Everitt, Daniel Filan, Mayank Daswani, and Marcus Hutter. Self-modification of
policy and utility function in rational agents. In Artificial General Intelligence, 2016.
Benja Fallenstein, Nate Soares, and Jessica Taylor. Reflective variants of Solomonoff
induction and AIXI. In Artificial General Intelligence. Springer, 2015a.
Benja Fallenstein, Jessica Taylor, and Paul F Christiano. Reflective oracles: A founda-
tion for game theory in artificial intelligence. In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction,
pages 411–415. Springer, 2015b.
Benja Fallenstein, Jessica Taylor, and Paul F Christiano. Reflective oracles: A foun-
dation for classical game theory. Technical report, Machine Intelligence Research
Institute, 2015c. http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04145.
Daniel Filan. Agents using speed priors. Honours thesis, Australian National University,
October 2015.
Daniel Filan, Jan Leike, and Marcus Hutter. Loss bounds and time complexity for
speed priors. In Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2016.
158 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jakob N Foerster, Yannis M Assael, Nando de Freitas, and Shimon Whiteson. Learning
to communicate to solve riddles with deep distributed recurrent Q-networks. Tech-
nical report, University of Oxford, 2016. http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02672.
Dean P Foster and H Peyton Young. On the impossibility of predicting the behavior
of rational agents. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98(22):12848–
12853, 2001.
Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT press,
1998.
Future of Life Institute. Elon musk donates $10m to keep AI beneficial. http://
futureoflife.org/misc/AI, January 2015a. Accessed: 2015-03-28.
Future of Life Institute. 2015 project grants recommended for funding. http:
//futureoflife.org/first-ai-grant-recipients/, 2015b. Accessed: 2016-03-28.
Future of Life Institute. Research priorities for robust and beneficial artificial intel-
ligence: An open letter. http://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/, January
2015c. Accessed: 2016-04-26.
John Gittins. Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 148–177, 1979.
Irving John Good. The paradox of confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, pages 145–149, 1960.
Irving John Good. Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machine. Advances
in Computers, 6:31–88, 1965.
Irving John Good. The white shoe is a red herring. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 17(4):322–322, 1967.
Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. Deep learning. Book in prepa-
ration for MIT Press, http://www.deeplearningbook.org, 2016.
Google. The latest chapter for the self-driving car: mastering
city street driving. http://googleblog.blogspot.com.au/2014/04/
the-latest-chapter-for-self-driving-car.html, April 2014. Accessed:
2015-03-27.
Google. What we learned in Seoul with AlphaGo. https://googleblog.blogspot.
com.au/2016/03/what-we-learned-in-seoul-with-alphago.html, March 2016.
Accessed: 2016-03-28.
Aditya Gopalan and Shie Mannor. Thompson sampling for learning parameterized
Markov decision processes. In Conference on Learning Theory, pages 861–898, 2015.
Geoffrey J Gordon. Reinforcement learning with function approximation converges to
a region. In Advanced in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2001.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 159
Peter D. Grünwald. The Minimum Description Length Principle. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, 2007.
Péter Gács. On the relation between descriptional complexity and algorithmic proba-
bility. Theoretical Computer Science, 22(1):71–93, 1983.
Kurt Gödel. Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und ver-
wandter Systeme I. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38(1):173–198, 1931.
Trevor Hastie, Robert Tibshirani, and Jerome Friedman. The Elements of Statistical
Learning. Springer, 2nd edition, 2009.
Matthew Hausknecht and Peter Stone. Deep recurrent Q-learning for partially observ-
able MDPs. In 2015 AAAI Fall Symposium Series, 2015.
Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek. Transcend-
ing complacency on superintelligent machines. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephen-hawking/artificial-intelligence_b_5174265.html, April 2014. Ac-
cessed: 2015-03-28.
Nicholas J Hay. Universal semimeasures: An introduction. Master’s thesis, University
of Auckland, 2007.
Nicolas Heess, Jonathan J Hunt, Timothy P Lillicrap, and David Silver. Memory-based
control with recurrent neural networks. Technical report, Google DeepMind, 2015.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04455.
Johannes Heinrich and David Silver. Deep reinforcement learning from self-play in
imperfect-information games. Technical report, DeepMind, 2016. http://arxiv.
org/abs/1603.01121.
Matthias Heizmann, Daniel Dietsch, Jan Leike, Betim Musa, and Andreas Podelski.
Ultimate Automizer with array interpolation (competition contribution). In Tools and
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, pages 455–457. Springer,
2015.
Matthias Heizmann, Daniel Dietsch, Marius Greitschus, Jan Leike, Betim Musa, Claus
Schätzle, and Andreas Podelski. Ultimate Automizer with two-track proofs (compe-
tition contribution). In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of
Systems, pages 950–953. Springer, 2016.
Carl G Hempel. Studies in the logic of confirmation (I.). Mind, pages 1–26, 1945.
Carl G Hempel. The white shoe: No red herring. The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 18(3):239–240, 1967.
Marcus Hutter. A theory of universal artificial intelligence based on algorithmic com-
plexity. Technical report, 2000. http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.AI/0004001.
160 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marcus Hutter. Universal sequential decisions in unknown environments. In European
Workshop on Reinforcement Learning, pages 25–26, 2001a.
Marcus Hutter. New error bounds for Solomonoff prediction. Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, 62(4):653–667, 2001b.
Marcus Hutter. Self-optimizing and Pareto-optimal policies in general environments
based on Bayes-mixtures. In Computational Learning Theory, pages 364–379.
Springer, 2002a.
Marcus Hutter. The fastest and shortest algorithm for all well-defined problems. In-
ternational Journal of Foundations of Computer Science, 13(03):431–443, 2002b.
Marcus Hutter. A gentle introduction to the universal algorithmic agent AIXI. Technical
report, IDSIA, 2003. ftp://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/techrep/IDSIA-01-03.ps.gz.
Marcus Hutter. Universal Artificial Intelligence. Springer, 2005.
Marcus Hutter. Sequential predictions based on algorithmic complexity. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 72(1):95–117, 2006a.
Marcus Hutter. General discounting versus average reward. In Algorithmic Learning
Theory, pages 244–258. Springer, 2006b.
Marcus Hutter. 50’000€ prize for compressing human knowledge. http://prize.
hutter1.net/, 2006c. Accessed: 2015-03-29.
Marcus Hutter. Universal algorithmic intelligence: A mathematical top→down ap-
proach. In Artificial General Intelligence, pages 227–290. Springer, 2007a.
Marcus Hutter. On universal prediction and Bayesian confirmation. Theoretical Com-
puter Science, 384(1):33–48, 2007b.
Marcus Hutter. Discrete MDL predicts in total variation. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pages 817–825, 2009a.
Marcus Hutter. Open problems in universal induction & intelligence. Algorithms, 3(2):
879–906, 2009b.
Marcus Hutter. Feature dynamic Bayesian networks. In Artificial General Intelligence,
pages 67–73. Atlantis Press, 2009c.
Marcus Hutter. Feature reinforcement learning: Part I: Unstructured MDPs. Journal
of Artificial General Intelligence, 1:3–24, 2009d.
Marcus Hutter. Can intelligence explode? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(1–2):
143–166, 2012a.
Marcus Hutter. One decade of universal artificial intelligence. In Theoretical Founda-
tions of Artificial General Intelligence, pages 67–88. Springer, 2012b.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 161
Marcus Hutter. Extreme state aggregation beyond MDPs. In Algorithmic Learning
Theory. Springer, 2014.
Marcus Hutter and Andrej A. Muchnik. On semimeasures predicting Martin-Löf ran-
dom sequences. Theoretical Computer Science, 382(3):247–261, 2007.
IBM. Deep Blue. http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/
deepblue/, March 2012a. Accessed: 2015-03-27.
IBM. A computer called Watson. http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/
en/icons/watson/, March 2012b. Accessed: 2015-03-27.
Edwin T Jaynes. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Sham Machandranath Kakade. On the Sample Complexity of Reinforcement Learning.
PhD thesis, University College London, 2003.
Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Economet-
rica, pages 1019–1045, 1993.
Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer. Weak and strong merging of opinions. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 23(1):73–86, 1994.
Emilie Kaufmann, Nathaniel Korda, and Rémi Munos. Thompson sampling: An asymp-
totically optimal finite-time analysis. In Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 199–213.
Springer, 2012.
HJ Kim, Michael I Jordan, Shankar Sastry, and Andrew Y Ng. Autonomous helicopter
flight via reinforcement learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems, page None, 2003.
Stephen Cole Kleene. Introduction to Metamathematics. Wolters-Noordhoff Publishing,
1952.
Tejas D Kulkarni, Karthik R Narasimhan, Ardavan Saeedi, and Joshua B Tenenbaum.
Hierarchical deep reinforcement learning: Integrating temporal abstraction and in-
trinsic motivation. Technical report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.06057.
Ray Kurzweil. The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. Viking
Books, 2005.
Tor Lattimore. Theory of General Reinforcement Learning. PhD thesis, Australian
National University, 2013.
Tor Lattimore. Regret analysis of the finite-horizon Gittins index strategy for multi-
armed bandits. In Conference on Learning Theory, 2016.
162 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tor Lattimore and Marcus Hutter. Asymptotically optimal agents. In Algorithmic
Learning Theory, pages 368–382. Springer, 2011.
Tor Lattimore and Marcus Hutter. PAC bounds for discounted MDPs. In Algorithmic
Learning Theory, pages 320–334. Springer, 2012.
Tor Lattimore and Marcus Hutter. On Martin-Löf convergence of Solomonoff’s mixture.
In Theory and Applications of Models of Computation, volume 7876, pages 212–223.
Springer, 2013.
Tor Lattimore and Marcus Hutter. General time consistent discounting. Theoretical
Computer Science, 519:140–154, 2014.
Tor Lattimore and Marcus Hutter. On Martin-Löf (non-)convergence of Solomonoff’s
universal mixture. Theoretical Computer Science, 588:2–15, 2015.
Tor Lattimore, Marcus Hutter, and Vaibhav Gavane. Universal prediction of selected
bits. In Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 262–276. Springer, 2011.
Neil Lawrence. Future of AI 6. Discussion of ‘Superintelligence: Paths,
Dangers, Strategies’. http://inverseprobability.com/2016/05/09/
machine-learning-futures-6, May 2016. Accessed: 2016-05-10.
Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. Deep learning. Nature, 521(7553):
436–444, 2015.
Shane Legg. Is there an elegant universal theory of prediction? In Algorithmic Learning
Theory, pages 274–287, 2006.
Shane Legg. Machine Super Intelligence. PhD thesis, University of Lugano, 2008.
Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter. A collection of definitions of intelligence. Frontiers in
Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 157:17–24, 2007a.
Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter. Universal intelligence: A definition of machine intelli-
gence. Minds & Machines, 17(4):391–444, 2007b.
Shane Legg and Joel Veness. An approximation of the universal intelligence measure. In
Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence,
pages 236–249. Springer, 2013.
Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. Merging and learning. Statistics, Probability and
Game Theory, pages 147–168, 1996.
Jan Leike and Matthias Heizmann. Ranking templates for linear loops. In Tools and
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, pages 172–186. Springer,
2014a.
Jan Leike and Matthias Heizmann. Geometric series as nontermination arguments
for linear lasso programs. Technical report, University of Freiburg, 2014b. http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1405.4413.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 163
Jan Leike and Matthias Heizmann. Ranking templates for linear loops. Logical Methods
in Computer Science, 11(1):1–27, March 2015.
Jan Leike and Matthias Heizmann. Geometric nontermination arguments. 2016. Under
preparation.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. Indefinitely oscillating martingales. In Algorithmic
Learning Theory, pages 321–335, 2014a.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. Indefinitely oscillating martingales. Technical report,
Australian National University, 2014b. http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.3169.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. On the computability of AIXI. In Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence, pages 464–473, 2015a.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. On the computability of Solomonoff induction and
knowledge-seeking. In Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 364–378, 2015b.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. Bad universal priors and notions of optimality. In
Conference on Learning Theory, pages 1244–1259, 2015c.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. Solomonoff induction violates Nicod’s criterion. In
Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 349–363. Springer, 2015d.
Jan Leike and Marcus Hutter. On the computability of Solomonoff induction and AIXI.
2016. Under review.
Jan Leike, Tor Lattimore, Laurent Orseau, and Marcus Hutter. Thompson sampling is
asymptotically optimal in general environments. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelli-
gence, 2016a.
Jan Leike, Jessica Taylor, and Benya Fallenstein. A formal solution to the grain of
truth problem. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2016b.
Leonid A Levin. On the notion of a random sequence. Soviet Mathematics Doklady, 14
(5):1413–1416, 1973.
Ming Li and Paul M. B. Vitányi. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its
Applications. Texts in Computer Science. Springer, 3rd edition, 2008.
Yitao Liang, Marlos C Machado, Erik Talvitie, and Michael Bowling. State of the art
control of Atari games using shallow reinforcement learning. In Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems, 2016.
Timothy P Lillicrap, Jonathan J Hunt, Alexander Pritzel, Nicolas Heess, Tom Erez,
Yuval Tassa, David Silver, and Daan Wierstra. Continuous control with deep rein-
forcement learning. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2016.
John L Mackie. The paradox of confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, pages 265–277, 1963.
164 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Omid Madani, Steve Hanks, and Anne Condon. On the undecidability of probabilis-
tic planning and infinite-horizon partially observable Markov decision problems. In
AAAI, pages 541–548, 1999.
Omid Madani, Steve Hanks, and Anne Condon. On the undecidability of probabilistic
planning and related stochastic optimization problems. Artificial Intelligence, 147
(1):5–34, 2003.
Sridhar Mahadevan. Optimality criteria in reinforcement learning. In AAAI Fall Sym-
posium on Learning Complex Behaviors in Adaptive Intelligent Systems, 1996.
Patrick Maher. Inductive logic and the ravens paradox. Philosophy of Science, pages
50–70, 1999.
A Rupam Mahmood, Huizhen Yu, Martha White, and Richard Sutton. Emphatic
temporal-difference learning. Technical report, University of Alberta, 2015. http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1507.01569.
Norman Margolus and Lev B Levitin. The maximum speed of dynamical evolution.
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 120(1):188–195, 1998.
Jarryd Martin, Tom Everitt, and Marcus Hutter. Death and suicide in universal artifi-
cial intelligence. In Artificial General Intelligence, 2016.
John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude Shannon. A proposal
for the Dartmouth summer research project on artificial intelligence. 1955.
Ronald I Miller and Chris William Sanchirico. The role of absolute continuity in “merg-
ing of opinions” and “rational learning”. Games and Economic Behavior, 29(1):170–
190, 1999.
Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Alex Graves, Ioannis Antonoglou,
Daan Wierstra, and Martin Riedmiller. Playing Atari with deep reinforcement learn-
ing. Technical report, Google DeepMind, 2013. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5602.
Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A Rusu, Joel Veness,
Marc G Bellemare, Alex Graves, Martin Riedmiller, Andreas K Fidjeland, Georg Os-
trovski, Stig Petersen, Charles Beattie, Amir Sadik, Ioannis Antonoglou, Helen King,
Dharshan Kumaran, Daan Wierstra, Shane Legg, and Demis Hassabis. Human-level
control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518(7540):529–533, 2015.
Volodymyr Mnih, Adrià Puigdomènech Badia, Mehdi Mirza, Alex Graves, Timothy P
Lillicrap, Tim Harley, David Silver, and Koray Kavukcuoglu. Asynchronous methods
for deep reinforcement learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning,
2016.
Luke Muehlhauser and Anna Salamon. Intelligence explosion: Evidence and import.
In Singularity Hypotheses, pages 15–42. Springer, 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 165
Martin Mundhenk, Judy Goldsmith, Christopher Lusena, and Eric Allender. Complex-
ity of finite-horizon Markov decision process problems. Journal of the ACM, 47(4):
681–720, 2000.
Markus Müller. Stationary algorithmic probability. Theoretical Computer Science, 411
(1):113–130, 2010.
Vincent C Müller and Nick Bostrom. Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey
of expert opinion. Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, pages 553–571, 2016.
John H Nachbar. Prediction, optimization, and learning in repeated games. Economet-
rica, 65(2):275–309, 1997.
John H Nachbar. Beliefs in repeated games. Econometrica, 73(2):459–480, 2005.
Arun Nair, Praveen Srinivasan, Sam Blackwell, Cagdas Alcicek, Rory Fearon, Alessan-
dro De Maria, Vedavyas Panneershelvam, Mustafa Suleyman, Charles Beattie, Stig
Petersen, Shane Legg, Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, and David Silver. Mas-
sively parallel methods for deep reinforcement learning. Technical report, Google
DeepMind, 2015. http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.04296.
Andrew Ng. Is A.I. an existential threat to humanity? https://www.quora.com/
Is-A-I-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/answer/Andrew-Ng, January 2016.
Accessed: 2016-05-19.
Phuong Nguyen, Odalric-Ambrym Maillard, Daniil Ryabko, and Ronald Ortner. Com-
peting with an infinite set of models in reinforcement learning. In Artificial Intelli-
gence and Statistics, pages 463–471, 2013.
Jean Nicod. Le Problème Logique de L’Induction. Presses Universitaires de France,
1961.
André Nies. Computability and Randomness. Oxford University Press, 2009.
James Olds and Peter Milner. Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation
of septal area and other regions of rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, 47(6):419, 1954.
Stephen M Omohundro. The basic AI drives. In Artificial General Intelligence, pages
483–492, 2008.
OpenAI. About OpenAI. https://openai.com/about/, December 2015. Accessed:
2016-04-27.
Laurent Orseau. Optimality issues of universal greedy agents with static priors. In
Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 345–359. Springer, 2010.
Laurent Orseau. Universal knowledge-seeking agents. In Algorithmic Learning Theory,
pages 353–367. Springer, 2011.
166 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Laurent Orseau. Asymptotic non-learnability of universal agents with computable hori-
zon functions. Theoretical Computer Science, 473:149–156, 2013.
Laurent Orseau. Universal knowledge-seeking agents. Theoretical Computer Science,
519:127–139, 2014a.
Laurent Orseau. The multi-slot framework: A formal model for multiple, copiable AIs.
In Artificial General Intelligence, pages 97–108. Springer, 2014b.
Laurent Orseau. Teleporting universal intelligent agents. In Artificial General Intelli-
gence, pages 109–120. Springer, 2014c.
Laurent Orseau and Stuart Armstrong. Safely interruptible agents. In Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence, pages 557–566, 2016.
Laurent Orseau and Mark Ring. Self-modification and mortality in artificial agents. In
Artificial General Intelligence, pages 1–10. Springer, 2011.
Laurent Orseau and Mark Ring. Space-time embedded intelligence. In Artificial General
Intelligence, pages 209–218. Springer, 2012a.
Laurent Orseau and Mark Ring. Memory issues of intelligent agents. In Artificial
General Intelligence, pages 219–231. Springer, 2012b.
Laurent Orseau, Tor Lattimore, and Marcus Hutter. Universal knowledge-seeking
agents for stochastic environments. In Algorithmic Learning Theory, pages 158–172.
Springer, 2013.
Pedro A Ortega and Daniel A Braun. A minimum relative entropy principle for learning
and acting. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, pages 475–511, 2010.
Pedro A Ortega and Daniel A Braun. Generalized Thompson sampling for sequential
decision-making and causal inference. Complex Adaptive Systems Modeling, 2(1):2,
2014.
Ian Osband, Dan Russo, and Benjamin van Roy. (More) efficient reinforcement learning
via posterior sampling. In Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 3003–3011,
2013.
Christos H Papadimitriou and John N Tsitsiklis. The complexity of Markov decision
processes. Mathematics of Operations Research, 12(3):441–450, 1987.
Martin L Puterman. Markov Decision Processes. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
Samuel Rathmanner and Marcus Hutter. A philosophical treatise of universal induction.
Entropy, 13(6):1076–1136, 2011.
Mark Ring and Laurent Orseau. Delusion, survival, and intelligent agents. In Artificial
General Intelligence, pages 11–20. Springer, 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 167
Chris Rogers and David Williams. Diffusions, Markov Processes, and Martingales:
Volume 1, Foundations. Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1994.
Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey, and Max Tegmark. Research priorities for robust and
beneficial artificial intelligence. Technical report, Future of Life Institute, 2015. http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1602.03506.
Stuart J Russell and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence. A Modern Approach. Prentice
Hall, 3rd edition, 2010.
Daniil Ryabko. Characterizing predictable classes of processes. In Uncertainty in Arti-
ficial Intelligence, pages 471–478, 2009.
Daniil Ryabko. On finding predictors for arbitrary families of processes. The Journal
of Machine Learning Research, 11:581–602, 2010.
Daniil Ryabko. On the relation between realizable and nonrealizable cases of the se-
quence prediction problem. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2161–
2180, 2011.
Daniil Ryabko and Marcus Hutter. On sequence prediction for arbitrary measures. In
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pages 2346–2350, 2007.
Daniil Ryabko and Marcus Hutter. Predicting non-stationary processes. Applied Math-
ematics Letters, 21(5):477–482, 2008.
Régis Sabbadin, Jérôme Lang, and Nasolo Ravoanjanahry. Purely epistemic Markov
decision processes. In AAAI, pages 1057–1062, 2007.
Tom Schaul, John Quan, Ioannis Antonoglou, and David Silver. Prioritized experience
replay. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2016.
Jürgen Schmidhuber. The speed prior: A new simplicity measure yielding near-optimal
computable predictions. In Computational Learning Theory, pages 216–228. Springer,
2002.
Jürgen Schmidhuber. Philosophers & futurists, catch up! Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 19(1-2):173–182, 2012.
Jürgen Schmidhuber. Deep learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural Networks,
61:85–117, 2015.
Murray Shanahan. The Technological Singularity. MIT Press, 2015.
Claude E Shannon. Programming a computer for playing chess. The London, Edinburgh,
and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 41(314):256–275, 1950.
Joseph R Shoenfield. Mathematical Logic. Addison-Wesley Reading, 1967.
Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-
Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
168 BIBLIOGRAPHY
David Silver, Aja Huang, Chris J Maddison, Arthur Guez, Laurent Sifre, George van den
Driessche, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Veda Panneershelvam, Marc
Lanctot, Sander Dieleman, Dominik Grewe, John Nham, Nal Kalchbrenner, Ilya
Sutskever, Timothy Lillicrap, Madeleine Leach, Koray Kavukcuoglu, Thore Graepel,
and Demis Hassabis. Mastering the game of Go with deep neural networks and tree
search. Nature, 529(7587):484–489, 2016.
Satinder Singh, Michael L Littman, Nicholas K Jong, David Pardoe, and Peter Stone.
Learning predictive state representations. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, pages 712–719, 2003.
Satinder Singh, Michael R James, and Matthew R Rudary. Predictive state represen-
tations: A new theory for modeling dynamical systems. In Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence, pages 512–519, 2004.
Nate Soares. Formalizing two problems of realistic world-models. Technical report,
Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 2015. http://intelligence.org/files/
RealisticWorldModels.pdf.
Nate Soares and Benja Fallenstein. Aligning superintelligence with human interests: A
technical research agenda. Technical report, Machine Intelligence Research Institute,
2014. http://intelligence.org/files/TechnicalAgenda.pdf.
Ray Solomonoff. A formal theory of inductive inference. Parts 1 and 2. Information
and Control, 7(1):1–22 and 224–254, 1964.
Ray Solomonoff. Complexity-based induction systems: Comparisons and convergence
theorems. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 24(4):422–432, 1978.
Kaj Sotala and Roman V Yampolskiy. Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: A survey.
Physica Scripta, 90(1):018001, 2014.
Tom F Sterkenburg. Putnam’s diagonal argument and the impossibility of a universal
learning machine. Technical report, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, 2016. http:
//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12096/.
Jordan M Stoyanov. Counterexamples in Probability. Courier Corporation, 3rd edition,
2013.
Malcolm Strens. A Bayesian framework for reinforcement learning. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, pages 943–950, 2000.
Peter Sunehag and Marcus Hutter. Consistency of feature Markov processes. In Algo-
rithmic Learning Theory, pages 360–374. Springer, 2010.
Peter Sunehag and Marcus Hutter. Optimistic agents are asymptotically optimal. In
Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 15–26. Springer, 2012a.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 169
Peter Sunehag and Marcus Hutter. Optimistic AIXI. In Artificial General Intelligence,
pages 312–321. Springer, 2012b.
Peter Sunehag and Marcus Hutter. Rationality, optimism and guarantees in general
reinforcement learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 16:1345–1390, 2015.
Richard Sutton. Learning to predict by the methods of temporal differences. Machine
Learning, 3(1):9–44, 1988.
Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction.
MIT Press, 1998.
Richard G Swinburne. The paradoxes of confirmation: A survey. American Philosoph-
ical Quarterly, pages 318–330, 1971.
Csaba Szepesvári. Algorithms for Reinforcement Learning. Morgan & Claypool Pub-
lishers, 2010.
Gerald Tesauro. Temporal difference learning and TD-Gammon. Communications of
the ACM, 38(3):58–68, 1995.
William R Thompson. On the likelihood that one unknown probability exceeds another
in view of the evidence of two samples. Biometrika, pages 285–294, 1933.
John N Tsitsiklis and Benjamin Van Roy. An analysis of temporal-difference learning
with function approximation. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 42(5):674–
690, 1997.
Alexandre Tsybakov. Introduction to Nonparametric Estimation. Springer, 2008.
Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, and David Silver. Deep reinforcement learning with
double Q-learning. In AAAI, 2016.
Joel Veness, Kee Siong Ng, Marcus Hutter, William Uther, and David Silver. A Monte-
Carlo AIXI approximation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 40(1):95–142,
2011.
Joel Veness, Marc G Bellemare, Marcus Hutter, Alvin Chua, and Guillaume Desjardins.
Compress and control. In AAAI, 2015.
Vernor Vinge. The coming technological singularity. Vision 21: Interdisciplinary Sci-
ence and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace, 1:11–22, 1993. http://www.rohan.
sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html.
Paul MB Vitányi, Frank J Balbach, Rudi L Cilibrasi, and Ming Li. Normalized in-
formation distance. In Information Theory and Statistical Learning, pages 45–82.
Springer, 2009.
Nikos Vlassis, Mohammad Ghavamzadeh, Shie Mannor, and Pascal Poupart. Bayesian
reinforcement learning. In Marco Wiering and Martijn van Otterlo, editors, Rein-
forcement Learning, pages 359–386. Springer, 2012.
170 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Peter BM Vranas. Hempel’s raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard Bayesian solution.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(3):545–560, 2004.
Toby Walsh. The singularity may never be near. Technical report, University of New
South Wales, 2016. http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.06462.
Ziyu Wang, Nando de Freitas, Tom Schaul, Matteo Hessel, Hado van Hasselt, and
Marc Lanctot. Dueling network architectures for deep reinforcement learning. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2016.
Larry Wasserman. All of Statistics. Springer, 2004.
Christopher JCH Watkins and Peter Dayan. Q-learning. Machine learning, 8(3-4):
279–292, 1992.
Eric W Weisstein. Random walk—1-dimensional. In MathWorld—A Wolfram
Web Resource. Wolfram Research, Inc., 2002. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
RandomWalk1-Dimensional.html.
Marco Wiering and Martijn van Otterlo, editors. Reinforcement Learning. Springer,
2012.
Ian Wood, Peter Sunehag, and Marcus Hutter. (Non-)equivalence of universal priors.
In Solomonoff 85th Memorial Conference, pages 417–425. Springer, 2011.
Huizhen Yu. On convergence of emphatic temporal-difference learning. In Conference
on Learning Theory, pages 1724–1751, 2015.
Eliezer Yudkowsky. Creating friendly AI 1.0: The analysis and design of benevolent
goal architectures. Technical report, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence,
2001.
Eliezer Yudkowsky. Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global
risk. In Global Catastrophic Risks, pages 308–345. Oxford University Press, 2008.
Tom Zahavy, Nir Ben Zrihem, and Shie Mannor. Graying the black box: Understanding
DQNs. Technical report, Israel Institute of Technology, 2016. http://arxiv.org/
abs/1602.02658.
Jacob Ziv and Abraham Lempel. A universal algorithm for sequential data compression.
IEEE Transactions on information theory, 23(3):337–343, 1977.
List of Notation
Abbreviations
AIXI Bayesian RL agent with a Solomonoff prior, see Section 4.3.1
AI artificial intelligence
HLAI human-level artificial intelligence
MDL minimum description length, see Example 3.14
MDP Markov decision process, see Section 4.1.3
POMDP partially observable Markov decision process, see Section 4.1.3
RL reinforcement learning
UTM universal Turing machine, Section 2.4
Mathematical notation
:= defined to be equal
:∈ defined to be an element of
A, B, Ω sets
#A the cardinality of the set A, i.e., the number of elements
∆Ω the set of probability distributions over a finite or countable set Ω
1x the characteristic function that is 1 for x and 0 otherwise.
f , g functions
f
×≥ g there is a constant c > 0 such that f ≥ cg
f ×= g f
×≥ g and g ×≥ f
N the set of natural numbers, starting with 1
Q the set of rational numbers
R the set of real numbers
n, k, t, m, i, j natural numbers
t (current) time step, t ∈ N
k some other time step, k ∈ N
q, q′ rational numbers
r real number
X a finite nonempty alphabet
X ∗ the set of all finite strings over the alphabet X
X∞ the set of all infinite strings over the alphabet X
X ] X ] := X ∗ ∪ X∞, the set of all finite and infinite strings over the
alphabet X
x, y, z (typically finite) strings from X ]
x<t the first t− 1 symbols of the string x
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